¶ 80 (dissenting). I agree with much of the majority opinion, but I write separately because I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that "the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by entering a scheduling order that incorporated a void local rule...." Majority op., ¶ 5.
I
¶ 81. I agree with a number of the majority's conclusions: To begin with, I agree with the majority's determination that "Wisconsin circuit courts have discretion to control their dockets." Majority op., ¶ 31. I further agree with the majority that "Wisconsin Stat. § 802.10 addresses 'calendar practice' and provides that a circuit court 'may enter a scheduling order on the court's own motion or on the motion of a party.’" Id.
*566¶ 82. We must be cognizant, however, of the fact that circuit courts are required to adequately manage a busy docket, and they need the discretion to render justice. Circuit court judges are responsible for an enormous volume of cases. In order to fairly, effectively, and efficiently administer justice, the judge needs the ability to set meaningful deadlines. This court has acknowledged the value of timely processing cases at the circuit court level. In fact, in addition to the requirement that circuit courts certify that they have no "matters awaiting decision beyond" the 90-day period, see SCR 70:36, this court also sets case processing guidelines for Wisconsin circuit court judges. By way of example, the circuit court "case processing time standards" for a civil case such as this indicates that this case should be concluded within 360 days.
¶ 83. For any number of reasons, this case was not concluded within 360 days. The case at issue was filed February 3, 2004. The scheduling order was sent to counsel on August 3, 2005. Various motions for sanctions were filed by both parties. On February 1, 2006, the defendants filed a notice of motion and motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, the plaintiff's counsel failed to comply with the scheduling order, which incorporated the local rule on its face, when filing a response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
¶ 84. I agree with the majority that "[t]he scheduling questionnaire used by the circuit court was sufficient to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 802.10(3)." Majority op., ¶ 37. I also agree with the majority that there is "no erroneous exercise of discretion in the circuit court employing a scheduling questionnaire to create its scheduling order." Majority op., ¶ 38. Here, the court engaged in consultation with the parties through the scheduling questionnaire.
*567¶ 85. The majority correctly states that Wis. Stat. § 802.08 provides flexibility for a trial court to specify earlier times in the scheduling order. This makes sense because trial courts need to be given broad discretion in how to handle their calendars and in how to properly address individual issues reflected in individual cases. I agree with the majority that "the statute's plain language and the Judicial Council Note indicate that scheduling orders may trump Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)." Majority op., ¶ 45.
¶ 86. Correctly, the majority opinion recognizes that scheduling order deadlines may supersede statutory deadlines. Majority op., ¶ 48. I agree with the majority opinion that the language in Hunter v. AES Consultants, Ltd., 2007 WI App 42, 300 Wis. 2d 213, 730 N.W.2d 184, requiring a trial court to explain on the record its deviation from the scheduling deadlines, should be withdrawn. Majority op., ¶ 50.
¶ 87. I likewise agree with the majority that:
There is surely a presumption that a court is acting rationally and impartially in constructing a scheduling order. There is no need for the court to go on the record to explain the fact that it deviated from a state rule to accommodate the needs of party A or to give party B the time to file a reply brief. The time for the court to explain a scheduling decision is when it must resolve a dispute. Ideally, the court should be given the opportunity to explain its order or change its order before the order is violated.
Majority op., ¶ 53.
II
¶ 88. While I agree with much of the majority opinion, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that deadlines must be placed in the scheduling order before *568the judge's signature in order for those deadlines to be enforceable. The majority states that "[i]t is important to note that the circuit court could have imposed the same 20-day time frame for responding to a summary judgment motion by specifying the response time 'in the scheduling order itself.'" Majority op., ¶ 66. The majority determines that the scheduling order only implicitly incorporated a void local court rule. Majority op., ¶ 47.
¶ 89. I part ways with the majority's determination that this scheduling order merely implicitly incorporates deadlines from a void local court rule. In the case at issue, the scheduling order specifically stated the following: "Motion for judgment on pleading/summary judgment must be filed by 02/01/2006." Below this language the following language appears: "[SEE ATTACHED SHEET FOR MOTION PROCEDURE]." It is undisputed that the parties in this case were provided with the scheduling order and the attached sheet. The attached sheet for motion procedure is just over one page long. It is also undisputed that counsel, who failed to meet the deadlines required in the scheduling order, also failed "to fully review the notice accompanying that scheduling order."
¶ 90. I write separately because the majority's conclusion that the motion practice must be specified in the order itself is a distinction without a difference. While placement of a response time in the text of the scheduling order may give clear notice to the parties, that notice is irrelevant if a party fails to carefully review the scheduling order. Reading the order gives notice to the party whether the motion practice is in the first page or in the referenced attachment. It seems curious to conclude that if the order has the same information printed in a page that precedes the circuit court judge's signature it is enforceable, but if the *569information appears on a clearly referenced attached sheet after the judge's signature, it is unenforceable.
¶ 91. It is reasonable for a judge to expect that the parties to a lawsuit will adhere to a scheduling order. Here, the scheduling order on its face puts the parties and counsel on notice of the court's expectations regarding the deadlines.
hH HH I — I
¶ 92. As a part of handling a busy calendar and giving parties their day in court, circuit court judges must possess sufficient discretion. In a hectic schedule, it is imperative that the parties follow court orders. When deadlines are disregarded a court calendar can quickly become unmanageable. One can imagine the repercussions from a circuit court judge's order only having meaning on occasion. Judges must have the ability to make discretionary case-by-case distinctions and allowances in order for justice to be properly dispensed.
¶ 93. I agree with much of the majority opinion, but I write separately because I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that "the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by entering a scheduling order that incorporated a void local rule ...." Majority op., ¶ 5.
¶ 94. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.