dissenting:
Neither the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States nor those of this court compel the curtailment of effective grand jury investigations that is brought about by the opinion of the majority.
The majority strikes down that portion of the subpoena that demanded the production of the following books and records of Gaylur “for the period from January 1, 1964 to March 31, 1966”: “[g]eneral ledger, accounts receivable and accounts payable records, cash receipts and cash disbursements journals, payroll ledger, bank statements ande cancelled checks.” The determination that this portion of the subpoena was unreasonably broad is based on the assertion that it includes “items essential to the conduct of Gaylur’s business relationships with companies and individuals other than those who could conceivably affect North America’s interests.”
To evaluate these conclusions it is necessary to consider the testimony given by George Klauser, the chief auditor for the State’s Attorney’s office. The parties stipulated that Klauser is “an expert in the auditing field as an accountant, and more specifically as relates to the investigation of financial crimes.”
Klauser’s explanation of the procedure employed in examining corporate books demonstrates that concern for “the vital nature of these records to Gaylur’s operations” is not well-founded. While Klauser did admit that some of the “items [are] essential to the conduct of Gaylur’s day to day affairs,” he also explained that “where it might exert a hardship on the company that tenders the books and records, without [their] leaving the hands of the representative of the company we make copies of the * * * records and return them immediately.” The majority does not attempt to explain how such a very temporary deprivation of Gaylur’s books can be regarded as “unreasonably burdensome,” the determinative criterion. Cf., See v. City of Seattle, (1967) 387 U.S. 541, 544, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, 947, 87 S. Ct. 1737.
In finding that a portion of the subpoena is unreasonably broad, the majority suggests that Klauser’s sole justification for including the items found objectionable was a vague assertion that they are necessary “to balance the total picture of the company.” In fact, however, Klauser explained in detail the specific relevance of each item:
“The general ledger is pertinent and material to the investigation. The general ledger is a summary or control of any business, and that would be the book that we’d have to balance all activity out with, to ascertain if any shortage or theft or fraud was perpetrated against the Insurance Company of North America.
“The accounts receivable and accounts payable records are records that would support the entries made in the general ledger. They would be the detailed records of the accounts receivable. If merchandise was sold, belonging to the Insurance Company of North America, not yet paid for, the accounts receivable records should reflect that. The accounts payable records would reflect merchandise that had been sold for which the Insurance Company of North America had not yet been paid.
“The cash receipts journal would reflect, in detail, the entries of the general ledger. It would show what material was sold belonging to the Insurance Company of North America. The cash disbursements also would, in detail, reflect what disbursements were made in handling the sale of this merchandise belonging to the Insurance Company of North America.
“The payroll ledger is part of the balance, in detail, of entries made in the general ledger. It would reflect, in part, what expenses were incurred by Gaylur, in selling merchandise belonging to the Insurance Company of North America.
“Bank statements and cancelled checks are material and pertinent to the investigation because they would support the entries made in the cash receipts and cash disbursement journals.”
The majority finds that the records it regards as objectionable will disclose information about companies that had no dealings with the Insurance Company of North America, but that finding alone does not support a conclusion that these records are immaterial to the grand jury’s legitimate inquiries. It merely indicates that compliance with the subpoena would necessarily produce some irrelevant information. The determinative question is whether these records will also disclose information that is relevant, and that question is not answered. In contrast, Klauser’s testimony and the findings of the circuit court are clear: there is reasonable cause to believe that the documents do contain information relevant to the grand jury’s investigation.
The texts of the grand jury subpoenas that were sustained in People v. Allen, 410 Ill. 508, cert. denied, (1952) 344 U.S. 815, 97 L. Ed. 635, 73 S. Ct. 9, and People v. Ryan, 410 Ill. 486, cert. denied, (1952) 343 U.S. 964, 96 L. Ed. 1361, are set forth in those opinions. They specifically demanded all but two of the eight items that the majority in this case finds objectionable. The first of the two remaining items, “bank statements,” is no more than the equivalent of a “check register and journal,” “[a] 11 cancelled checks,” and “[a] 11 records showing cash receipts” and “cash disbursements,” all of which were demanded in the earlier cases. The relevance of the second of the two items, the “payroll ledger”, was explained as follows by Klauser: “The payroll ledger is part of the balance, in detail, of entries made in the general ledger. It would reflect, in part, what expenses were incurred by Gaylur, in selling merchandise belonging to the Insurance Company of North America.” Klauser further stated that he had been informed by the State’s Attorney’s office “that, in making an accounting with the insurance company [North America], Gaylur stated, on its report, the amount that was expended for different types of services * * * [and that] the amount that was spent for payroll expenses is separated on this report.” It was not unreasonable to investigate the possibility that one method by which Gaylur might have perpetrated frauds upon North America was by overstating the amounts paid employees for services performed on North America’s account.
The controlling considerations were recently set forth in People v. Allen, 410 Ill. 508. There we pointed out that “it is obvious that no absolute rule can be laid down either as to the number of books and records which can be compelled to be produced or as to the time interval which they cover. For what the constitutions prohibit is not all searches and seizures, but only those which are unreasonable. (People v. Reid, 336 Ill. 421; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, [55 L. Ed. 771.]) The reasonable scope of an investigation depends upon what is being investigated. * * * The constitutional provisions were not intended to paralyze the power of the government to ferret out crime. The observation in Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541, 554, [52 L. Ed. 327, 336,] is pertinent: ‘But unless it can be said that the court or grand jury never has any right to call for all the books and papers, or correspondence, between certain dates and certain persons named, in regard to a complaint which is pending before such court or grand jury, we think the objection here made is not well founded. We see no reason why all such books, papers and correspondence which related to the subject of inquiry, and were described with reasonable detail, should not be called for and the company directed to produce them. Otherwise, the State would be compelled to designate each particular paper which it desired, which presupposes an accurate knowledge of such papers, which the tribunal desiring the papers would probably rarely, if ever, have’.” 410 Ill. at 514-15. See also, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling (1945), 327 U.S. 186, 90 L. Ed. 614; United States v. Morton Salt Co. (1949), 338 U.S. 632, 94 L. Ed. 401; United States v. Bryan (1949), 339 U.S. 323, 94 L. Ed. 884.
Mr. Justice Underwood concurs in this dissent.