dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of Heinzman’s convictions for official misconduct relating to his offenses against R.S. Because I believe that the evidence is sufficient to support Heinz-man’s convictions, I would affirm.
The majority correctly restates the law regarding the requisite connection between the behavior underlying an official misconduct charge and the defendant’s official duties: “There must be a connection between the charge and the duties of the office. A charge for misconduct must rest upon criminal behavior that is related to the performance of official duties.” State v. Dugan, 793 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (Ind.2003). I certainly agree with the majority that if the defendant’s charged conduct bears no relation to his official duties then he cannot be convicted of official misconduct. See id. (“Needless to say, if the misconduct bears no relation to the official duties, there is no official misconduct.”). However, I depart from my colleagues on the question of whether Heinzman’s crimes against R.S. relate to the performance of his official duties.
Heinzman contended at trial and again now on appeal that he worked with R.S.’s family in his capacity as a CPS worker for “[n]ot longer than a week” in August 2003, Tr. p. 932, and that this official relationship ended before the molestations occurred. Appellant’s Br. p. 25. At the time when Heinzman. met R.S. and throughout the period of molestation, Heinzman was a Child Protective Services family case manager for the Department of Family and Children.5 Ex. p. 81. He initially visited R.S.’s home after R.S. made an allegation while at school that his mother hit him. Tr. p. 385-86. During this home visit, R.S. informed Heinzman that he had lied about the abuse. Id. at 387. Nonetheless, Heinzman met with R.S. and members of his extended family for two to three hours and took photographs of bruises on R.S.’s legs. Id. at 386, 542. R.S.’s mother, Andrea, testified at trial that Heinzman then asked the family what services he could provide for them: “He talked to us about, asked us if we needed, if our family needed anything, if we needed any services, what could he do for us.” Id. at 542. Andrea replied, “I told him ... that [R.S.] needed ... a Big Brother from the Big Brother/Big Sister program because Hamilton County had a waiting list and that ... we *726could use clothes and food and, because [R.S.] was getting bigger.” Id. at 543.
In response to Andrea’s request — which, again, came directly in response to Heinz-man’s offer to provide services — Heinzman returned to the family’s home the following week with $300 to $400 worth of Wal-Mart gift cards for clothes and food. Id. at 544. During one of these two initial visits, he also instructed Andrea to call him at his office if she had trouble with R.S. Id. at 545. She soon did so, and Heinzman told her to bring R.S. to his office. Id. R.S. then began seeing Heinzman in his office regularly, as Heinzman admitted at trial. Id. at 934; see also id. at 545-47. Heinz-man also admits in his appellate brief that he helped the family become involved with the Center for Mental Health beginning in September 2003. Appellant’s Br. p. 4. Andrea explained at trial that the Center for Mental Health was “[a] place where [R.S.] could see a psychiatrist, for his medications, and go to therapy.” Tr. p. 547. Heinzman further admits that he later attended a planning council meeting for R.S., and this meeting took place in November 2003. Id. at 933; see also Ex. p. 85 (Heinzman’s handwritten note regarding the date and time of R.S.’s planning council meeting). Heinzman later began taking R.S. on outings with Andrea’s permission. It was during these outings that the molestations occurred.
Heinzman was ultimately convicted of multiple counts of official misconduct for sex offenses committed against R.S. between August 4, 2004, and March 3, 2005. The majority reverses these convictions because it finds that the evidence does not show that he officially worked on R.S.’s CPS case beyond a one-week time period in August 2003. Op. p. 724. Preliminarily, it is noteworthy that Heinzman’s compensatory time worksheets maintained for his employer, which were entered into evidence at trial and emphasized by the State during closing arguments, show that Heinzman logged official time on R.S.’s CPS case as late as April 16, 2004 — in direct contradiction to Heinzman’s trial testimony that the case was closed in August 2003. Ex. p. 82; Tr. p. 932-33. Beyond this, however, it is also clear that the jury believed that Heinzman continued working with R.S.’s family in a manner related to his CPS employment throughout the duration of his interactions with R.S. First, the compensatory time worksheet evidences that Heinzman’s characterization of his relationship with R.S. after August 2003 as personal rather than official is blatantly dishonest. More telling, though, is Heinzman’s own characterization of his services to R.S. In Heinzman’s estimation, “[bjetween August 2003 and April 2005, [he] had contact with R.S.’s mother regarding R.S., arranging visits and checking on his needs over a hundred times.” Appellant’s Br. p. 5 (emphasis added) (citing Tr. p. 600). This service — checking on R.S.’s needs — is directly in line with Heinzman’s official responsibilities as a CPS family case manager. A job description for a CPS family case manager was admitted without objection at trial and reflects that Heinzman had the following official duties:
• Investigate! ] reported incidents of child abuse, neglect, make[] a determination of whether or not the incident is substantiated and develop!] recommendations to a Juvenile Court for disposition.
⅝ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ⅝ ⅝
• Perform! ] needs assessments to determine treatment options for families and children.
⅜ ⅝ * * * *
• Maintain! ] case files and develop! ] briefing reports for the community child *727protection team, in-office case staffing or out-of-home placement agency staffing.
• Develop[ ] plans with families and children in their home to divert children from the juvenile justice system.
• Develop! ] case plans to assist families and children to become more self-sufficient in a safe and nurturing environment and to assure a permanent home for the child.
Ex. p. 81 (emphasis added). The purpose of his official duties was “to protect children from abuse and neglect and either maintain or reunify families whenever possible.” Id. Thus, even assuming that Heinzman is telling the truth that he closed R.S.’s CPS file before the molestations occurred,6 by persisting in checking on R.S.’s needs and interacting with his family, Heinzman’s continued interactions with R.S. were related to his official duties. See Dugan, 793 N.E.2d at 1039.
The majority concludes that the evidence does not reflect actions undertaken by Heinzman that are related to his duties as a CPS family case manager. This, however, is based upon its acceptance of Heinzman’s statement that he worked on R.S.’s case for only a week in August 2003. Op. p. 724. In contrast, the jury was presented with the aforementioned evidence that Heinzman continued to perform services related to his initial meetings with R.S.’s family long after Heinzman contends his role as a CPS family case manager ended with the family. The only evidence I have located in the record to the contrary is Heinzman’s self-serving testimony that he dedicated a mere ten to fifteen hours to officially working for R.S. and his family over the course of a week. Tr. p. 932-33. The jury heard the conflicting evidence on this point, and the State and the defense argued this issue during closing arguments. Id. at 1034-1036 (State argues the point and ends, “You will have to decide who to believe.”); 1062-63 (defense argument). The jury then judged the credibility of the witnesses, ultimately disbelieving Heinzman. I believe that the majority has improperly reweighed the evidence in reaching its result. I would therefore affirm Heinzman’s convictions for official misconduct relating to his offenses against R.S.
. Child Protective Services later became a part of the Department of Child Services when that department was statutorily created.
. In his appellate brief, Heinzman directs us to no documentation in the record other than his own testimony that the file was, in fact, closed.