(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent on several bases. First, as noted by the majority, the prevailing policy in Minnesota is that vacation of a default judgment should be liberally granted to encourage trials on the merits. Taylor v. Steinke, 295 Minn. 244, 246, 203 N.W.2d 859, 860 (1973). This is particularly true where, as here, there appears to be a valid defense and no substantial prejudice will result to plaintiff if the judgment is vacated. Id.
Here, the trial court found, and I agree, that appellants offered sufficient evidence to support a reasonable defense on the merits. Furthermore, appellants acted with due diligence in responding almost immediately after notice of entry of the default judgment. A demand letter and copy of an unsigned complaint do not constitute legal notice of a pending action to which appellants were required to reply. It is evident that Hovelson sent the unsigned complaint, which raised numerous causes of action and quoted inflammatory language for the purpose of its shock value, to intimidate appellants into settlement. Appellants’ failure to respond to the settlement demand was not unjustified nor was their response legally required.
In addition, and most importantly, Hovel-son has shown no prejudice. In acknowledging this fact, the trial court declined to vacate the default judgment because the “conduct of defendant borders on intentionally ignoring process and vacation should not be allowed.” The trial court’s apparent offense at appellants’ actions is not a sufficient basis for denying the motion to vacate.
Considering appellants’ showing on three out of the four criteria, the trial court erred in refusing to permit appellants to litigate the action on the merits.
Further, a judgment may also be opened when plaintiff has not proven every element of the case, including damages, by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Hill v. Tischer, 385 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Minn.Ct.App.1986); see also Elk River Enterprises, Inc. v. Adams, 357 N.W.2d 139, 140-41 (Minn. Ct.App.1984).
Although the record indicates that Hovel-son offered some evidence to support her claim, it is not apparent from the trial court’s findings and conclusions that Hov-elson proved every element of her case by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, the trial court’s award of almost $78,-000 for breach of contract and $77,000 for some questionable remaining claims is du-plicative, giving Hovelson a windfall in a matter of questionable merit.
*145Finally, I believe the trial court seriously erred in granting Hovelson’s ex parte motion to add USSF Minnesota and Scandinavian USSF as defendants after Hovelson had been contacted by opposing counsel, particularly since appellants had contacted Hovelson to inform her that judgment had been entered in the wrong name and to request that the judgment be vacated.
For all these reasons, I would vacate the default judgment and allow the parties to proceed with a trial on the merits.