dissenting:
There can be no doubt that the words “whenever possible” vest the court with discretion. As I interpret that discretion it is not limited solely to the question whether there are, or can be found, persons of the same religious belief willing to adopt the child; it includes other relevant considerations as well. But it is not a discretion that permits the court to omit entirely the question of religious belief or to depreciate the high priority that the legislature clearly intended it to have. In this case the record shows that the probation officer completely disregarded the statute. His unremitting efforts to bring about the adoption of these children by the petitioners began before the children were born. The record further shows that there were numerous Catholic families whose homes had been investigated by a licensed child welfare agency, who were seeking children to adopt, were of good reputation, and who were available to adopt these children. Under these circumstances, it seems to me that the trial court was clearly within its discretion in dismissing the petition and that the Appellate Court correctly sustained that action. 8 Ill. App.2d 144.
So far as intervention is concerned, the opinion of the court suggests a literal application of the provisions of section 26.1 of the Civil Practice Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, chap. 110, par. 26.1.) Adoption proceedings have unique characteristics, however, and the legislature has recognized them in the statute relating to adoptions, where it is provided that the court “shall specifically designate either a licensed child welfare agency, probation officer of the court, or some other suitable agency or person” to investigate the circumstances of the case and report to the court. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, chap. 4, par. 3 — 1.) Such an ex parte report is unknown in adversary litigation. I think that the recognized capacity of licensed agencies to render important assistance in these unusual cases, makes inappropriate a literal application of the rules that govern intervention in other cases.
Mr. Justice Schaefer concurs in the foregoing dissent.