(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I do so because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court did not commit reversible error when it failed to exercise its discretion regarding the appointment of advisory counsel. Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.02, subd. 2, states *470that the “court may appoint ‘advisory counsel’ to assist the accused who voluntarily and intelligently waives the right to counsel.” Here, the district court mistakenly believed it could not appoint advisory counsel, and therefore appellant, Clay Carl Clark, did not have the benefit of the court properly exercising its discretion.
While I agree with the majority’s holding that there is no constitutional right to advisory counsel, the importance of such counsel should not be discounted. The majority fashions a very narrow role for advisory counsel, citing State v. Richards for the proposition that advisory counsel’s responsibilities are “ ‘to steer a defendant through the basic procedures of trial’ and ‘to relieve the judge of the need to explain and enforce basic rules of [the] courtroom.’ ” 552 N.W.2d 197, 206 (Minn.1996) (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984)). But the context in which the issue of advisory counsel’s role arose in Richards was much different than in Clark’s case. In Richards, the pro se defendant had the benefit of advisory counsel, and the issue was whether the defendant could step aside to have his advisory counsel proceed in his place. Id. at 205. In such circumstances, we were construing the already-appointed advisory counsel’s role narrowly in order to emphasize that advisory counsel “ ‘should not be allowed to destroy the jury’s perception that the defendant is representing himself.’ ” Id. at 206 (quoting McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 184, 104 S.Ct. 944).
The role of advisory counsel need not be as narrow as the majority suggests. In Richards, we cited the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of advisory counsel in McKaskle. The issue considered in McKaskle was the role of advisory counsel when the district court appointed such counsel for a pro se defendant, who objected to the presence of any advisory counsel. 465 U.S. at 170-71, 104 S.Ct. 944. In McKaskle, the Supreme Court articulated the minimal role of advisory counsel- — to help the pro se defendant with the basic mechanics of courtroom procedures. Id. at 184, 104 S.Ct. 944. In contrast, Clark affirmatively requested that the district court provide him with the assistance of advisory counsel. If advisory counsel had been appointed, it may be that Clark would have utilized such counsel to a far greater extent than the minimal role the Court envisioned for a pro se defendant who did not want help in the first instance. Importantly, neither the Supreme Court nor our court has held that advisory counsel is limited to helping the pro se defendant with procedural issues.
With this more expansive view of advisory counsel in mind, I turn to the fact that the district court violated Minn. R.Crim. P. 5.02, subd. 2. This rule gives the court discretion in appointing advisory counsel upon the defendant’s request. At trial, the court mistakenly informed him that the “rules have now changed. There is no stand-by counsel.” Thus, the court committed error by not contemplating the exercise of its discretion to appoint advisory counsel. Yet, the majority concludes that “Clark has not made a showing that lack of advisory counsel resulted in prejudice to him.” I do not reach the same conclusion, as I believe it is too difficult, if not impossible, to measure the impact advisory counsel may have had on Clark’s trial. I do not believe that we can say with any fair degree of certainty that if Clark had been granted his request for advisory counsel, it would not have led to additional witnesses, better arguments, and perhaps even a different outcome. I agree with the California Supreme Court when it reversed a trial court that failed to exercise its discretion because it “[m]istakenly be-liev[ed] it had no authority to appoint advi*471sory counsel.” People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal.3d 731, 209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994, 1000 (1984). The California court reversed and granted a new trial because of the “impossibility of assessing the effect of the absence of counsel upon the presentation of the case.” Id., 209 Cal-Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d at 1001. For this same reason, the court in Clark’s case must at least consider the effect of granting advisory counsel, as the rules of criminal procedure dictate.
Finally, while I do not conclude that a district court’s failure to exercise its discretion regarding the appointment of advisory counsel should result in per se reversal, I nevertheless conclude that the circumstances in Clark’s case do require reversal. Therefore, I would hold the court’s error was prejudicial and warrants granting a new trial.