I respectfully dissent, and would hold that the erroneous assumption of the risk charge prejudiced the Coles, and therefore would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. Moreover, as explained below, in my view the majority’s discussion of the “two issue rule” is fundamentally flawed.
I agree with the majority of this Court that the trial judge erred in charging the jury on the defense of assumption of the risk. In my view, the Coles were prejudiced by this charge which instructed the jury that it must return a defense verdict if it found “the plaintiff freely and voluntarily exposed hex-self to a known danger and understood and appreciated the danger” in light of the two “informed consent” forms which wex-e introduced into evidence. In my opinion, we need not engage in speculation and evidence weighing to determine this charge constituted reversible error.
I am also concerned because the opinion invokes the two issue rule to affirm this appeal despite the rule’s inapplicability. The two issue rule holds that where a lower court’s general verdict rests on two independent grounds, only one of which is challenged on appeal, the appellate court will affirm. The rule is simply one expression of the fundamental appellate philosophy of our courts: to affirm the decision of the lower court if possible. It also serves a second appellate goal, that is, to conserve scarce appellate resources by allowing courts to forgo analyzing “pointless ... exceptions” which cannot alter the outcome. Buckner v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 159, 177 S.E.2d 544 (1970). These policies are reflected in situations other than challenges to a general verdict. See e.g. Brading v. County of Georgetown, 327 S.C. 107, 490 S.E.2d 4 (1997)(failure to argue all grounds for ruling below requires affirmance); Buckner, supra (same); S.C. Prop, and Cas. Guar. Ass’n v. Yensen, 345 S.C. 512, 548 S.E.2d 880 (Ct.App. 2001)(same).
I agree with the majority that the two issue rule is properly applied where a general verdict for the plaintiff rests on more than one theory of liability, not all of which are challenged on appeal, or where a defense verdict rests on multiple theories, *411at least one of which is not challenged.4 Here, we have a defense verdict, but only one liability theory and one defense. As I understand the majority opinion, it is applying the two issue rule to preclude appellate review of a defense verdict where the “two issues” are the defendant’s challenge to the plaintiffs proof, and an (admittedly inapplicable) affirmative defense. This new rule would mean, for example, that in an automobile wreck ease where the plaintiff testified the light was green and the defendant testified the light was red, neither party could appeal the charging of inapposite liability theories or defenses following a general jury verdict because a “general verdict for [either party] may be sustained because it is independently supported by the negligence claim which was properly submitted to the jury.” I cannot join in the creation of this new rule.
The two issue rule has no application, in my view, where as here there is one liability theory (negligence) and the defense theories are “not proven” and “assumption of the risk.” That the jury may have returned a defense verdict upon a finding that Dr. Raut was not negligent rather than on the erroneous assumption of the risk defense should not affect the Coles’ right to an appeal and a reversal. Since the appellate court has no basis upon which to determine whether the defense verdict rests on the jury’s decision that the Coles failed in their proof or upon a finding that Mrs. Cole assumed the risk, in my view, the Coles have demonstrated the requisite prejudice entitling them to a new trial. The majority, I fear, has unwittingly resurrected the same perversion of the “two issue rule” that it soundly rejected in Anderson v. S.C. Dep’t of Highiways & Pub. Transp., 322 S.C. 417, 421, 472 S.E.2d 253, 255 (1996)(rejecting Court of Appeals’ misapplication of the *412two issue rule, in part “because [if] the jury’s general verdict could potentially be upheld anytime it was susceptible of two or more constructions, there would be no incentive for trial courts to correct such errors....”).
Since I believe the Coles established the requisite prejudice from the improper assumption of the risk and since the “two issue rule” does not apply, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and remanding the matter for a new trial.
. Unlike the majority, I do not read Hussmann Refrigerator & Supply Co. v. Cash & Carry Grocer, Inc., 134 S.C. 191, 132 S.E. 173 (1926) as involving the application of the two issue rule, but rather as holding that where a party interposes no timely objection, a general verdict for the other party disposes of all claims and counterclaims. Hussmann is not a case where a party failed to challenge on appeal all the grounds upon which the jury’s verdict might rest, but rather one where a party’s failure at trial to timely object to the form of the verdict precluded further relief. Anderson v. West, 270 S.C. 184, 241 S.E.2d 551 (1978), also cited by the majority, actually supports my view that the rule is properly invoked only where the appellant fails to challenge all the theories upon which the jury verdict might rest.