*1020ORIGINAL ACTION
DeBRULER, Justice.
This is an original action challenging the authority of the respondent to stay and suspend a condemnation order overruling objections to a complaint of relator to condemn a right of way for a high voltage transmission line over certain privately owned lands, and the appointment of appraisers to assess damages for the taking. The stay order prevented relator from utilizing the easement pending the appeal.
Following the order of condemnation and appointment of appraisers, the proceedings in the cause in the trial court continued up to the point where relators paid the damages assessed by the court-appointed appraisers to the clerk, and thereby became entitled pursuant to Ind.Code § 32-11-1-7 to take possession of the subject easement. After that point the landowners sought and respondent granted the stay order which we now consider.
Respondent and the landowners find authority for the stay order in Ind.R.Tr.P. 62(D), Ind.R.App.P. 6(B) and 4(B)(6). Relator's claim of no jurisdiction is based on the eminent domain statute.
Indiana Code § 32-11-1-5 gives the owner the right to file objections to the con-demmnor's lawful authority to maintain a condemnation action in court, and the right to immediately appeal an adverse decision on the question in an expedited fashion. This granting section concludes however with the proviso that "such appeal shall not stay proceedings in such cause." Proceedings which routinely follow an overruling of objections include an assessment of damages by the court-appointed appraisers, payment of such damages to the clerk with assumption of possession of the subject property by the condemmor, and a trial upon any exceptions to finally determine damages and just compensation.
In this case the condemnation order was made December 30, 1982, and relator paid the clerk the damages assessed by the court-appointed appraisers on March 28, 1988. On June 18, 1988 almost three
months later the respondent court issued its order staying the condemnation order pending its appeal, and thereby prevented relator from exercising its right to possession and use of the easement during the appeal, a right which it had gained by paying the clerk the assessed damages in the sum of $52,500.00, pursuant to Ind.Code § 82-11-1-7, which provides:
"If the plaintiff (condemnor) shall pay to the clerk of such court the amount of damages thus assessed, it shall be lawful for such plaintiff to take possession of and hold the interest in the lands so appropriated, for the uses stated in such complaint, subject to the appeal provided for in section five [82-11-1-5] [appeal of interlocutory order of appropriation and appointing appraisers] of this act."
The foremost object of statutory interpretation is to determine and carry out the legislative intent as expressed in the statute. Thompson v. Thompson, (1972) 259 Ind. 266, 286 N.E.2d 657. Individual sections in the statute should be read in light of the statute as a whole. The words used in the statute are assumed to have been intended to retain their ordinary and popularly understood meaning. If the legislative intent is clear from the language of the statute, the language prevails and will be given effect. Eads, et al. v. J. & J. Sales Corp., (1971) 257 Ind. 485, 275 N.E.2d 802.
As we read the two provisions quoted from above the Legislature states in clear and direct fashion that the immediate appeal of a condemnation order shall not be a source of reason to impede the further proceedings in the case at the trial level. The intention is clear and unmistakable. It is that the prosecution of the case at the trial level must be permitted to continue on as though no appeal of the condemnation order was taking place. That this reading of the language is accurate is supported by that of Ind.Code § 82-11-1-7 which proclaims that "it shall be lawful for such plaintiff to take possession of and hold the interest in the lands so appropriated, for the uses stated in the complaint, subject to the appeal provided for in section five [32-11-*10211-5] [appeal of interlocutory order of appropriation and appointing appraisers] in this act." It is again unmistakable that the statute contemplates that the condemnor will take possession of the subject lands while the appeal of the condemnation order is going on. That possession however is specifically to be regarded as subject to, i.e., subordinate to, the outcome of the appeal. We therefore hold that respondent's stay order is contrary to the express intent of the Legislature which is unmistakable in the language employed in the statute. We would venture to say that the purpose the Legislature had in mind was to avoid delay in trial court proceedings, which would in turn, to a high degree of probability, adversely effect the public interest to be served by the acquisition. The Legislature has, in bestowing the immediate right of the landowner to appeal the condemnation order rather than requiring that such appeal be taken after the final determination of damages, burdened the condemnor with separate defense of the appeal and its additional costs, and actual tender of damages assessed by the neutral court-appointed appraisers as a condition to taking possession of the subject lands, and burdened the landowner with the requirement of proceeding with the appeal in an expedited fashion and has in these and other respects sought to balance the competing interests of con-demmnor and condemnee to be effected by a stay order.
Respondent and the landowners however contend that the authority to stay the condemnation order stems from this Court's rules. Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(B)(6) provides for the certification of interlocutory orders to the Court of Appeals for immediate review and recognizes the authority of the trial court to stay such orders, and further provides that statutes in conflict are superseded. To conclude that this rule governs, while attractive in the sense that it would bring another proceeding under the general umbrella of the rules, would be intolerable in that it would require that the discretion of the trial court to deny the statutory right of a landowner to appeal a condemnation order immediately be recognized. It is by reason of the eminent domain statute that the appropriation order is immediately reviewable on appeal. Indiana Serv. Corp. v. Flora, (1941) 218 Ind. 208, 31 N.E.2d 1015. It is therefore clear that the discretion recognized in trial court to certify interlocutory orders has no application to appeals from appropriation orders in condemnation cases. Trial courts and appellate courts have no authority to prevent the immediate appeal of condemnation orders. It is likewise clear that the purpose of Ind.R.App.P. 4 is to draw the line between the jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals. The language in 4(B)(6) that statutes in conflict with the rule are superseded, refers to conflicts with this general purpose. It does not purport to supersede statutory provisions for immediate appeals in special situations such as the eminent domain statute. Appellate Rule 6(B) and Trial Rule 62(D) both expressly recognize the continued validity of special statutory provisions.
Rule 6(B) provides in part:
"Nothing herein shall be construed as giving a right to stay, by giving such bond, any judgment or order which cannot now be stayed and suspended by the giving of an appeal bond."
Trial Rule 62 contains like language and a like recognition of special statutory provisions governing the right to stay orders pending appeal. We therefore conclude that there is no conflict within the realm of stay orders pending appeal between the eminent domain statute and the aforementioned rules of this Court, and that the statute therefore governs. Accordingly we conclude that the respondent had no jurisdiction to issue the stay order which is the subject of this original action. The permanent writ requiring that such order be expunged is therefore granted this day.
HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur. GIVAN, C.J., dissents with opinion in which PIV J., concurs.