I respectfully dissent. In my view, the disentitlement doctrine applies to a crime victim’s damages action against a fugitive defendant based upon the admitted commission of a felony.
Fugitives from justice are disentitled from claiming the privileges afforded to incarcerated persons. For example, a felon who flees from the jurisdiction of our courts waives appellate review of the conviction. (People v. Buffalo (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 838, 839 [123 Cal.Rptr. 308].) This is because courts “ ‘have no jurisdiction over persons charged with crime, *1412unless in custody actual and constructive. It would be a farce to proceed in a criminal cause, unless the Court had control over the person charged, so that its judgment might be made effective.’ (People v. Redinger [1880] 55 Cal. 290, 298.)” (People v. Buffalo, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 839.) No denial of the federal due process clause results from the dismissal of a fugitive’s criminal appeal. (Allen v. Georgia (1897) 166 U.S. 138 [41 L.Ed. 949, 17 S.Ct. 525] [order of dismissal sustained after fugitive attempted to revive his appeal following recapture]; see Molinaro v. New Jersey (1970) 396 U.S. 365, 366 [24 L.Ed.2d 586, 587-588, 90 S.Ct. 498].)
It logically follows that the disentitlement doctrine “ ‘should apply with greater force in civil cases where an individual’s liberty is not at stake.’ [Citations.]” (United States v. $129,374 in U.S. Currency (9th Cir. 1985) 769 F.2d 583, 588.) For example, California courts may deny appellate review to persons who are in contempt of court. (MacPherson v. MacPherson (1939) 13 Cal.2d 271, 277 [89 P.2d 382].) As our Supreme Court stated: “A party to an action cannot, with right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court in hearing his demands while he stands in an attitude of contempt to legal orders and processes of the courts of this state. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) This district previously denied appellate review in Estate of Scott (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 590, 594 [310 P.2d 46], stating: “It is contrary to the principles of justice to permit one who has flaunted the orders of the courts to seek judicial assistance.” As noted therein, state courts possess the “‘inherent power to use [their] processes to induce compliance with a supplemental order reasonably issued in aid of execution.’ ” (Id. at p. 594.)
The majority opinion attempts to distinguish United States v. $129,374 in U.S. Currency, supra, 769 F.2d 583 and other similar cases, citing the burden-shifting aspect of the forfeiture proceedings and the designation of the property owner as “claimant.” (21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).) Despite these characteristics of forfeiture proceedings, however, a property owner who has notice of the forfeiture proceedings and chooses to flee from the jurisdiction of the courts thereby waives the right of “defending the forfeiture action.” (United States v. $129,374 in U.S. Currency, supra, 769 F.2d at p. 589, italics added.) There is no valid distinction between this case and United States v. $129,374 in U.S. Currency.
By distinguishing a defendant in a civil forfeiture proceeding from a defendant in an “ordinary” action for damages, the majority opinion hints that Doe’s action fails to satisfy some nexus requirement with respect to Polanski’s criminal conviction. But under the facts of this case, we need not decide whether the disentitlement doctrine imposes a nexus requirement. (See United States v. $129,374 in U.S. Currency, supra, 769 F.2d at p. 588; Conforte v. C.I.R. (9th Cir. 1982) 692 F.2d 587, 590.) The unlawful sex *1413crime to which Polanski pled guilty involves the identical conduct alleged in Doe’s sexual assault and battery cause of action. Accordingly, there could be no closer nexus than that present here.
At first blush, it appears Doe may have waited beyond the limitations period before filing suit. Although the majority opinion does not expressly mention the statute of limitations, it points out Doe waited until she was 25 years old to file this action. But this is not a case where a claimant who is otherwise barred from bringing an action can do so only because the defendant is a fugitive. California tolls the limitations period for the commencement of actions during the period the fugitive is absent from this state. (Code Civ. Proc., § 351.)1 In fact, the Supreme Court has determined that the absent defendant’s amenability to service of process is irrelevant under this section. (Dew v. Appleberry (1979) 23 Cal.3d 630, 632 [153 Cal.Rptr. 219, 591 P.2d 509].)
Although Polanski raised the statute of limitations in his answer, the trial court sustained Doe’s demurrer with respect to this affirmative defense. The trial court concluded the limitations period is tolled under section 351 while Polanski remains absent from California.
In addition to section 351, section 340.3 indicates that where judgment is not pronounced against the convicted felon because he has fled from this state, the victim’s time for bringing a damages action based upon the underlying felony does not commence until the fugitive returns and judgment is pronounced. Section 340.3, an urgency statute, took effect on September 20, 1983, after the passage of Proposition 8 (the Victims’ Bill of Rights, Cal. Const., art. I, § 28).2
*1414In my view, either Polanski has waived the right to appear and defend against the victim’s action which directly arises from the underlying felony to which he pled guilty, or he should be treated as any other nonresident defendant who appears through counsel. The majority’s approach falls somewhere in between. On the one hand, the majority opinion unintentionally aids Polanski’s flight from justice by implicitly requiring Polanski’s victim to travel to foreign soil for his deposition.3 And on the other hand, the majority opinion accedes to Polanski’s demand to defend while remaining a fugitive without guaranteeing him appellate review.
Although the majority opinion declines to apply the disentitlement doctrine at this stage of the litigation, Polanski’s future rights remain uncertain. The majority opinion bases its analysis in part on the distinction between a plaintiff or proponent (who the majority would bar from using the judicial system to take the offensive) and a defendant (who the majority holds must be allowed to protect himself). Strictly construed, the majority opinion would allow Polanski to use only defensive measures and would bar him from taking affirmative steps such as filing an appeal4 and seeking extraordinary relief by way of a writ petition. But he certainly would be allowed to respond, as here, to any writ petition filed by his opponent and to an appeal filed by Doe should the judgment be against her. Would he be allowed to file a cross-complaint or allege affirmative defenses? If the judgment is against him, may he bring a motion for a new trial? Are such actions to be construed as defensive tactics or do they constitute taking the offensive? Too many questions are unresolved. This will be anything but an orderly trial because the trial judge will have to resolve such matters which will surely arise. Undoubtedly, we will be called upon numerous times during the trial to resolve such matters on writ petitions. The majority opinion’s middle ground approach leads to a piecemeal resolution of the matter and offends the orderly processes of our courts. Polanski may be allowed to do some things an ordinary litigant can do, but not others. The only reasonable approach is to either let him defend himself fully or not at all.
*1415Polanski seeks to dictate the terms of his participation in our judicial system, choosing to take advantage of our processes only when it suits his convenience. He expects our courts and his victim to accede to his demands so he may have his cake and eat it too.
In my opinion, Polanski waived his right to appear through counsel and defend against his victim’s damages action when he flaunted the authority and orders of our courts by fleeing from our jurisdiction. Justice demands that a court should not bow to the flagrant demands of a fugitive who refuses to acknowledge its authority.
I would grant the peremptory writ of mandate.
Petitioner’s application for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 30, 1990. Mosk, J., and Arabian, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Section 351 provides: “If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is out of the State, the action may be commenced within the terms herein limited, after his return to the State, and if, after the cause of action accrues, he departs from the State, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.”
Section 340.3 states: “Unless a longer period is prescribed for a specific action, in any action for damages against a defendant based upon such person’s commission of a felony offense for which the defendant has been convicted, the time for commencement of the action shall be within one year after judgment is pronounced. If the sentence or judgment is stayed, the time for the commencement of the action shall be tolled until the stay is lifted. For purposes of this section, a judgment is not stayed if the judgment is appealed or the defendant is placed on probation.”
In this case, Polanski fled before pronouncement of judgment in his underlying felony prosecution. If section 340.3 applies, the limitations period for Doe’s damages action based on the underlying felony to which Polanski pled guilty will not even commence until he returns for sentencing. There may be a retroactivity issue, however, since Doe reached the age of majority in 1981, two years before enactment of section 340.3. (See Gallo v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1375, 1378-1384 [246 Cal.Rptr. 587] [no retroactive revival of a *1414personal injury cause of action already barred by the statute of limitations when § 340.3 took effect].)
The majority opinion points out at footnote 5, ante, that Polanski could be ordered to attend a deposition in Los Angeles. Breathes there a soul who honestly believes he would obey such an order? Obviously, the only way to take his deposition is to travel to his haven. If, ultimately, his answer is stricken for refusal to obey such an order (see § 2023), we end up with his forfeiture of his right to defend himself, the same result which is right now justified by his fugitive status.
This district dismissed an appeal under analogous facts in Estate of Scott, supra, 150 Cal.App.2d 590, 594. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “[w]hile a statutory review is important and must be exercised without discrimination, such a review is not a requirement of due process. [Citations.]” (National Union v. Arnold (1954) 348 U.S. 37, 43 [99 L.Ed. 46, 51, 75 S.Ct. 92].)