dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would have affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to respondents.
The case involves after-the-fact allegations by a client. There had been a completed dissolution pursuant to stipulated terms agreed to in open court, and later appellant expressed dissatisfaction with the economics of her settlement. The allegations are general in nature, basically revolving around a claim that appellant should have received more from the stipulated settlement.
The elements of negligent practice of law are stated in Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 293-94 (1970):
[T]he client has the burden of proving the existence of the relationship of attorney and client; the acts constituting the alleged negligence * * *; that it was the proximate cause of the damage; and that but for such negligence * * * the client would have been successful in the prosecution or defense of the action.
The existence of an attorney/client relationship was not in dispute and appellant did make claims constituting the alleged negligence. However, the record shows no genuine specifics alleged by appellant concerning (1) proximate cause; (2) that but for the claimed negligence, appellant would have received more; and (3) that appellant would have been more successful by further negotiations or a trial.
Further, although not essential to defeat the motion for summary judgment, expert testimony in a legal malpractice case is important and appellant offered no expert testimony that respondent acted improvidently.
What record there is was thoroughly reviewed by a trial court cognizant of the claims and counterclaims. I find nothing in the record convincing me to reverse the trial court’s summary judgment on the merits of appellant’s claim.