(dissenting).
The majority’s reliance on Thomas Som-merness’ ownership of the Sportsman’s Bar to defeat common liability requires closer scrutiny.
The purpose of the Civil Damages Act is both penal and remedial. Conde v. City of Spring Lake Park, 290 N.W.2d 164, 166 (Minn.1980); Ascheman v. Village of Hancock, 254 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Minn.1977); Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 125, 200 N.W.2d 149, 155 (1972). The penal aspect of the Act operates to induce the liquor industry to police itself. In the case of a sole proprietorship, where the liquor vendor can also be an intoxicated vendee, self-regulation can be imposed indirectly through the liquor vendor’s insurer. The Act’s remedial aspect assures that innocent persons can recover damages from commercial entities, which can bear losses by insuring against them as a cost of engaging in a hazardous business for profit. Ross, 294 Minn, at 125, 200 N.W.2d at 155. Because of the overriding remedial purpose of the Act, liquor dealers are strictly liable for all dam*181ages caused by the illegal sale of liquor. Id.
Although liability under the Act is based on strict liability rather than negligence, and the Act does not expressly provide for an action between liquor vendors, contribution has been allowed because it places the burden of loss on the entities that can prevent injury caused by. alcohol consumption and broadens the financial base for recovery. Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Company, 281 Minn. 417, 422-23, 161 N.W.2d 657, 661 (1968).
Case law has not permitted an action for contribution from the alleged intoxicated person, on the grounds that (1) there is no common liability between an alleged intoxicated person and the liquor vendor; and (2) to allow contribution would diminish the support available to the family and frustrate the remedial purposes of the Civil Damages Act. See Conde, 290 N.W.2d at 166; Ascheman, 254 N.W.2d at 385.
Sportsman’s Bar argues here that under Conde and Ascheman it cannot be sued for contribution because Sommerness was the owner of Sportsman’s Bar, and therefore a suit against Sportsman’s Bar would be a suit against Thomas Sommerness or his heirs. However, the finding of no common liability in those cases was based on the fact that an alleged intoxicated person’s dependents could not bring a direct action against the alleged intoxicated person in negligence for loss of their means of support.
In this case Sommerness both provided support for his family and was a liquor vendor. The fact that his wife and children could not bring a direct negligence action against him for the loss of their means of support does not preclude a direct action against Sportsman’s Bar under the strict liability provisions of the Civil Damages Act. Liability would be based on strict liability rather than negligence. See Ross, 200 N.W.2d at 154-55; Dahl v. Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis, 265 Minn. 216, 220-21, 121 N.W.2d 321, 324 (1963). The Act imposes liability on all liquor vendors for damages caused by the illegal sale of liquor, regardless of the identity and fault of the victim. Sommerness’ ownership interest, whatever its nature and extent, does not limit the reach of the Act, and it has not been shown that the legislature intended to exclude families of liquor vendors from the Act’s protection.
The Conde and Ascheman courts were also concerned that contribution from the decedent-vendee would diminish the support available to the family and frustrate the remedial purposes of the Civil Damages Act. In this case, however, Quadna is presently involved in a bankruptcy action which may impede complete recovery. The insurance required by Sportsman’s under Minn.Stat. § 340.11, subd. 21 (1984), may well enhance the family’s potential for recovery, rather than diminish it. Sportsman’s liability, at least to the limits of the required insurance, would arguably advance the remedial purposes of the Act.
Finally, Sportsman’s Bar is also subject to liability under the penal aspects of Minn. Stat. § 340.12, which requires the filing of a bond by a liquor vendor to obtain a liquor license. Recovery is allowed under this section of the statute, not for the tortious wrong done to the plaintiff, but to penalize the dealer for illegally providing liquor to an intoxicated person. See Robinson v. Lamott, 289 N.W.2d 60, 65-66 (Minn.1979); see also Dahl, 265 Minn. at 220-21, 121 N.W.2d at 324 (noting the distinction between Minn.Stat. §§ 340.12 and 340.95).
While there may be no common liability on a negligence theory, I do not think that the holdings of Conde and Ascheman relieve Sportsman’s Bar of the liability imposed by Minnesota statutes holding vendors strictly liable for the illegal sale of liquor.