concurring in part and concurring in result in part.
I concur in result, but write separately in light of the majority’s conclusion that the letter agreements do not terminate until revocation of the gaming license. On all other issues, I concur.
As an initial matter I must note that, incredibly, East Chicago argues that the letter agreements are not enforceable, yet asks to receive increased payments through their enforcement. “[T]his Court should find that the letter agreement is void and unenforceable as a matter of law and that East Chicago was entitled to summary judgment....” Appellant’s Brief at 44. In its motion, East Chicago asked the trial court to “bar the payment of further gaming revenues to Second Century and the Foundations, [and] redirect such revenues to the City....” App. at 585. If, as East Chicago suggests, the letter agreements are void, then it lacks any basis for its claim.
Accepting East Chicago’s assertion that the letter agreements are void, the majority did not need to reach the issue of the contract’s duration. However, if we must, I would agree with East Chicago and conclude that the letter agreements terminated after five years.1 The 1995 letter refer-*384eneed “the first 5 years of licensure, but contained no other terms regarding the contract’s duration. Id. at 669. Per statute, the parties understood that the term of the original license would be five years. Ind.Code § 4-33-6-10(c) (1993) (ss). The parties also were aware that the license was issued to a gaming concern rather than the City or any other local entity. As such, there cannot be any reasonable expectation that the agreement would be effective beyond the original five-year term, as the majority concludes, especially where the license was not a property right (Ind. Code § 4-33-6-17(2) (1993) (ss)), was subject to revocation by the Commission at any time (I.C. § 4-33-6-17(1) (1993) (ss)), and statute requires annual renewal (Ind. Code § 4-33-6-12 (1993) (ss)). While the majority concludes that the letter agreements terminate upon a remote, improbable event, the practical effect of that decision binds the parties and their successors indefinitely. A contract that has no termination date or which provides that it will last indefinitely is terminable at will by either party. See Ten Cate Enbi, Inc. v. Metz, 802 N.E.2d 977, 982 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (citing Marksill Specialties, Inc. v. Barger, 428 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Ind.Ct.App.1981)). Therefore, at most, there exists a contract terminable at will.
Regardless, the outcome is the same whether a contract exists or not. This Court cannot reward East Chicago’s duplicity. For these reasons, I concur in result.
. In an Alice-in-Wonderland battle among those asserting entitlement to gambling revenues, East Chicago is the only party challenging the contract's duration. In its answer, Resorts asked the trial court to determine "the parties’ respective rights under the Economic Development Letter Agreements in the event that the Commission approves the transfer of the Gaming License [to Resorts] and includes as a condition of the Gaming License that Resorts comply with the Economic Development Letter Agreements.” Id. at 322 (emphasis added). Resorts apparently considered itself obligated to make the payments as a condition of receiving a gaming license to operate the assets purchased from Harrah’s, but it did not admit to being bound by the letter agreements or by the series of subsequent agreements in 1998, 1999, and 2000. Resorts did not submit an appellate brief.
It does not appear that the current license requires compliance with the terms of the letter agreements. In originally licensing Showboat to operate the riverboat in East Chicago, the Commission attached the letter agreements as exhibits to its Certificate of Suitability and established the payments as a condition of licensure. In 1999, the Commission issued a license to Harrah's. Concluding that Harrah's had committed to honor the Showboat letter agreements, the Commission decided informally that "Second Century is a negotiated item in the economic development agreement,” and that oversight of Second Century would be left to the City. App. at 2169, 2294.
Second Century brought the instant action on April 15, 2005. Six days later, in issuing a gaming license to Resorts, the Commission made no reference to the provisions of the letter agreements. On March 9, 2006, the Commission renewed the license. While the Commission established four conditions of li-censure, none of them addressed the disputed payments. On June 8, 2006, the Commission passed "A Resolution Disapproving in Part the East Chicago Local Development Agreement.” Id. at 2201-04. The Resolution disapproved of that portion of the letter agreements "requiring the riverboat licensee(s) to make payments to Second Century.” Id. at 2202.