State v. Kaufmann

[Cite as State v. Kaufmann, 2023-Ohio-3528.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHTABULA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2023-A-0008

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Civil Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas

DAVID M. KAUFMANN,
Trial Court No. 2020 CR 00358
Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION

Decided: September 29, 2023
Judgment: Affirmed

Colleen M. O’Toole, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Christopher R. Fortunato,
Assistant Prosecutor, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Plaintiff-
Appellee).

Joseph R. Klammer, The Klammer Law Office, LTD, The Historic Mentor Center Street
School, 7482 Center Street, Unit 6, Mentor, OH 44060 (For Defendant-Appellant).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

{¶1} Appellant, David M. Kaufmann, appeals the judgment of the Ashtabula

County Court of Common Pleas, denying his petition for post-conviction relief without a

hearing. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

{¶2} Appellant was indicted on three counts of gross sexual imposition, felonies

of the fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) and R.C. 2907.05(C)(1); he was

also indicted on one count of gross sexual imposition, a misdemeanor of the third degree,

in violation of R.C. 2907.06(A)(4) and R.C. 2907.06(C). He pleaded not guilty to the
charges. He later withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered into a plea of guilty to two

counts of felony-four gross sexual imposition. At the plea hearing, the prosecutor advised

the court that the following occurred:

Your Honor, there were two different victims and two different
dates. The first, Your Honor, he had gotten into the shower
with the victim who was then 16, and they were showering
together; both were nude. During this time, he would get an
erection and at times cuddle with her in the shower.
The other girl, who was 13 at the time, indicated she was
having difficulty shaving other pubic hair. [Sic.] He proceeded
to again get into the shower naked with her, assist her in
shaving her, and they would wash with a washcloth her private
areas.
{¶3} Upon receiving the state’s factual basis, the trial court asked appellant if he

agreed with the state's recitation. Appellant’s counsel responded with the following:

{¶4} “Judge, as you heard the conversation between me and [the prosecutor]

earlier, there's already been admissions, and an agreement by everybody who would be

involved in this case, that that behavior did happen. We were discussing whether or not -

- he showered with the girls and he did shave them. That’s what happened.”

{¶5} The trial court then asked defense counsel whether appellant admitted the

conduct, to which counsel stated, “[H]e does.” Appellant interjected, stating: “And I -- from

day one, I admitted that there was a responsibility to take care of, yes. But --.” Defense

counsel cut appellant off, stating: “That's enough.”

{¶6} The trial court ultimately sentenced appellant to an 18-month term of

imprisonment for each count, to be served consecutively to one another.

{¶7} Appellant appealed his conviction to this court arguing, inter alia, his trial

counsel was ineffective for admitting conduct that was beyond that for which he was

charged. In particular, he asserted counsel misrepresented, on record, that he shaved
2

Case No. 2023-A-0008
and showered with both victims when, in fact, he was alleged to have assisted in shaving

just one of the victims. Appellant claimed this misrepresentation influenced the trial judge

to sentence him to maximum, consecutive sentences. This court rejected appellant’s

argument and affirmed the trial court on September 30, 2022. See State v. Kaufmann,

11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2022-A-0011, 2022-Ohio-3487 (“Kaufmann I”).

{¶8} On November 7, 2022, appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief

alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel premised upon evidence dehors the record.

The state opposed the motion and the trial court denied the same without a hearing. This

appeal followed.

{¶9} Appellant’s first assignment of error provides:

{¶10} “The trial court erred in denying the petition for post-conviction relief.”

{¶11} Under this assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred in

denying his petition without a hearing because he presented sufficient evidence dehors

the record of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. Specifically, appellant contends trial

counsel was likely on criminal probation during the pendency of the matter and was

sentenced to drug and alcohol treatment. Trial counsel “effectively disappear[ed]” during

the pendency of the underlying matter due to some unspecified “condition.” Trial counsel

allegedly forged a power of attorney on appellant’s behalf, “demonstrating a deteriorating

condition of trial counsel.” And, in a separate case, trial counsel was found ineffective in

a post-conviction relief proceeding, near the same time counsel was representing

appellant, based on evidence submitted dehors the record.

{¶12} Appellant further asserts the discovery provided by the state included no

allegations of force or threat of force as required by R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), yet trial counsel

3

Case No. 2023-A-0008
encouraged appellant to plead guilty at the last minute. And trial counsel improperly

assured appellant that he would be sentenced to probation, yet appellant received the

maximum, consecutive sentences for the crimes to which he pleaded guilty.

{¶13} In light of the cumulative nature of the above allegations, which he

maintains involve evidence dehors the record, appellant claims that he was deprived of

effective assistance of counsel and the trial court erred in denying his petition based upon

the doctrine of res judicata.

{¶14} In State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶

58, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “a trial court’s decision granting or denying a

postconviction petition filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 should be upheld absent an abuse

of discretion[.]” See also State v. Martin, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2017-T-0014, 2018-

Ohio-3244, ¶ 20 (affirming the dismissal of a petition without a hearing).

{¶15} In GondorI, at ¶ 51, the Supreme Court made clear that in matters relating

to postconviction relief, the trial court’s decision should be given deference:

In postconviction cases, a trial court has a gatekeeping role
as to whether a defendant will even receive a hearing. In State
v. Calhoun (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 714 N.E.2d 905,
paragraph two of the syllabus, this court held that a trial court
could dismiss a petition for postconviction relief without a
hearing “where the petition, the supporting affidavits, the
documentary evidence, the files, and the records do not
demonstrate that petitioner set forth sufficient operative facts
to establish substantive grounds for relief.” This court
reversed the judgment of the appellate court
in Calhoun, holding that “the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the credibility of [the] affidavits,” which
served as the basis for his petition. * * * Id. at 286, 714 N.E.2d
905.

(Emphasis omitted.)

4

Case No. 2023-A-0008
 {¶16} “When, however, a trial court denies a petition by operation of law, e.g., by

application of the doctrine of res judicata, this court’s review is de novo.” State v. Butcher,

11th Dist. Portage No. 2013-P-0090, 2014-Ohio-4302, ¶ 6, citing Zamos v. Zamos, 11th

Dist. Portage No. 2008-P-0021, 2009-Ohio-1321, ¶ 14, and State v. Prade, 2014-Ohio-

1035, 9 N.E.3d 1072, ¶ 18 (procedural defects in a petition for postconviction relief, such

as one that is barred by res judicata, are reviewed on appeal de novo). That said, “‘a

criminal defendant seeking to challenge his conviction through a petition for

postconviction relief is not automatically entitled to a hearing.’” State v. Burke, 11th Dist.

Trumbull No. 2020-T-0013, 2020-Ohio-5474, ¶ 15, quoting Calhoun at 282, citing State

v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 443 N.E.2d 169 (1982). “‘Before granting an evidentiary hearing

on the petition, the trial court shall determine whether there are substantive grounds for

relief[.]’” (Emphasis omitted.) Burke at ¶ 15, quoting Calhoun at 282-283.

{¶17} R.C. 2953.21, Ohio’s postconviction relief statute, states, in pertinent part:

(A)(1)(a) A person in any of the following categories may file
a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the
grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate
or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other
appropriate relief:
(i) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense
or adjudicated a delinquent child and who claims that there
was such a denial or infringement of the person's rights as to
render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio
Constitution or the Constitution of the United States;
***
(D) * * * Before granting a hearing on a petition filed under
division (A)(1)(a) * * * of this section, the court shall determine
whether there are substantive grounds for relief. In making
such a determination, the court shall consider, in addition to
the petition, the supporting affidavits, and the documentary
evidence, all the files and records pertaining to the
proceedings against the petitioner[.]
5

Case No. 2023-A-0008
 ***
(F) Unless the petition and the files and records of the case
show the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the court shall
proceed to a prompt hearing on the issues * * * [.]

{¶18} “In a petition for post-conviction relief, which asserts ineffective assistance

of counsel, the petitioner bears the initial burden to submit evidentiary documents

containing sufficient operative facts to demonstrate the lack of competent counsel and

that the defense was prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness.” State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio

St.2d 107, 413 N.E.2d 819 (1980), at syllabus. “In order to prevail on an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must demonstrate that trial counsel’s

performance fell ‘below an objective standard of reasonable representation and, in

addition, prejudice arises from counsel’s performance.’” State v. Andrus, 11th Dist.

Ashtabula No. 2019-A-0082, 2020-Ohio-6810, ¶ 60, quoting State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio

St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶19} Further, a petition for post-conviction relief may be dismissed without an

evidentiary hearing when the claims raised are barred by the doctrine of res

judicata. State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 180, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967). Application of

the doctrine of res judicata prevents relitigation of issues that were already decided by a

court and litigation of matters that should have been brought in a previous action. State

v. McDonald, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2003-L-155, 2004-Ohio-6332, ¶ 21. “‘When a defendant

is represented by different counsel at trial and on direct appeal, res judicata ordinarily

bars the relitigation of any ineffective assistance of counsel claims that could have been

raised on direct appeal without reference to evidence dehors the record.’” State v.

Palmer, 2018-Ohio-1486, 110 N.E.3d 981, (9th Dist.), ¶ 11, quoting State v. Pannell, 9th

6

Case No. 2023-A-0008
Dist. Wayne No. 98CA0034, 1999 WL 25618, *2 (Jan. 20, 1999), citing State v. Lentz, 70

Ohio St.3d 527, 639 N.E. 2d 784 (1994), syllabus.

{¶20} “‘A claim is not barred by the operation of res judicata to the extent a

petitioner sets forth competent, relevant, and material evidence dehors the record.’” State

v. Vinson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-L-088, 2008-Ohio-3059, ¶ 32, quoting State v.

Delmonico, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2004-A-0033, 2005-Ohio-2882, ¶ 14 (citation

omitted); see also Cole 2 Ohio St.3d at 114. “Generally, the introduction in an R.C.

2953.21 petition of evidence dehors the record of ineffective assistance of counsel is

sufficient, if not to mandate a hearing, at least to avoid dismissal on the basis of res

judicata.” Cole at 114.

{¶21} “To be genuinely relevant, the evidence dehors the record must materially

advance the petitioner’s claim and ‘meet some threshold standard of

cogency.’” Delmonico, at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Schlee, 11th Dist. Lake No. 97-L-121,

1998 WL 964291, *2 (Dec. 31, 1998). “In the absence of such a standard, it would be too

easy for the petitioner to simply attach as exhibits ‘evidence which is only marginally

significant and does not advance the petitioner’s claim beyond mere hypothesis and a

desire for further discovery.’” State v. Sopjack, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 96-G-2004, 1997

WL 585904, *3 (Aug. 22, 1997), quoting State v. Coleman, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

900811, 1993 WL 74756, *7 (Mar. 17, 1993).

{¶22} With respect to appellant’s contentions regarding counsel’s possible

criminal probation, drug and alcohol treatment, and purported unexplained absence, we

fail to see how any of these factors in any necessary way impeded counsel’s

effectiveness. Simply because counsel may have been on criminal probation and

7

Case No. 2023-A-0008
sentenced to treatment does not imply his representation was deficient. And appellant

does not provide any evidence that counsel was somehow impaired during his active

representation (whether in court or outside of court). Further, even if counsel was

inexplicably absent at some point during the pendency of appellant’s case, the record

reflects he was present at each hearing and that appellant was satisfied with counsel’s

representation. This evidence, while dehors the record, is premised upon speculation

regarding counsel’s ability to fairly and reasonably represent appellant and thus fails to

materially advance appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness. Indeed, it is unclear how the

evidence, without more to buttress the speculative claim of counsel’s alleged

“deterioration” is even relevant to counsel’s assistance in the underlying matter.

{¶23} In an additional effort to demonstrate trial counsel’s representation was

ineffective due to some unspecified “deteriorating condition,” appellant submitted what he

describes as a power of attorney in which counsel purportedly forged appellant’s initials.

Assuming counsel inscribed appellant’s initials without his knowledge or consent,

appellant asserts this document provides evidence that counsel had impaired judgment

in his capacity as appellant’s criminal attorney. We cannot agree.

{¶24} Appellant’s claim is not linked directly to counsel’s representation or

recommendations in the underlying matter. The assertion has no bearing on whether

appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his plea. As a result, any

arguable or alleged concern with counsel’s “condition” (as it relates to the power of

attorney) cannot operate as a basis for an ineffectiveness claim at the change-of-plea

stage in this case.

8

Case No. 2023-A-0008
 {¶25} Next, appellant contends that the bill of particulars submitted by the state

failed to suggest that appellant’s actions, which led to the indictment, were committed

with force or threat of force. In this respect, appellant asserts counsel was ineffective for

recommending appellant plead guilty rather than test the state’s evidence at trial and

possibly obtain a jury instruction on a lesser included offense of misdemeanor sexual

imposition.

{¶26} In Kaufmann I, 2022-Ohio-3487, at ¶ 13, this court emphasized:

“[t]he mere fact that, if not for the alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel, the defendant would not have entered
a guilty plea [is] not sufficient to establish the requisite
connection between the guilty plea and the ineffective
assistance. * * * Rather, ineffective assistance of trial counsel
is found to have affected the validity of a guilty plea when it
precluded a defendant from entering his plea knowingly and
voluntarily.” (Emphasis removed.) [State v.] Madeline, [11th
Dist. Trumbull No. 2000-T-0156, 2002 WL 445036, *3 (Mar
22, 2002)], citing State v. Sopjack, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 93-
G-1826, 1995 WL 869968, *4, citing State v. Haynes, 11th
Dist. Trumbull No. 93-T-4911, 1995 WL 237075, at 4-5. This
court has explained that “by entering a plea of guilty, appellant
waived the right to contest the effectiveness of his
representation prior to the entry of the guilty plea if it did not
cause less than a knowing and voluntary plea.” Haynes,
supra, at *1; see, also, Madeline, supra. “As a general
proposition, the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that a guilty
plea ‘represents a break in the chain of events which has
preceded it in the criminal process.’” Haynes,
supra, quoting State v. Spates, 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 272[,595
N.E.2d 351,] (1992).

{¶27} Furthermore, in Kaufmann I, at ¶ 15-16, appellant challenged counsel’s

effectiveness which necessitated an analysis of the validity of appellant’s plea of guilty.

After reviewing the record and, most importantly the transcript of the change-of-plea

hearing, this court observed:

9

Case No. 2023-A-0008
 A plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt to the
allegations in the indictment. Crim.R. 11(B)(1). By implication,
a valid guilty plea represents a complete admission to the
state’s rendition of the facts upon which the charges are
based and which it represents it would prove had the matter
proceeded to trial. Appellant does not dispute the state’s
factual allegations. And, during the plea hearing, the trial court
requested appellant to read portions of his plea agreement
regarding his waiver of rights and his admission to the
offenses at issue. The trial court confirmed appellant
understood the rights he was waiving and that he understood
and had no questions about the effect of the plea; namely, that
he admitted to committing the offenses at issue.

We perceive no basis to conclude appellant’s plea was not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. In this
respect, counsel was not ineffective during the plea process.

{¶28} Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, a “‘decision of a reviewing court in a

case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent

proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels.’” State v. Akemon, 173 Ohio

App.3d 709, 2007-Ohio-6217, 880 N.E.2d 143, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.), quoting Nolan v. Nolan,

11 Ohio St.3d 1, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984). Without cogent, relevant, and material evidence

dehors the record to impugn the validity of appellant’s plea of guilty, it remains valid and

binding law of the underlying case.

{¶29} With the foregoing in mind, the bill of particulars, which was appended to

appellant’s petition, seems to, for the most part, recite the indictment. And the indictment,

as is not uncommon, fails to elucidate how the state intended to prove the element of

force or threat of force. Still, both trial counsel’s discovery demand and request for a bill

of particulars were in the record. Furthermore, the state’s bill of particulars is also in the

record. Appellant’s argument does not undermine the validity of his guilty plea. Rather,

it relates to an aspect of counsel’s representation which occurred prior to appellant’s plea

10

Case No. 2023-A-0008
of guilt. Any potential argument relating to counsel’s ineffectiveness vis-à-vis his

investigation of the evidence on the substantive element of force or threat of force was

consequently waived via appellant’s valid plea of guilty.

{¶30} As an adjunct to the above argument, appellant also contends the

indictment suggests that one of the victims could have been an adult at the time the

crimes took place. He notes that if the victims were both below the age of majority, the

type of force or threat of force could be more easily established via circumstantial

evidence. If, however, one of the victims was an adult, such proof becomes more difficult.

As such, he concludes, counsel was ineffective for failing to fully explore the victim’s ages.

We disagree.

{¶31} At the plea hearing, the prosecutor, during his factual recitation, stated that

one victim was 16 and one was 13. There was no objection to these factual

representations. With this point in mind, counsel could have made the strategic decision

to recommend accepting the plea of guilty, knowing, as appellate counsel for appellant

observes, that force or threat of force as that element relates to victims under the age of

majority is easier for the state to establish than if the victims were of majority age. See,

e.g., State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 58, 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988). (There is coercion

inherent in parental authority or one in loco parentis where sexual abuse of a child occurs.

Such coercion can be subtle and psychological.)1 Regardless, appellant’s argument

relating to the relative age of one of the victims did not affect the knowing, intelligent and

1. Although Eskridge was a rape case, the force element needed to prove the offense of gross sexual
imposition is the same as it is for rape. See State v. Riggs, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-1279, 2005-Ohio-
5244, ¶ 20. And Ohio courts routinely apply the Eskridge-force analysis to gross-sexual-imposition cases.
Id., citing cases from various Ohio appellate districts.
11

Case No. 2023-A-0008
voluntary character of the plea. As a result, as with the previous argument, appellant

waived this challenge by entering a valid guilty plea.

{¶32} Next, appellant asserts counsel promised him he would be sentenced to

probation rather than prison. As a result, and in light of the maximum, consecutive terms

he received, he argues counsel was ineffective. We do not agree.

{¶33} Appellant attached a printed photograph of a text exchange he had with trial

counsel regarding prospective sentences. The messages indicate they were sent just

prior to appellant’s sentencing hearing. During the dialogue, appellant asks, “Are you

confident that we’re going into a situation that’s going to be probation[?]” To which

counsel responded, “Yes less the victims. Never heard a word from the girls or their mom

ever.” Counsel’s representation indicates he is “confident” that appellant might receive

probation. Counsel’s representation was conditional and merely advances an opinion,

not a guarantee. We therefore conclude counsel did not promise appellant he would

receive probation.

{¶34} Moreover, at the change-of-plea hearing, the trial court advised appellant of

the minimum and maximum prison terms it could impose. The trial court also advised

appellant that there is no mandatory presumption for prison. Nevertheless, the trial court

emphasized that the nature and duration of the sentence was within the court’s “sole

discretion.” Appellant acknowledged he understood.

{¶35} Appellant was aware that probation was possible, but also aware he could

be sent to prison for up to 18 months on each count to which he pleaded guilty. Counsel’s

representations, while hopeful, cannot be viewed as a promise that appellant would

receive probation, especially in light of the court’s advisements at the change-of-plea

12

Case No. 2023-A-0008
hearing. Counsel’s performance cannot be deemed deficient based upon the

representation that he was “confident” that appellant would receive probation.

{¶36} Appellant next notes that, in the context of a guilty plea, a party need only

show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.

52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Appellant then cites the United States

Supreme Court decision in Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 198

L.Ed.2d 476 (2017). Pursuant to Lee, appellant contends that, in the context of an

ineffectiveness claim, “[t]he decision whether to plead guilty * * * involves assessing the

respective consequences of a conviction after trial and by plea. * * * When those

consequences are, from the defendant’s perspective, similarly dire, even the smallest

chance of success at trial may look attractive.” Id. at 367. Lee addressed a situation in

which a defendant was wrongly advised that he was not subject to mandatory deportation

in relationship to his plea of guilty and is therefore inapposite and distinguishable.

{¶37} In Lee, the defendant was able to demonstrate deficient performance via

inaccurate advice pertaining to mandatory deportation. Here, there is nothing to suggest

that counsel’s advice was inherently or necessarily inaccurate—appellant simply received

an unfavorable sentence after entering a valid guilty plea. Moreover, Lee principally

addresses the prejudice prong of the ineffective-assistance analysis in the context of a

mandatory-deportation case. The Court noted that when the inquiry is focused on what

the individual defendant would have done, the possibility of even a highly unlikely result

may be relevant to the extent it would have affected the defendant’s decision. Lee at 368.

The Court observed that “[c]ourts should not upset a plea solely because of post

13

Case No. 2023-A-0008
hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s

deficiencies.” Id. at 369. Rather, they should “look to contemporaneous evidence to

substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences.” Id. In effect, the holding in Lee is

premised upon the recognition that mandatory deportation and imprisonment is inherently

different than mere imprisonment alone. The Court’s resolution of Lee as well as its

predecessors and progeny are narrow and specific to the circumstances of a defense

attorney’s wrong advice relating to mandatory deportation. Facts unrelated to this case.

{¶38} Next, appellant appears to argue that counsel was ineffective for failure to

file a motion to sever the offenses for purposes of trial. As discussed above, however,

by pleading guilty, appellant waived the ability to contest any arguable errors other than

those that affect the validity of his guilty plea. We fail to see how failing to file a motion to

sever in any way impacted the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary character of the plea.

{¶39} Finally, appellant draws this court’s attention to a separate case in which a

petition for post-conviction relief was granted based upon evidence dehors the record

wherein trial counsel represented a different defendant. Simply because a petition in

another case was granted on ineffective assistance grounds does not imply counsel was

ineffective in this case. Indeed, it is unclear how the separate case is relevant to the

matter sub judice. As detailed throughout this opinion, we fail to discern from the filings

attached to appellant’s petition that counsel’s representation was deficient such that

appellant suffered prejudice. The separate case has no direct bearing on this conclusion.

{¶40} Appellant did present some evidence dehors the record in support of his

claim of ineffective assistance. As discussed above, however, the evidence does not

materially advance his claim. Because we conclude appellant failed to establish

14

Case No. 2023-A-0008
substantial grounds for relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, we

additionally conclude the trial court was not required to hold a hearing on the petition.

{¶41} Appellant’s first assignment of error lacks merit.

{¶42} Appellant’s second assignment of error provides:

{¶43} “Trial court erred in failing to explain the denial of the petition for post-

conviction relief.”

{¶44} Under this assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court failed to

provide adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law for proper appellate review. We

do not agree.

{¶45} R.C. 2953.21(H) provides, in relevant part: “If the court does not find

grounds for granting relief, it shall make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law

and shall enter judgment denying relief on the petition.” Here, in its judgment entry, the

trial court detailed the claims set forth in appellant’s petition and noted that he alleged

ineffective assistance in Kaufmann I. The court conceded appellant did not raise the

arguments in Kaufmann I, but underscored that, by pleading guilty, he waived the right to

contest counsel’s ineffectiveness once he entered a valid guilty plea. Although our

analysis of appellant’s arguments on appeal go into greater depth than the trial court’s

entry, this does not imply the trial court failed to comply with the dictates of R.C.

2953.21(H). The court rendered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Even if this

court differs with the trial court’s rationale, we conclude its entry is sufficient and its

ultimate disposition is sound.

{¶46} Appellant’s second assignment of error lacks merit.

15

Case No. 2023-A-0008
 {¶47} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Ashtabula

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

concur.

16

Case No. 2023-A-0008