dissenting.
The trial court properly concluded that the foreseeability issue was not clear cut and that it should be determined by a jury.
This ease is unlike Larson v. Larson, 373 N.W.2d 287 (Minn.1985), where the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a decision of the trial court to submit a foreseeability issue to a jury. In Larson, there had been a single prior threat from the third party actor, a threat that was vague in kind, and the third party’s conduct did not occur until two months later. See id. at 289. Similarly, in Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn.1982), the absence of foreseeability was determined as a matter of law because the third party actor had made no prior specific threats against specific victims. See id. at 26.
Appellant Patzwald evidently made a decision to bring a large number of people to her home, involving the gathering of many guests on her lawn. This decision was made in the face of an unusual series of threats by Gene Edward Krey to act violently toward appellant. Appellant knew that Krey’s hostilities extended to her son, and she knew that Krey had threatened her friend and a clergyman of her church. Krey had in fact acted violently toward appellant. Krey’s home was near the home of appellant, and his threatening words and conduct repeatedly occurred on appellant’s premises. Some of this threatening conduct was bizarre. Twice appellant sought police assistance because of Krey’s threats, and there is evidence that she believed Krey’s stability was deteriorating. The last of the threats of Krey had been only a couple of weeks before his harmful conduct.
Under the circumstances we should affirm the trial court’s decision to submit the matter to a jury.