OPINION
PAGE, Justice.Appellant Kelvin Jackson was convicted of first-degree aggravated robbery in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2006), following a jury trial in Ramsey County. The district court sentenced Jackson to an executed term of 210 months, a double durational upward departure from the high end of the range for the presumptive sentence under Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines. The court of appeals affirmed. Concluding the departure was impermissibly based on uncharged criminal conduct, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
On Sunday, November 6, 2005, at 8:45 p.m., Maplewood police were dispatched to a residence on a home invasion robbery and assault. Upon arrival, they found the homeowner, 67-year-old G.W., bleeding profusely from head wounds. G.W. told them that a man and a woman had forced their way into his home, assaulted him, and stolen his property. Earlier that day, around 9:30 a.m., a woman had come to G.W.’s residence, asking to use his phone because she had car trouble. G.W. allowed her to use the cordless phone in the kitchen, but when she walked into the living room, G.W. told her to return to the kitchen because his wife was sleeping. G.W. believed the woman involved in the nighttime robbery was the same woman who had used his phone in the morning.
The police investigation led to Jackson, who resided in an apartment building a short distance from G.W.’s residence. Two officers went to Jackson’s residence, arriving approximately three hours after the robbery, and made contact with Jackson and his girlfriend Rachel West. After a *356short conversation, the officers left. Because Jackson and West resembled the description of the robbery suspects, the officers searched the area between the apartment building and G.W.’s residence. During the search, the officers found G.W.’s wallet and identification papers in the apartment building dumpster. After calling for additional officers, the decision was made to arrest Jackson and West. When the officers entered Jackson’s apartment, West was clutching $100 in cash. Meanwhile, G.W. was transported by ambulance to the hospital where he was treated for a fracture of the left orbital floor and full-thickness lacerations to the scalp. While in the hospital, G.W. suffered a heart attack.
Jackson was initially charged with one count of first-degree aggravated robbery (armed with a dangerous weapon), Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2006), and a second count of first-degree aggravated robbery (inflicts bodily harm upon another), id. Shortly before trial, the complaint was amended to add second-degree aggravated robbery, Minn.Stat. § 609.245, subd. 2 (2006); and for the heart attack, first-degree assault, Minn.Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2006).
At trial, G.W. described the robbery and assault. He had been home alone watching TV when he answered a knock on the door. He recognized the woman he had seen earlier that day, and, as he opened the door, a man “rushed in and cracked” him on the eye with what he thought was a handgun. According to G.W., the man struck him on the head several more times as he fell to the floor, landing on his stomach. The man then pinned him to the floor, took his wallet, and directed the woman to take various items from his home to their car. When they were finished, the man told him to “stay there for ten minutes” and threatened to come back and shoot him if he failed to comply. G.W. made an in-court identification of Jackson as the assailant. Also, at trial, a medical consultant involved in G.W.’s care at the hospital testified that G.W.’s head injuries fit within the legal definition of substantial bodily harm.
At the close of the State’s case, the district court granted Jackson’s motion for judgment of acquittal of the first-degree assault charge. The jury subsequently found Jackson guilty of the remaining charges. After the guilt phase of the trial concluded, for purposes of sentencing, the jury was instructed to answer three questions submitted by special verdict form: (1) did the aggravated robbery occur in G.W.’s home; (2) did G.W. sustain multiple blows to the head; and (3) did G.W. sustain an orbital fracture. After a short deliberation, the jury returned with affirmative answers to all three questions. At sentencing, the district court imposed an executed sentence of 210 months for first-degree robbery (armed with a dangerous weapon). The sentence was a double du-rational departure from the high end of the presumptive sentencing guidelines range. Specifically, the court based the departure on the severity of the victim’s injuries and the invasion of the victim’s zone of privacy.
Jackson appealed, challenging an evidentiary ruling, the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the conviction, and the propriety of the enhanced sentence. The court of appeals affirmed. State v. Jackson, No. A06-1001, 2007 WL 2245594 (Minn.App. Aug.7, 2007). We granted review of the sentencing issue.
I.
Jackson argues that the sentencing departure was improperly based on uncharged offenses of third-degree assault and burglary. Generally, we review a dis*357trict court’s decision to depart from the presumptive guidelines sentence for an abuse of discretion. Taylor v. State, 670 N.W.2d 584, 588 (Minn.2003). If the district court’s reasons for departure are “improper or inadequate” and there is insufficient evidence in the record to justify the departure, the departure will be reversed. Id. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn.2002). Under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), the jury determines the facts that support the departure.
The purpose of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines is to “establish rational and consistent sentencing standards which reduce sentencing disparity and ensure that sanctions following conviction of a felony are proportional to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the offender’s criminal history.” Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d at 68 (quoting Minn. Sent. Guidelines I). Accordingly, the “primary relevant sentencing criteria” are the “offense of conviction and the offender’s criminal history.” Id.
To maintain uniformity and proportionality, departures from the presumptive guidelines sentence are discouraged. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d at 68; see Minn. Sent. Guidelines I. The grounds provided by the guidelines for departure, “while nonexclusive, are intended to apply to a small number of cases, and each departure must be based on the offense of conviction rather than charges that were dropped or never alleged.” Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d at 68; see also Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.A.01, cmt., II.D.103, cmt.; Dale G. Parent & Richard S. Frase, Why Minnesota Will Weather Blakely’s Blast, 18 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 12, 2005 WL 4001178, at *5 (2005) (noting that early case law reinforced the guidelines commission’s key policy choices, including that “judges could not enhance a sentence based on offenses for which the defendant had not been charged or for which charges had been dropped”).1 Departures must comport with the guidelines criteria, which cannot be waived even by plea agreement. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d at 72 (holding that departures from the guidelines “must be supported by substantial and compelling circumstances, and that a plea agreement — standing alone — is not a sufficient basis to depart from the sentencing guidelines”).
In Jackson’s case, judgment was entered and the enhanced sentence imposed on the conviction for aggravated robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon. The departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence was based on the nature of the victim’s injuries and commission of the crime in the victim’s zone of privacy, his home. Regarding the nature of the injuries, the State presented expert evidence that the orbital fracture amounted to substantial bodily harm; and the jury was asked to find, and did find, that the victim sustained an orbital fracture. The infliction of substantial bodily harm is third-degree assault. Minn.Stat. § 609.223 (2006). A departure cannot be based on uncharged criminal conduct. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d at 68; State v. Simon, 520 N.W.2d 393, 394 (Minn.1994) (explaining that a departure from the presumptive sentence for assault with a dangerous weapon cannot be based on an uncharged *358assault with a dangerous weapon accompanied by infliction of substantial bodily harm). In addition, Minn.Stat. § 609.035 (2006) prohibits cumulative punishment for conduct that constitutes more than one offense. A departure would also have been improper had the offense been charged. State v. Norregaard, 384 N.W.2d 449, 450 (Minn.1986) (holding that separate sentences for aggravated robbery and third-degree assault were barred by Minn.Stat. § 609.035 (1984)).
With regard to the zone of privacy, the nonconsensual entry into a dwelling with intent to commit a crime when a person (not an accomplice) is present is first-degree burglary. Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) (2006). The fact that the offense takes place in a dwelling elevates the crime to a higher grade than it would otherwise be. Compare id., subd. 2(a)(1) (burglary of a dwelling), with id., subd. 3 (burglary of a building). The crime of burglary “carries with it some special risks to life and is not therefore purely a property offense.” State v. Hodges, 386 N.W.2d 709, 711 (Minn.1986). Burglary is a serious crime, and punishment is allowed for both the burglary and the crime committed in the dwelling. Minn. Stat., § 609.585 (2006). Jackson’s aggravated robbery was a severity level VIII offense, and the parties agree that he had a criminal history score of 4. The presumptive sentence was 88 months, with a presumptive sentencing range of 75-105 months. By application of the rules that set the criminal history score at zero for consecutive sentences, Minn. Sent. Guidelines ILF., the presumptive range for the burglary, a severity level VIII offense, was 41-57 months. The maximum available duration without any departure for the robbery and burglary, hypothetically speaking, was therefore 162 months. This is not meant as a comment on charging decisions, which are solely within the discretion of the prosecution, but rather as an observation that the guidelines do not contemplate enhanced sentences based on uncharged criminal conduct that would be far greater than what would otherwise be permitted based on charged criminal conduct. We therefore hold that Jackson’s enhanced sentence was based upon impermissible departure factors.
II.
Pre-Blakely, when the reasons stated on the record for a departure were improper or inadequate, we independently examined the record to determine whether there was sufficient evidence “ ‘to justify departure’ for legitimate reasons.” State v. Jones, 745 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Minn.2008) (citation omitted). Post-Blakely, unless waived by the defendant, the fact-finding function is performed by the jury. Id. Accordingly, we reverse Jackson’s enhanced sentence and remand for imposition of the presumptive sentence or, unless waived by Jackson, the empanelling of a resentencing jury to determine the existence of facts in support of legitimate aggravating factors for enhanced sentencing, including sentencing as a career or dangerous offender under Minn.Stat. § 609.1095 (2006) as indicated in the pre-sentence investigation report. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D.b.(8) and (9); see State v. Henderson, 706 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn.2005) (holding that enhanced sentencing under the career offender statute required jury findings). As a matter of judicial policy in Minnesota, “a court cannot ‘impose on a defendant who has secured a new trial a sentence more onerous than the one he initially received.’” Hankerson v. State, 723 N.W.2d 232, 241 (Minn.2006) (quoting State v. Holmes, 281 Minn. 294, 296, 161 N.W.2d 650, 652 (1968)). Accordingly, on remand, the State cannot seek *359and the court cannot impose a sentence in excess of 210 months.
III.
In the interests of judicial economy, we address Jackson’s argument that a 210-month sentence is disproportionate. This argument implicates our decision in State v. Evans, in which we concluded that, generally, upward durational departures should not exceed double the presumptive sentence length. 311 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Minn.1981). Evans was a sentencing appeal related to convictions of aggravated robbery involving different elderly victims and different incidents in November 1980. Id. at 482. The defendant’s criminal history score was zero, the presumptive sentence under the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of the offenses for aggravated robbery with a criminal history score of zero was 24 months in prison, and consecutive sentencing was not a departure. Id. Thus, the guidelines permitted a 48-month sentence without departure. Id. The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms of 15 years each, or a total of 30 years. Id. This court reduced the sentence to 96 months, adopting the standard- that “generally in a case in which an upward departure in sentence length is justified, the upper limit will be double the presumptive sentence length.” Id. at 483. We also stated, however, that in “unusually compelling” cases “an even greater degree of departure will be justified.” Id.
Jackson argues that the guidelines sentencing system has changed considerably over the past 27 years, increasing dramatically the presumptive duration of sentences for serious offenses. He calls attention to the presumptive sentencing ranges that now extend 20 percent above the presumptive fixed sentence.2 His brief includes charts comparing the 1981 presumptive durations and ranges for serious offenses with the 2007 presumptive durations and ranges for the same offenses to illustrate the exponential increase in sentence durations by application of the Evans rule. He suggests that the Evans rule is no longer necessary given the wide presumptive sentencing ranges that cover a broader range of criminal conduct than the minimum to constitute the offense. In the alternative, Jackson proposes modifications to the rule, such as limiting any departure to twice the presumptive fixed duration or calculating the departure with a criminal history of zero to avoid “double counting” the offender’s criminal record.
*360We understand that in 2005 the legislature substantially broadened the sentencing ranges. When the guidelines were developed, statutory authority was granted for a 15 percent sentencing range. Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm’n, Report to the Legislature at 6 (Jan.2005). The Commission chose a narrower range. Id. The 2005 legislation required a sentencing range of 35 percent: 20 percent above the presumptive fixed sentence and 15 percent below the presumptive fixed sentence. Act of Aug. 1, 2005, ch. 136, art. 16, § 1, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1113 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5(2) (2006)). For example, a severity level IX offense with a zero criminal history score now has a sentencing range of 29 months (74 to 103), and the same offense with a criminal history of 6 or more has a range of 54 months (135 to 189). “[P]reviously, all cells at level IX had a width [of 10] months.” Parent & Frase, supra, 2005 WL 4001178, at *8. The intent of the legislation was to reduce aggravated durational departures. Id.
If a jury finds facts that support a departure from the presumptive sentence, the court may exercise discretion to depart but is not required to depart. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D.; see State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn.1981) (“It would be a rare case which would warrant reversal of the refusal to depart.”). Departures from the presumptive sentence are justified only when substantial and compelling circumstances are present in the record. State v. McIntosh, 641 N.W.2d 3, 8 (Minn.2002); Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D. To achieve uniformity and proportionality,' whether sentences above the broadened presumptive maximum merit stricter scrutiny is an open question. Appellate courts do have the authority to modify a sentence on many grounds, including that the sentence is inconsistent with statutory requirements, Minn.Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2006), or that modification is “in the interest of ‘fairness and uniformity.’” State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn.2006) (quoting State v. Vazquez, 330 N.W.2d 110, 112 (Minn.1983)).
As for the Evans doubling rule, it may be that the rule is in need of serious reevaluation, but we question whether this court is, at this time, the proper forum for doing so. This is especially true in light of the fact that the Guidelines Commission has collected and analyzed information on actual sentencing practices over the more than 25 years the guidelines have been in effect and makes recommendations to the legislature on various aspects of sentencing. Minn.Stat. § 244.09, subd. 6 (2006). We believe, in the first instance, that the continued efficacy of the Evans departure rule, if any, is a question more properly addressed by the Commission.3
Reversed and remanded.
. Dale G. Parent served as the Executive Director of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines from its inception in September 1978 until May 1982. The guidelines went into effect in May 1980. Richard S. Frase is the Benjamin N. Berger Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. Parent & Frase, supra, 2005 WL 4001178, at *1.
. Under the sentencing guidelines, sentences are determined by use of a grid system. Minn. Sent. Guidelines IV. The vertical axis on the grid tracks the severity of the offense, while the horizontal axis tracks the offender’s criminal history. To determine the proper sentence to be imposed in any given case, a sentencing court locates the cell on the grid that corresponds to the offense level and the offender’s criminal history. Not counting the cells applicable to relatively minor offenses, each cell on the grid contains three different numbers. The lowest number is the minimum guidelines sentence for that particular cell, the highest number is the maximum guidelines sentence, and the middle number is what might be referred to as the “presumptive fixed sentence.” Originally the presumptive sentencing range for an aggravated rob-beiy with a criminal history score of zero (which was the situation in Evans, 311 N.W.2d at 482) was 23-25 months. It is now 41-57 months. See Minn.Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5(2) (2006) (requiring Sentencing Commission to set presumptive fixed sentence as well as a sentencing range extending 20 percent above and 15 percent below that presumptive fixed sentence). All three numbers in any given cell constitute an acceptable sentence based solely on the offense at issue and the offender’s criminal history score-the lowest is not a downward departure, nor is the highest an upward departure. Minn. Sent. Guidelines IV. In Jackson's case, with a criminal history score of 4, the presumptive sentencing range, which was 60-70 months under the original formulation of the guidelines, is now 75-105 months.
. The dissent asserts that our interpretation of the sentencing guidelines system eliminates aggravating sentencing factors of particular cruelty and zone of privacy. We believe the dissent reads the majority too broadly. The jury in this case was not asked to find particular cruelty beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Kevin S. Burke, State v. Dettman: The End of the Sentencing Revolution or Just the Beginning?, 33 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 1331, 1342-43 (2007) (noting issues in defining "cruelty” for sentencing juries). As for zone of privacy, cases referencing burglaries of dwellings have involved particular cruelty. E.g., State v. Winchell, 363 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn.1985) (affirming sentencing departure when robbery occurred in late-night home invasion, defendant and his accomplice bound the victims, defendant put three people in fear, a young child was present, defendant held a gun next to a victim’s head, and rape was discussed). Cf. State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 379 (Minn.2005) (affirming sentencing departure when, in an attempt to assassinate a rival gang member, ten bullets were indiscriminately fired in a residential area and a particularly vulnerable child was *361shot to death while playing on a friend’s front porch). We disagree with the dissent's claim that we have created a new rule. As we explained, one of the Guidelines Commission’s key policy choices was that an enhanced sentence could not be “based on offenses for which the defendant had not been charged.” Parent & Frase, supra, 2005 WL 4001178, at *5. We believe this policy choice is as significant following the 2005 legislation that substantially broadened the sentencing ranges as it was with the original sentencing ranges.