dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. It should be initially pointed out this case involves a binder of insurance referencing a policy of insurance which the insured claimed he did not receive. The standard fire policy contains a 60-day vacancy provision extended by endorsement in this case to 90 days. The provision is clearly unambiguous and based on the lack of ambiguity, the trial court concluded that the reasonable expectation doctrine is inapplicable and denied coverage. Appellant cites Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co., 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn.1985) as authority that a policy need not be ambiguous to trigger the reasonable expectations rule. It appears that appellant’s argument is well-founded. The proceedings had been completed before the Atwater case was decided, so the trial court did not have the opportunity to distinguish the At-water case.
However, under Atwater it would appear that certain factors must exist before the reasonable expectations doctrine is applicable. In Atwater the court stated:
As Professor Keeton points out, ambiguity in the language of the contract is not irrelevant under this standard but becomes a factor in determining the reasonable expectations of the insured, *243along with such factors as whether the insured was told of important, but obscure, conditions or exclusions and whether the particular provision in the contract at issue is an item known by the public generally. The doctrine does not automatically remove from the insured a responsibility to read the policy. It does, however, recognize that in certain instances, such as where major exclusions are hidden in the definitions section, the insured should be held only to reasonable knowledge of the literal terms and conditions.
Id. at 278. Thus, such factors are either that the policy provision is ambiguous, or that the exclusion is obscurely hidden in the policy and such provision is not a normal or usual policy provision.
In the instant case, the vacancy provision is without doubt a normal and usual condition in a fire policy. In fact, it is contained in the Minnesota Standard Fire Policy.
Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the trial court.