(dissenting).
Believing that the decision of the Commissioner should be reversed and remanded, I respectfully dissent.
Our review of the Commissioner’s decision involves a dual standard. We must defer to the special knowledge of the Commissioner and avoid substituting our judgment for his. But, we must closely scrutinize his decision and intervene when he has failed to give “reasoned consideration to all material facts and issues.” Greater Boston Television Corporation v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C.Cir.1970), certiorari denied, 403 U.S. 923, 91 S.Ct. 2229, 29 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971).1 See Reserve Mining Co., 256 N.W.2d at 824-825. “The deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia.” Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 88 S.Ct. 929, 19 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1968).2
In his initial decision, the Commissioner’s representative said it was “obvious” that relator “did not actively seek work under any definition.” Responding to the man*845date of the Minnesota Supreme Court for further consideration of the issue, the Commissioner has added very little. In his current decision, the Commissioner’s representative states the long-standing contention of the department that in-person job contacts are the most effective way to obtain employment, and he states without further discussion that it was reasonable to instruct relator to make those contacts. The decision shows no consideration of the kind of work relator sought, or the economic circumstances at the time of his job search. It inadequately addresses relator’s claim that he was unable to pay for travel to look for employment. The decision fails to note any evidence or explanation to support a department policy to require in-person job contacts by all unemployed persons without regard for circumstances of the case.
I am convinced the Commissioner failed to consider the issue in this case, i.e., whether in-person job contacts were needed to demonstrate reasonable and diligent job search efforts in the situation encountered by this relator.
Additionally, I am of the opinion that the Commissioner’s decision fails to satisfy the mandate of the Minnesota Supreme Court in James, 339 N.W.2d 891. In the mandate and in several additional statements in the James opinion it is emphasized that the court expected a comparison of relator’s efforts to seek work with standards articulated in administrative rules. The Supreme Court insisted upon an application of legal standards to the particular facts in the case. In my opinion, that application of standards, a comparison of the standards with the facts, has not yet occurred.
. Because so much of the language in the F.C.C. case was repeated and approved in Reserve Mining Co., Id., it is worthwhile noting several observations in the D.C. Circuit opinion:
Expert discretion is secured, not crippled, by the requirements for substantial evidence, findings and reasoned analysis. * * * * * * The function of the court is to assure that the agency has given reasoned consideration to all the material facts and issues. * *
Its supervisory function calls on the court to intervene * * * if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a "hard look” at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making.
Greater Boston Television Corporation, Id. at 850-851.
. This quotation was included in the analysis of the standard of review in Greater Boston Television Corporation, 444 F.2d 850. See footnote 1.