Trusley v. State

VAIDIK, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent with the majority's conclusion that Trusley's admissions at her guilty plea and sentencing hearings do not constitute an admission to facts underlying the aggravating cireumstance that she was in a position of trust with the ten-month-old victim. Consequently, I would affirm Trusley's enhanced sentence.

In Blakely v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court applied the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), which provides: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Blakely, - U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2536, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348). "A fact that is admitted by the defendant does not run afoul of the Blakety/Apprendi constitutional requirements." Teeters v. State, 817 N.E.2d 275, 279 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); see also Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537. Thus, if a defendant admits to facts underlying an aggravator, the jury does not have to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether that aggravator exists.

Being in a "position of trust" with the victim is a valid aggravating cireumstance, see Bacher v. State, 722 N.E.2d 799, 802 n. 5 (Ind.2000), and the trial court found that this aggravator was present here. At her guilty plea hearing, Trusley admitted that on February 27, 2001, the victim was in her care; that she acted recklessly while the victim was in her care; and that such *114recklessness resulted in the victim's death. Trusley also admitted that she was "a daycare provider for him and [she] had custody of him during the period of time in which he died[.]" Plea Tr. p. 10. During her sentencing hearing, Trusley testified that she was a daycare provider and that at the time of the victim's death, she had been running her daycare business for approximately five years.

I believe these admissions are sufficient to establish that Trusley was in a position of trust with the victim. Because Trusley admitted that she was the victim's daycare provider and that she had custody of him at the time of his death, it is hard to imagine what other information would be necessary in order to establish that Trus-ley was in a position of trust with the victim. Because Trusley admitted to facts underlying the position of trust aggravstor, a jury did not have to find that this aggravator existed. Because a single aggravating circumstance is adequate to justify a sentence enhancement, see Powell v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1128, 1135 (Ind.2002), reh'g denied, I would affirm Trusley's enhanced sentence.