(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent for the following reasons:
1. When a firefighter is hired by the City of Minneapolis, he is required to sign an oath to uphold the laws of this State and the ordinances of the City of Minneapolis.
Kelvie was charged as follows:
16. On December 5, 1984, at 2912— 15th Avenue South, Minneapolis, Minnesota, the employee violated his oath of office to support the laws of the State of Minnesota and the Ordinances of the City of Minneapolis by violating Minnesota Statutes §§ 152.09, subd. 1(2) and 152.-092, and Minneapolis Code of Ordinances §§ 223.10, 223.70, 223.120, and 223.230, each being a violation of Civil Service Commission Rule 12.02(i).
17. On December 5, 1984, at 2912— 15th Avenue South, Minneapolis, Minnesota, the employee violated his oath of office to support the laws of the State of Minnesota and the Ordinances of the City of Minneapolis by violating Minnesota Statutes §§ 152.09, subd. 1(2) and 152.-092, and Minneapolis Code of Ordinances §§ 223.10, 223.70, 223.120, and 223.230, each being a violation of Civil Service Commission Rule 12.02(q).
The Commissioners adopted the opinion of the administrative law judge, which held:
Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the charges allege breaches of Commission Rules because John Kelvie violated his oath of office by committing crimes in violation of state laws and city ordinances. At the time of Kelvie’s discharge and the time of the hearing on this matter, Mr. Kelvie had not been convicted of any criminal offenses. Those charges have not been proved.
Proof of a criminal conviction is not required. The departmental charges allege John Kelvie violated certain statutes and ordinances, not that he was convicted of those violations. An administrative discharge does not depend upon a criminal conviction. Mediate v. City of Indianapolis, 407 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ind.App.1980).
It is not necessary for an administrative body to wait for the outcome of other criminal proceedings before dismissing an employee. McNeal v. Civil Service Commission, 237 Ark. 301, 302, 372 S.W.2d 614, *907615 (1963); State ex rel. Ashbaugh v. Bahr, 68 Ohio App. 308, 311, 40 N.E.2d 677, 679 (1941). A civil service commission has authority independent of the criminal courts. Fleming v. Holland, 260 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Mo.Ct.App.1953).
2. Even when an employee has been acquitted of the criminal charge, he may be discharged. In Adkins v. North Platte Civil Service Commission, 206 Neb. 500, 504-05, 293 N.W.2d 411, 414 (1980), the court held acquittal of a city police officer on an assault charge did not preclude the city’s civil service commission from terminating him for the conduct constituting the basis for the charge. Accord Guadette v. Board of Public Safety, 20 Conn.Supp. 147, 150, 127 A.2d 836, 838 (1956); Roberson v. City of Rome, 72 Ga.App. 55, 60, 33 S.E.2d 33, 36-37 (1945); Purdie v. Detroit Police Department Trial Board, 318 Mich. 430, 435, 28 N.W.2d 283, 285 (1947); In re Schuppe, 1 A.D.2d 912, 913, 149 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (1956). A city may rely on the same conduct which was the basis of criminal accusations to support charges against the officer, although he was acquitted of the criminal offenses. Howie v. Personnel Board of Appeals, 122 Ga.App. 276, 277, 176 S.E.2d 663, 664 (1970).
The standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. An administrative discharge hearing merely requires a mere preponderance of the evidence. The administrative law judge specifically found John Kelvie possessed marijuana, marijuana smoking paraphernalia, syringes and a triple beam scale. It is undisputed such possession constituted a violation of the Minneapolis City Ordinances and the laws of Minnesota.
3. In administering Kelvie the oath requiring him to uphold its laws, the City of Minneapolis was not simply expressing vague ideals. It set a standard which Kel-vie was expected to meet. Finding the violation of the oath was not justifiable cause for dismissal reduces the administration of the oath to a meaningless formality. I would conclude that was not the intent of the City.
4. In State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council, 53 Minn. 238, 55 N.W. 118, the supreme court defined sufficient “cause” for an officer’s dismissal as “one which specifically relates to and affects the administration of the office * * * showing that he is not a fit or proper person to hold the office.” Id. at 244, 55 N.W. at 120. The City of Minneapolis has determined that persons chosen to fill the office of firefighter must swear to uphold the laws of the City and State. By requiring the oath by Kelvie, the City indicated its belief that upholding its laws is directly related to holding the office of firefighter, and only those persons who swear to do so are fit and proper persons to serve as firefighters.
5. The majority cites Nodes v. City of Hastings, 284 Minn. 552, 170 N.W.2d 92 (1969), where the supreme court upheld the discharge of an officer who had a reputation for habitually neglecting to pay his debts. Although the majority distinguishes Kelvie from Nodes on the basis Kelvie does not have a reputation for smoking marijuana, I believe an officer’s possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia is more serious than failure to pay bills.
6. Firefighters serve the citizens of Minneapolis and are respected by its citizens. Requiring its firefighters to uphold the laws of the City and State is not an unreasonable demand by the City of Minneapolis. We have consistently held in unemployment compensation cases that violation of an employer’s reasonable work rules or requests is justification for dismissal and denial of unemployment benefits. See, e.g., Jones v. Rosemount, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). That reasoning supports finding Kelvie violated his oath of office, which constituted just cause for dismissal.