¶ 249. (dissenting). It is the province of this court to decide the constitutionality of legislation, not the wis*626dom of the legislature. I conclude that Act 11 is an unconstitutional intrusion on the state pension fund.1
¶ 250. The challenge to Act 11 is multifaceted. Unlike the majority opinion, a dissent need not resolve the constitutionality of each provision. I shall touch upon only two of the challenges, but my silence about the others should not be interpreted as agreement with the majority opinion about them.
¶ 251. First, the majority opinion upholds the $200 million contribution credit given employers, which the legislative drafting file baldly refers to as a "contribution holiday" for employers. The monies held in the Employe Trust Fund (ETF) have been irrevocably placed in trust for the benefit of the retirement system participants, and the State cannot direct that such monies be used for non-ETF purposes. The $200 million employer contribution credit, as Justice Bab-litch also explains, is a diversion of $200 million of ETF monies in which retirement system participants have a protected property and contract right.
¶ 252. This diversion is an unlawful taking and an impairment of contract, as well as a violation of *627trust principles. The Wisconsin and federal constitutions do not allow the legislature to balance the state budget or shift resources among governmental entities by using assets belonging to the ETF. Promises to contribute to the fund are assets belonging to the ETF. As a result of the majority opinion, Wisconsin now unfortunately joins other states that have viewed their once-burgeoning pension funds as sources of budget relief.2
¶ 253. Second, although Act 11 has multiple benefit enhancements for both past and present employees, the majority opinion carefully avoids determining a constitutional "issue of magnitude":3 Does Act 11 violate the extra compensation clause of Article IV, Section 26 of the Wisconsin Constitution?4
¶ 254. The majority opinion explains its dilemma in addressing this constitutional question: If Article IV, *628Section 26 does not apply to Act 11, the majority opinion would be holding that a simple majority vote, not a three-fourths vote, is needed to adopt a law such as Act 11. The majority opinion does not want to establish the precedent that this Act does not grant extra compensation because it wants Section 26 to remain a viable check on the legislature.5
¶ 255. But if Section 26 does apply to Act 11,6 then the majority opinion would have to hold that the monies in the ETF are "state funds" to satisfy Article IV, Section 26, because Act 11 uses assets of the ETF to fund part of the benefits. Act 11 does not appropriate any non-ETF monies to cover the costs of increased benefits. The majority opinion apparently does not want to establish the precedent that assets of the ETF are "state funds" either.7
¶ 256. To avoid this dilemma, the majority opinion explains that the State Engineering Association failed to argue this point with sufficient clarity or conviction to make the majority feel bound to address the question.8 The State Engineering Association has requested that the court determine what "state funds" *629means in the Wisconsin Constitution, in the context of this case.9 Its argument is sufficient.
¶ 257. Furthermore, the focus in the majority opinion on whether Act 11 provides state funds ignores the fact that the legislature has not provided sufficient state funds to finance these benefit improvements, as Article IV, Section 26 requires. With the $200 million credit to employers and the $4 billion transfer from the TAA, Act 11 funds only a portion of the cost of the increased benefits for prior service.10
¶ 258. I see no other conclusion than that the increased benefits for past service provided in Act 11 are unconstitutional.
¶ 259. As to the severability of unconstitutional portions of Act 11, I agree with the respondents (the defenders of the constitutionality of Act 11) that the funding and benefit provisions are not severable. In other words, if any funding provisions are unconstitutional, the benefit provisions relating thereto cannot stand.
¶ 260. Despite my disagreement with the majority opinion about the constitutionality of Act 11,1 think the majority opinion sets forth important precedent that helps to limit the possibility of future intrusions on the state pension fund.
*630¶ 261. In particular, two facets of the majority opinion bear repeating. One, the majority upholds the statutory adjustment to actuarial assumptions only to the extent that the legislature does not interfere with the ETF Board's discretion.11 In concluding that the ETF Board must always have the final word regarding actuarial assumptions, the majority implicitly sides with the petitioners on this issue. The petitioners expressed fear that Act 11 might pave the way for future changes to the actuarial assumptions that could interfere with the ETF Board's authority. The majority opinion does not allow for this possibility.
¶ 262. Two, the majority opinion leaves open the possibility that employees as a class may have a viable cause of action should they have to make contributions to the employee reserve as a result of the $200 million credit to employers. See majority op. at ¶¶ 180-81. The majority has simply concluded that under the facts of this case, the possibility of a future employee contribution increase is too speculative a basis for deeming Act 11 unconstitutional. However, were the legislature to authorize a larger employer credit, or were the legislature to authorize employer credits on a regular basis, this court might view the potential for employee contributions as more than mere speculation and as a viable basis for challenging the constitutionality of such future credits.
¶ 263. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 264. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.
See Ridgeley A. Scott, A Skunk at a Garden Party: Remedies for Participants in State and Local Pension Plans, 75 Denv. U. L. Rev. 507,507 (1998) ("Legislators who want to spend more money than is available prefer to obtain the difference by a method other than raising taxes. Pension trusts for public employees are especially inviting because they frequently have substantial assets.") (citations omitted).
See majority op. at ¶ 233.
Article IV, Section 26, provides:
(1) The legislature may not grant any extra compensation to a public officer, agent, servant or contractor after the services have been rendered or the contract has been entered into.
(3) Subsection (1) shall not apply to increased benefits for persons who have been or shall be granted benefits of any kind under a retirement system when such increased benefits are provided by a legislative act passed on a call of ayes and noes by a three-fourths vote of all the members elected to both houses of the legislature and such act provides for sufficient state funds to cover the costs of the increased benefits.
See majority op. at ¶¶ 88, 232.1 am troubled by the majority opinion's assertion that Section 26 will serve as an adequate check on the legislature in the future. See majority op. at ¶ 198. In my view, the majority opinion has undermined the effectiveness of this check by declining to enforce it in this instance. The majority opinion also relies on Joint Rule 12 even though it concludes that the rule does not correctly interpret the constitution. See majority op. at ¶¶ 91-97.
See majority op. at ¶ 87, indicating that Article IV, Section 26 applies to Act 11.
See majority op. at ¶ 232.
See majority op. at ¶ 233.
It is problematic to suggest that the legislature revisit the meaning of "state funds" in Article IV, Section 26, unless the majority opinion is referring to a constitutional amendment. See majority op. at ¶ 234.
For this fact, we need look no further than the subject line of the Legislative Reference Bureau's fiscal estimate form, which accompanied Assembly Bill 495. The subject line states that the act "make[s] several benefit improvements to the WRS and fund[s] them partially by recognizing $4 billion from the TAA." (Emphasis added.)
See majority op. at ¶ 211.