dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order terminating appellant’s parental rights to her two young children.
At the time of the final hearing in this case, one of appellant’s children had been out of the home for over twelve months and the other for less than twelve months. The case began when the oldest of these children was removed because of allegations of sexual and physical abuse against another child in the home. It was found that the charges of physical abuse against this child were meritorious, and that the father posed a danger to all of the children. As the case proceeded, appellant’s home was found to be unsanitary in the extreme, so environmental abuse was added as a condition to be rectified.
A new child was born, and was included in the case plan and removed from the home for a time as a result of one of the chaotic and frequently violent episodes that characterized the lives of appellant and her husband. Appellant eventually divorced her husband, completed some of the court-ordered counseling, and obtained new housing. However, there was evidence that appellant maintained frequent contact with her ex-husband and exposed the children to him, including one episode where the ex-husband, driving despite a long-suspended license, was involved in a car wreck that resulted in the death of appellant’s unborn child. There was also evidence that she did not complete the court-ordered counseling or employ reasonable efforts to do so within the time allotted, and that her unsanitary and unhealthy living habits had followed her to her new housing. Accordingly, the trial judge terminated her parental rights to the two children, and this appeal followed.
For reversal, appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights to the eldest child; that the trial judge exhibited bias against her; and that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to the youngest child, who had not been out of the home for twelve months. I would affirm.
Although termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy in derogation of the natural rights of the parents, it is equally true that parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child. Wade v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 337 Ark. 353, 990 S.W.2d 509 (1999). The question before us is whether the trial court clearly erred in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of facts warranting termination of parental rights. Johnson v. Department of Human Services, 78 Ark. App. 112, 82 S.W.3d 183 (2002).
I believe the evidence clearly supports a finding that several significant new factors arose after the filing of the petition, including appellant having willfully maintained contact with and exposed the children to danger from her ex-husband who, it appears, preferred to give up custodial rights and visitation rather than participate in anger-management therapy. That appellant flagrantly continued her relationship with her ex-husband is tragically demonstrated by the death of appellant’s unborn child during the pendency of these proceedings, while appellant was riding in a car driven by her ex-husband. There was also evidence that, although appellant and her child-abuser ex-husband were ostensibly separated, they were frequently seen together in town by ADHS employees, and that, on one occasion, appellant’s ex-husband answered the telephone at her residence one morning and told the caller appellant was asleep. This evidence of continued contact is extremely significant, especially in light of evidence that, after appellant and her ex-husband were divorced, appellant’s son was seen with cuts and scars and told a family service worker that his father pushed him down and pulled his ear.
The evidence also supports a finding that the environmental neglect was not remedied. Given the long span of time that appellant had been working on these problems with only transitory improvement, I think that the trial judge could also properly find that appellant manifested the indifference or incapacity to remedy the issues causing removal of her eldest child.
The bulk of appellant’s brief is devoted to allegations that the trial judge was biased. However, there is no indication that she raised the issue below, and the issue of judicial bias is not preserved for appellate review where appellant neither objects to any statements made by the trial judge nor moves for the judge’s recusal. Nichols v. State, 69 Ark. App. 212, 11 S.W.3d 19 (2000).
Finally, given the evidence supporting termination of appellant’s parental rights with respect to her eldest child, it is clear that the trial court acted properly in terminating her parental rights to her youngest child. A twelve-month period outside the home is unnecessary under several circumstances, including cases where the parent is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have had his parental rights involuntarily terminated as to a sibling of the child, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(4); or where, subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect, other factors or issues arose which demonstrate that return of the juvenile to the family home is contrary to the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent’s circumstances which prevent return of the juvenile to the family home. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (b)(3)(B)(vii)(a).
We have often stated that there are no cases in which the superior position, ability, and opportunity of the trial court to observe the parties carry as great a weight as those involving children. See, e.g., Mason v. Mason, 82 Ark. App. 133, 111 S.W.3d 855 (2003). In matters involving the welfare of young children, we give great weight to the trial judge’s personal observations, Johnson v. Department of Human Services, supra, and in resolving the question of whether the trial court clearly erred in finding that facts existed warranting termination of appellant’s parental rights, we are obliged to give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. The reason for this heightened standard of deference is that the trial judge had an opportunity that we do not have, i.e., to observe the litigants and determine from their manner, as well as their testimony, their sincerity, their apparent interest, and their affection, or lack of affection, for the child. See Qualls v. Qualls, 250 Ark. 328, 465 S.W.2d 110 (1971).
Giving the trial judge’s superior opportunity the deference to which it is entitled, I cannot agree that he clearly erred in finding that facts existed warranting termination of appellant’s parental rights.
Bird, J., joins in this dissent.