(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The questions before us are essentially (1) Does Minn.Stat. § 609.43(2) embrace conduct other than that specifically prohibited by statute? and (2) May violations of a city’s ethics manual, incorporating ethical codes of a lawyer’s professional responsibility, be the source of a claim that a prosecutor exceeded lawful authority and committed misconduct? I would answer both questions in the affirmative.
In dismissing the indictments for failure to state an offense, the trial court stated that only the legislature can declare specific conduct criminal offenses and that violations of the code of professional ethics cannot be the basis for criminal charges unless that behavior is specifically prohibited by statute. The indictments read:
Count I: Misconduct of Public Officer or Employee
From on or about October, 1982, through on or about July, 1985, in the City of Minneapolis, County of Hennepin, defendant in his capacity as Deputy City Attorney for the City of Minneapolis, did intentionally perform acts which he knew to be in excess of his lawful authority: to-wit: Defendant dismissed numerous parking tickets and dismissed, compromised, delayed or otherwise wrongfully manipulated the disposition of numerous tickets for moving violations as personal favors for Erwin Dauphin, to whom he was at such time financially indebted, with surrounding circumstances causing said acts to be flagrant violations of the Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility and the Ethics Code of the Minneapolis City Attorney.
Count II: Misconduct of Public Officer or Employee
From on or about October, 1982, through on or about July, 1985, in the City of Minneapolis, County of Hennepin, defendant in his capacity as Deputy City Attorney for the City of Minneapolis, did intentionally perform acts which he knew to be in excess of his lawful authority: to-wit: Defendant dismissed, compromised, delayed or otherwise wrongfully manipulated the disposition of numerous tickets for moving violations as personal favors for Stephen Wallack, to whom he was at such times financially indebted, with surrounding circumstances causing said acts to be flagrant violations of the Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility and the Ethics Code of the Minneapolis City Attorney.
Count III: Misconduct of Public Officer or Employee
From on or about October, 1982, through on or about July, 1985, in the City of Minneapolis, County of Hennepin, defendant in his capacity as Deputy City Attorney for the City of Minneapolis, did intentionally perform acts which he knew to be in excess of his lawful authority: to-wit: As favors to persons with whom he had direct or indirect personal or financial connections, defendant dismissed, compromised, delayed, or otherwise manipulated the disposition of numerous tickets for moving violations which occurred outside the City of Minneapolis, without possessing the informed authority of the responsible city attorney, and with surrounding circumstances causing said acts to both exceed defendant’s statutory authority and to be flagrant violations of the Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility and the Ethics Code of the Minneapolis City Attorney.
*407The indictment identified the basis for acts done “in excess of [Serstock’s] lawful authority” as prohibitions contained in the Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility and similar provisions in the Minneapolis City Attorney Code of Public Service Ethics Manual.
The disciplinary rules of the Lawyer’s Code applicable to the ticket fixing allegations include the following:
DR 1-102. Misconduct
(A) A lawyer shall not:
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(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
DR 8-101. Action as a Public Official (A) A lawyer who holds public office shall not:
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(3) Accept any thing of value from any person when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the offer is for the purpose of influencing his action as a public official.
DR 9-101. Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety
* * * * * *
(C) A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence improperly or upon irrelevant grounds any tribunal, legislative body, or public official.
The city attorney’s Ethics Manual, effective April 26,1976, is intended to “eliminate conflicts of interest in public office, improve standards of public service, and promote and strengthen the faith and confidence of the people of Minneapolis in their government.” Minneapolis City Attorney Code of Public Service Ethics Manual § 5.2. Even the appearance of impropriety shall be scrupulously avoided. Id. at § 5.3. The code is an official document of the city attorney’s office, prescribing ethical requirements and behavior of Minneapolis city attorneys. The city attorney’s code incorporates some of the broader mandates of the Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility, but is more specific. Provisions of the city attorney’s code applicable to respondent’s conduct include prohibitions against:
a. Using public office for private gain.
b. Giving discriminatory treatment to any person.
Id. at § 9.3.
Section 10 of the manual deals with conflicts of interest:
10.1 A conflict of interest exists whenever the performance of the official duties of a regular or special appointee has or appears to have a direct and predictable effect upon the private interest of such appointee or of the appointee’s spouse, child, parent, brother, sister or any person, partnership, firm, corporation or other organization with which he/she is associated financially. For example, a conflict of interest exists whenever official duties require a regular or special appointee to take a position that adversely affects his/her private interests. Private interests include special benefits, privileges, exemptions or advantages, pecuniary or otherwise.
10.2 No regular or special appointee shall permit a conflict of interest, as defined in Section 10.1, to exist.
Finally, section 11.1 generally prohibits city attorneys from soliciting or accepting any “compensation, gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan, or any other thing of monetary value.” (Emphasis added.)
Former Anoka County Attorney Robert Johnson testified before the grand jury as an expert on the prosecutor’s function and the limits placed on the prosecutor. Johnson was county attorney for 32 years and served on a national committee that established prosecutorial standards and goals.
Johnson stated that prosecutors must be beyond reproach because the prosecutor is the principal official who administers and maintains the integrity of the criminal jus*408tice process. He testified that ethical codes pertaining to conflicts of interest and avoiding the appearance of impropriety apply more so to prosecutors than to private attorneys. Johnson also stated that it is unprofessional conduct to exceed a prosecutor’s discretion and that a prosecutor has no lawful authority to engage in unprofessional conduct.
We recently discussed the phrase “lawful authority” in State v. Andersen, 370 N.W.2d 653 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), where we affirmed a mayor’s conviction of misconduct of a public official under Minn.Stat. § 609.43(2). We stated:
The term “lawful authority” derives its meaning from a set of rules not contained in the official misconduct statute. The statute, however, does not leave a judge or jury with unrestrained discretion to define a crime. The lawful authority of the public officers of this State is not so poorly defined that, as a general principle, public officials, judges and juries are unable to determine the propriety of a public officer’s actions.
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In addition, actions are “forbidden by law” under section 609.43(2) in the generic sense. There does not have to be particular penal statute which forbids Andersen’s alleged conduct in order for her to be prosecuted under section 609.-43(2). What was illegal for Andersen to do in her official capacity as mayor is not so indefinite that a legitimate argument can even be made that she could legally threaten a citizen of the town she governs and then seek to interfere with an investigation of her threats. The ordinary citizen could understand that section 609.43(2) clearly encompasses her alleged conduct.
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Sometimes generalizations must be used in regulations which apply to an array of public employees because of the impracticality and difficulty of phrasing the regulations more precisely.
Id. at 662-63 (citations omitted).
Read literally, the statute at issue seems to cover conduct not otherwise proscribed by criminal statutes, as Andersen states. The statute includes the phrase “for which no other sentence is specifically provided by law,” as well as a prohibition against “an act which he knows is in excess of his lawful authority or which he knows he is forbidden by law to do in his official capacity.”
Respondent relies on the general rule of interpretation that penal statutes are strictly construed. State v. Corbin, 343 N.W.2d 874 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). However, this does not mean that only the narrowest possible construction must be adopted in disregard of the purpose of the statute. United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 510, 75 S.Ct. 504, 508, 99 L.Ed. 594 (1955); State v. Tronca, 84 Wis.2d 68, 80, 267 N.W.2d 216, 221 (1978).
In New Jersey, the common law crime1 of official misconduct was recently codified. N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2. Both before and after the codification in 1979, the New Jersey courts gave a broad interpretation to official misconduct. In Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 474-75, 86 A.2d 201, 221, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, 73 S.Ct. 25, 97 L.Ed. 652 (1952), the court discussed the duties of public officers. The court held that they are “under an inescapable obligation to serve the public with the highest fidelity,” that “they are required to display such intelligence and skill as they are capable of, to be diligent and conscientious, to exercise their discretion not arbitrarily but reasonably, and above all to display good faith, honesty and integrity,” and that “[t]hey must be impervious to corrupting influences and they must transact their business frankly and openly.” Id. (citations omitted). These obligations are imposed on public *409officers by the common law and are “essential to the soundness and efficiency of our government, which exists for the benefit of the people who are its sovereign.” Id. at 476, 86 A.2d at 222 (citation omitted).
In State v. Weleck, 10 N.J. 355, 369, 91 A.2d 751, 758 (1952), the New Jersey court upheld an indictment against a prosecutor for misconduct recognizing that public officers cannot divorce themselves from basic moral principles. See State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63 (1953). The Winne court quoted from 1 Burdick, Law of Crime 388:
Misconduct in office, or ‘official misconduct,’ means, therefore, any unlawful behavior in relation to official duties by an officer intrusted in any way with the administration of law and justice, or, as otherwise defined, any act or omission in breach of a duty of public concern, by one who has accepted public office.
Id. 12 N.J. at 176, 96 A.2d at 75.
More recently, in State v. Stevens, 203 N.J.Super. 59, 495 A.2d 910 (N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.1984) the court, in dealing with misconduct of a police officer for conducting strip searches, stated that the “charge of misconduct in office may be sustained without -proof of a criminal act.” Id. 203 N.J.Super. at 68, 495 A.2d 915 (emphasis added).
The rationale of the New Jersey cases was expressly adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Hess, 279 S.C. 14, 20, 301 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1983), a case affirming the conviction of a police chief for common law misconduct in secretly meeting with a key figure in organized crime and accepting money from him.
Illinois courts have also adopted a broad view of official misconduct. In People v. Samel, 115 Ill.App.3d 905, 71 Ill.Dec. 738, 451 N.E.2d 892 (1983), a police officer was convicted of official misconduct for his use of a law enforcement data system to facilitate burglaries. The court stated that the phrase “lawful authority” as used in the Illinois official misconduct statute
derives its meaning from a set of rules not contained in the official misconduct statute, and the phrase “in excess of his lawful authority” is sufficiently definite to enable public officials and employees to determine the propriety of their actions.
Id. 115 Ill.App.3d at 909, 71 Ill.Dec. at 742, 451 N.E.2d at 896 (citation omitted).
The Samel court also stated:
The purpose of the official misconduct statute is manifestly to compel public officials and employees, while acting in their official capacity, to do so in a lawful manner. Law, in its generic sense, is a body of rules of action or conduct prescribed by controlling authority and having binding legal force. We believe that it is in this sense that the term was used by the legislature in defining the offense of official misconduct.
Id. 115 Ill.App.3d at 910-11, 71 Ill.Dec. at 742, 451 N.E.2d at 896 (citations omitted). Samel also indicated that an indictment for misconduct could be predicated on a “Supreme Court Rule which itself does not prescribe a penalty for its violation.” Id. 115 Ill.App.3d at 911, 71 Ill.Dec. at 743, 451 N.E.2d at 897 (citations omitted).
A later Illinois appellate case, People v. Weber, 133 Ill.App.3d 686, 88 Ill.Dec. 769, 479 N.E.2d 382 (1985), dealt with indictments against a prosecutor for official misconduct. While affirming dismissal on grounds that the indictment did not allege an offense, the court clearly indicated that had the indictment alleged a violation of a tenet of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the charge would have been proper. Id. 133 Ill.App.3d at 689-90, 88 Ill. Dec. at 771-72, 479 N.E.2d at 384-85.
In State v. Tronca, 84 Wis.2d 68, 267 N.W.2d 216 (1978), a city alderman was charged with misconduct for his actions dealing with liquor licenses. In affirming the conviction, the Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated that the powers of a public official include not only those expressly conferred, but de facto powers arising from custom or usage which have a corrupt influence on public affairs. Id. 84 Wis.2d at 80, 267 N.W.2d at 221. The court con-*410eluded the alderman’s actions in bargaining away his discretion in exchange for dishonest consideration or advantage to some constituents were inconsistent with his official duties. Id. at 90, 267 N.W.2d at 226.
In a somewhat analogous situation, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a private attorney for attorney misconduct under Minn.Stat. § 481.071 (1982) for her participation in a client’s deception of the court. State v. Casby, 348 N.W.2d 736 (Minn.1984). The court discussed the fact that the code of professional responsibility did not excuse the attorney’s conduct and stated that the attorney’s conduct was also in violation of several disciplinary rules. Id. at 739.
Based on our decision in State v. Andersen, 370 N.W.2d 653 (Minn.Ct.App.1985) and the well-reasoned opinions from the courts of Illinois and New Jersey, I believe our misconduct statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.-43(2), embraces conduct other than that specifically prohibited by other penal statutes. Any other interpretation would render portions of the statute meaningless and all portions of a statute must be given effect when possible. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1984). Logic assumes that if official misconduct encompassed conduct which was punishable as a crime only independently (e.g. bribery), there would be no need for an official misconduct provision. Prosecution of official misconduct under respondent’s interpretation would be cumulative and prohibited by Minn.Stat. §§ 609.035 and 609.04 (1984).
The Minnesota Supreme Court promulgated rules governing professional conduct of attorneys under the legislative authority granted in Minn.Stat. § 480.05 (1984). The code of professional responsibility is, of course, binding on all lawyers. In re Franke, 345 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Minn.1984) (citing In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 490, 189 N.W.2d 176, 178-79 (1971)). Attorneys are publicly accountable for adherence to “the rule of law, canons of ethics, and standards of professional responsibility.” Daly, 291 Minn. at 490, 189 N.W.2d at 178 (footnote omitted). Further, the disciplinary rules define the minimum conduct below which no attorney shall fall.
Here, the City of Minneapolis adopted a specific ethics code for its city attorneys. Respondent’s name appears on the cover sheet of this document. He was obviously aware of the specific provisions in the ethics code and that they applied to him as a deputy city attorney for the City of Minneapolis.
The trial court erred in ruling the indictments failed to charge an offense. The indictment here did not “simply allege that the city attorney violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and Ethics Code of the Minneapolis City Attorney.” The indictment alleged that appellant, in his official capacity, “did intentionally perform acts which he knew to be in excess of his lawful authority.”
As the dissent observed in People v. La Carrubba, 46 N.Y.2d 658, 667, 389 N.E.2d 799, 804, 416 N.Y.S.2d 203, 208 (1979):
Appellant was not indicted, nor convicted, of violating Canons 2 and 3 of tbe Code of Judicial Conduct in-and-of themselves, but, rather, indicted and convicted for the Penal Law crime of official misconduct. No action was taken by the District Attorney and the Grand Jury, “unaided by any legislative enactment”, to convert the ethical standards set forth in the Code of Judicial Conduct into penal statutes.
If Serstock is convicted of the acts charged in the indictment, he will be convicted of the crime of Misconduct of a Public Officer in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.43(2). The two codes define the limits of ethical conduct for city attorneys. Since Serstock is charged with notice of what the codes contain, violation of the codes is proof that he knowingly exceeded his lawful authority. The majority opinion does not differentiate, as the legislature clearly did, between public officials and private citizens. The public official is held to the standards of his office. Here, the indictments clearly allege flagrant violations of lawful authority. To hold that a prosecutor is not criminally liable for a *411pattern of ticket fixing for friends to whom he owed money defies common sense.
The indictments would be valid under the above quoted rationale of Andersen even without reference to the code of professional responsibility or the ethics code of the Minneapolis city attorney. To paraphrase Andersen: What was illegal for Serstock to do in his official capacity as assistant city attorney is not so indefinite that a legitimate argument can even be made that he could have legally “dismissed, compromised, delayed or otherwise wrongfully manipulated the disposition of numerous tickets for moving violations as personal favors for (Stephen Wallack/Erwin Dauphin), to whom he was at such time indebted * * *.” I believe these allegations alone are sufficient to support the indictment.
The trial court also ruled that the indictments were fatally defective and that they did not adequately apprise respondent of the charges. Minn.R.Crim.P. 17.02, subd. 2, requires that an indictment “shall contain a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” In addition, Minn.Stat. § 628.18 (1984) lists the tests for sufficiency of an indictment:
Tests of Sufficiency.
The indictment shall be sufficient if it is drafted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 17.02 of the rules of criminal procedure and if it can be understood therefrom:
(1) That it is entitled in a court having authority to receive it, though the name of the court is not accurately stated;
(2) That it was found by a grand jury of the county in which the court was held;
(3) That the defendant is named, or, if his name cannot be discovered, that he is described by a fictitious name, with the statement that he has refused to discover his real name;
(4) That the offense was committed at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, except where, as provided by law, the act, though done without the local jurisdiction of the county, is triable therein;
(5) That the offense was committed at some time prior to the time of finding the indictment;
(6) That the act or omission charged as the offense is clearly and distinctly set forth, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition;
(7) That the act or omission charged as the offense is stated with such a degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment, upon a conviction, according to the right of the case.
Id.
Minn.R.Crim.P. 17.06, subd. 1, states that “[n]o indictment * * * shall be dismissed nor shall the trial, judgment or other proceedings thereon be affected by reason of a defect or imperfection in matters of form which does not tend to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.”
In addressing the adequacy of an indictment, the overall concern is whether the accused is sufficiently apprised of the charges to prepare a defense and whether there is a danger that the accused may be placed in double jeopardy. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1046-47, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (citations omitted). See State v. Erickson, 362 N.W.2d 398 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. May 1, 1985). In addition, the general principle regarding adequacy of complaints applies equally to indictments. State v. Mancino, 257 Minn. 580, 102 N.W.2d 504 (1960). A defendant must demonstrate prejudice. Minn.R.Civ.P. 17.06, subd. 1; In re Welfare of TMV, 368 N.W.2d 421 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). See State v. Dunbar, 296 Minn. 497, 207 N.W.2d 289 (1973).
Applying these principles, the indictments in this case are adequate. Each count recites the statutory elements, alleging the date of offense, location, respondent’s official capacity, and the acts he was alleged to have performed in excess of his lawful authority in ordinary and concise language. Respondent is notified that Count I embraces misconduct for ticket fixing for Erwin Dauphin, Count II em*412braces misconduct involving ticket fixing for Stephen Wallack and Count III embraces conduct for ticket fixing for tickets issued outside the jurisdiction of the City of Minneapolis. The counts identify the Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility and the Ethics Code for the Minneapolis City Attorney as the source of the unlawful authority.
Respondent’s argument that each ticket fixed should have been a separate offense and thus the indictment should have specified approximately 100 counts of criminal conduct is not valid. Indictments must be clear, distinct and in concise language. The indictments here charged patterns of behavior, grouping the tickets allegedly fixed in rational groups for Dauphin, Wallack and those done outside respondent’s jurisdiction. The grand jury has discretion to aggregate a pattern of offenses into separate counts. Charging continuous acts over a period of time as a single offense is permitted in sexual assault prosecutions and there is no logical reason why a similar method does not apply in a multiple ticket fixing allegation. See State v. Becker, 351 N.W.2d 923 (Minn.1984).
Respondent is not prejudiced by the indictment because of the broad discovery available to him. Although the bill of particulars is abolished, Minn.R.Crim.P. 17.02, subd. 4, the comments to the criminal rules state: “The information supplied by a bill of particulars may be obtained by discovery under Rules 9 or 7.03.” In this case the State filed an “evidence summary” listing detailed charges. Further, respondent has received the grand jury transcript, exhibits, all investigative reports and official documents.
Indictments are not intended to be as complete as complaints. If they were lengthy accounts reciting all of the evidence and all of the details, they would take on the appearance of grand jury reports, which have been criticized by our supreme court. In re Grand Jury of Hennepin County, 271 N.W.2d 817 (Minn.1978); In re Grand Jury of Wabasha County, 309 Minn. 148, 244 N.W.2d 253 (Minn.1976). The indictments in this case were sufficient.
All three indictments against respondent should be reinstated because violation of the Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility may be the source of the duty giving rise to criminal charges of official misconduct under Minn.Stat. § 60'9.43(2). The indictments in this case were sufficient to apprise respondent of the charges and to enable respondent to withstand a potential double jeopardy infringement. I would reverse and remand for trial on all three counts.
, Common law crimes are abolished in Minnesota and no act or omission is a crime unless statutorily created. Minn.Stat. § 609.015, subd. 1 (1984). Section 609.43(2) apparently is the statutorily created replacement for the common law crimes of non-feasance, misfeasance and malfeasance in public office. See State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 163, 96 A.2d 63, 68 (1953).