specially concurring.
I fully concur in the majority opinion. Two comments in Justice Martone’s dissent, however, require a response from the Chief Justice.
Because the dissent departs from the issue before us to castigate the court for failing to adopt the petition to amend Ariz.R.Crim. Proc. 17.4, it is appropriate to explain why we did not adopt that proposal. The dissent makes much of the number of comments favoring the petition, see dissent at n. 2, but, as is often the case, the numbers do not paint an accurate picture. Other than judges, only three writers, none of whom is a practicing lawyer, supported the rule change. The dissent fails to mention that, in fact, several judges opposed the change and that the comments of representatives of the lawyers who would have had to practice under the proposed rule were unanimously unfavorable.1 The prosecutors opposed it on the grounds that it was contrary to the interests of victims and the public, and the defense bar opposed it on the grounds that it would significantly hinder their attempts to obtain fair treatment for their clients under a mandatory sentencing regime.
*152While the dissent dismisses these comments as merely those of “institutional bar groups,” we necessarily assume' that the State Bar and its Criminal Justice Section speak for lawyers in general and certainly for those prosecutors and defense lawyers who practice criminal law. Nor can we so lightly dismiss the views of every Maricopa County prosecutorial and defender office, particularly in the rare instance when these normally opposing groups agree. It is essential, we believe, to appropriately consider practitioners’ views of the vicissitudes of daily practice under the proposed change. This is especially true when, as in this case, the presiding judge of the criminal division of the Maricopa County bench agreed with those lawyers.
This debate is, of course, a non-issue in this case. See Yepes-Prado v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 36 F.3d 83 (9th Cir.1994). Those readers who desire an in-depth review, however, should peruse the comment to the petition to amend Rule 17.4 filed by Judge Ronald S. Reinstein, Presiding Criminal Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court. A copy of that comment is attached as an appendix. [Editor’s Note: See p. 30 for Appendix.] It is appropriate, however, to quote here one paragraph of that comment:
While some have argued that sentencing stipulations are regularly crafted by inexperienced young attorneys, and judges are best suited to determine in the first instance what an appropriate disposition in a case should be, the fact is that most of the more significant and sensitive cases in the justice system are handled by experienced prosecutors and defense attorneys who have lived and breathed these cases for months. The sentencing judge on the other hand more than likely only reviews the presentence report the night before sentencing. Many of those judges, while perhaps experienced in life and the law, at least in the beginning of their judicial careers or their assignment to the criminal bench, have no experience at all in criminal sentencing. We are not all anointed with mystical and instant wisdom when we don our judicial robes.
Comment of Ron Reinstein in Opposition to the Petition, filed Sept. 20, 1994, at 2-3.
Some may believe that we should damn the torpedoes and go forward with a rule opposed by all who would have to practice under it, but I disagree. Although we may empathize with the judges who seek to regain some of the discretion taken from them by mandatory sentencing, we must listen to those who would have had to practice under the changed rule.2 From the comments, it appeared that every lawyer practicing in the field believed the proposal would not work, would create havoc in the courts, and would be unfair to the public, victims, and defendants. Although these views did not and do not sway the dissenter, they convinced four members of the court that it would be an abuse of power to impose the rule until it was first tried with a group willing to experiment. That experiment is presently being implemented. Thus, it is not accurate for the dissent to say we have rejected the proposal. The final decision will come after we see how it works on an experimental basis.
Nor is it proper to criticize this court for not being in the “forefront on reform in the criminal justice system.” Dissent at 155, 894 P.2d at 698. This, perhaps, is the first time that anyone has accused us of lacking concern for reform of our justice system, whether civil or criminal. Indeed, one often hears criticism that the court may be too involved in reform efforts and rule changes. At any rate, eagerness to reform does not require us to agree with every project presented. Sometimes we must say no, even when we would like to say yes. The unanimous, in*153formed, and reasoned opposition of the practicing bar should and does raise our apprehension. Service on the supreme court does not confer supreme power, but does instill the need for caution.
. Writing on behalf of their respective offices were: Richard Romley, Maricopa County Attorney; Grant Woods, Arizona Attorney General; Kerry Wangberg, Phoenix City Prosecutor; Christopher Johns, Deputy Maricopa County Public Defender; and Kenneth Everett, Mohave County Public Defender. Other opposing comments were filed by Bruce Hamilton, on behalf of the State Bar’s Criminal Justice Section and Criminal Rules Committee, and Michael Baum-stark, on behalf of the Arizona Judicial Council.
. We are not unsympathetic to the judges’ views. Underlying this tempest, however, is the dissent’s implicit assumption that the views of practicing lawyers are to be disregarded while those of the judges, who need suffer none of the consequences of the imposition of a rule that the lawyers consider unworkable, should be accepted notwithstanding the bar’s unanimous opposition. We understand the judges’ desires to take back their sentencing power. Believing, with the judges, that the administration of justice would be better served if they were to regain at least some of their sentencing discretion, I for one recommend that they get off their hassocks and out of their judicial towers to join those who are working to persuade the public and the legislature that the present scheme does not well serve the ends of justice.