Dissenting Opinion.
Cooper, P. J.I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this matter for the following reasons:
The general rule of lav/ has been many times stated by both this Court and our Supreme Court in construing the Employment Security Act of Indiana that the findings of ultimate fact of the Board of Review are conclusive upon the courts upon a judicial review if sustained by any evidence of probative value.
In reviewing §52-1542 (k), Burns’ Ind. Stat. Anno., 1951 Repl., it affirmatively appears that the Employment Security Act contemplates that the Board of Review shall make a finding of ultimate facts, and, upon such finding of ultimate facts, base their conclusion of law and thereafter, make their decision thereon.
It is apparent from the purported findings and conclusions appearing in the record that the Board of Review failed to carry out the mandate of the statute hereinabove referred to, the purported findings and conclusions appearing in the record are as follow:
“The disparaging remarks about her religion may have been only unfeeling teasing or ‘kidding,’ but it was also the unfunny kind that can be seriously upsetting to any sensitive person. The relationship between the claimant and her fellow employee, and eventually between herself and the company, resulted in such an impasse that the claimant was compelled, in her own mind, to quit her job, although she was enthusiastic about the work and did not want to leave it. The employer did nothing to retain, the claimant’s services.
“The referee found that the circumstances under which the claimant left were somewhat *514confusing, that as a result of the accumulating circumstances of this separation, the employment relationship of this employer and this claimant reached a point where no alternative was available to the employer but to separate her. The majority of the Board believes that this doubt should be resolved in the claimant’s favor. Whether or not the claimant had good cause to leave his work in any case is a fact question to be decided upon the basis of the circumstances attendant to the particular case. National Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Review Board (1960), - Ind. App.-, 170 N. E. 2d 381. The claimant in the instant case did not leave her work voluntarily without good cause.
“DECISION: The referee’s decision in his case No. 60-A-2553, issued January 26, 1961 is hereby reversed.”
An exhaustive research of the authorities in this state fails to reveal any case wherein a statement of facts, such as in this case, were held to be ultimate findings of fact.
It is my opinion that the foregoing are not findings of ultimate fact as required by the statute and the rules of good legal procedure, but consist mainly of speculation and conjecture; some of it being merely argumentive.
It affirmatively appears from the majority opinion that the writer of said opinion assumes that the following statement, “The claimant in the instant case did not leave her work voluntarily without good cause”, is a finding of fact. With this I cannot agree as I am of the opinion that the foregoing statement is the conclusion of law which was necessary to justify the Board under the statute in making the decision they made in reversing the referee’s prior decision.
I realize that administrative boards are not generally bound by the strict rules of legal procedure *515applicable in actions of law; however, I do not believe we can close our eyes to important omissions such as is apparent in the present case before us because it is apparent from the majority opinion that the writer thereof was compelled to search and review the entire record in order to arrive at and determine the evidence in the case most favorable to the decision of the Board of Review, and in fact, set forth in such opinion matters of ultimate fact which should have been found by the Board of Review.
It has long been the general rule of law set forth in numerous decisions by this court and the Supreme Court of Indiana that every fact necessary for a petitioner’s recovery must be found and stated in the findings, or judgment must be for the defendant. Kehr v. Hall (1889), 117 Ind. 405, 20 N. E. 279; Town of Freedom v. Norris (1891), 128 Ind. 377, 27 N. E. 869; Mitchell v. Brawley (1895), 140 Ind. 216, 39 N. E. 497; McClure v. Anderson (1915), 58 Ind. App. 615, 108 N. E. 757; State ex rel. Siebrase v. Meiser (1929), 201 Ind. 337, 168 N. E. 185. Nothing can be added to a finding of fact by presumption, inference or - intendment. Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Moneyhun (1896), 146 Ind. 147, 44 N. E. 1106, 34 L. R. A. 141; Craig v. Bennett (1897), 146 Ind. 574, 45 N. E. 792; Hill v. Swihart (1897), 148 Ind. 319, 47 N. E. 705; Crowder v. Riggs, Auditor (1899), 153 Ind. 158, 53 N. E, 1019; Donaldson v. State ex rel. (1906), 167 Ind. 553, 78 N. E. 182; Rankin v. McCollister (1911), 175 Ind. 387, 93 N. E. 209; State ex rel. Siebrase v. Meiser, supra. Where a finding of fact is silent upon a material point it is deemed to be found against the one who has the burden of proof. Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Moneyhun, supra; Donaldson v. State ex rel., supra; Rankin v. McCollister, supra; Westphal v. Heckman *516(1916), 185 Ind. 88, 113 N. E. 299; State ex rel. Siebrase v. Meiser, supra. The finding should not set forth the evidence but should state the facts. Bryant v. Barger (1939), 106 Ind. App. 245, 250, 251, 18 N. E. 2d 965.
Furthermore, it affirmatively appears from the decision of the Board, which reads as follows: “The referee’s decision in his case No. 60-A-2553, issued January 26, 1961, is hereby reversed,” that the only action the Board took in reviewing the proceedings now before us was to reverse the decision of the referee. It does not make any decision of granting or denying unemployment benefits to the appellee herein, as originally prayed for below and as contemplated and required by the statute. This I believe is a fatal error.
I would remand the cause to the Review Board with instructions to make findings of ultimate fact and a decision thereon for or against the petitioner below.
Note. — Reported in 183 N. E. 2d 351.