(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The statement of facts recited by the majority opinion compels a finding of causation under Reese v. Henke, 277 Minn. 151, 152 N.W.2d 63 (1967). Defendant-respondent is at least a concurring cause of the accident and a new trial is mandated. To hold otherwise would only serve to give blind adherence to a general proposition of law that causation is a fact issue for the jury. Every case is different.
There are cases in which a finding of negligence requires a finding of causation. Here, the jury by its special verdict found:
1. At and immediately prior to the accident of February 6, 1980, was Defendant Robert Best negligent in the operation of his motor vehicle?
X Yes _No
If your answer to question number one is yes, then answer this question:
2. Was such negligence a direct cause of the accident?
_Yes X No
3. At and immediately prior to the accident of February 6, 1980, was Plaintiff James Thorn negligent?
X Yes No
If your answer to question number three is yes, then answer this question:
4. Was such negligence a direct cause of the accident?
X Yes _No
If you answered both questions two and four, and if your answers to both questions two and four are yes, then answer this question:
5. Taking all of the negligence which contributed as a direct cause to the occurrence of the accident at 100 percent, what percentage or proportion thereof do you attribute to:
(a) Defendant Robert Best %
(b) Plaintiff James Thorn %
Total 100%
Regardless of your handling of the above questions, and regardless of fault, answer this question:
6. What sums of money will fairly and adequately compensate Plaintiff James Thorn for damages directly caused by the accident of February 6, 1980, in the following respects:
(a) Past medical expenses to this date: $6,774.66
(b) Wages lost to this date: $17,000.00
(c) All damages not included in 6(a) and 6(b) above: $82,000.00
The issue here is whether the jury answers can be reconciled in any reasonable manner consistent with the evidence and its fair inference. Reese, 277 Minn. at 155, 152 N.W.2d at 66.
Many of the facts in the case under review are strikingly similar to those in Reese. Here, respondent came upon a disabled vehicle and he turned into an unobstructed lane to avoid colliding with the vehicle. Also after passing the vehicle, respondent knew he could have continued in that same unobstructed lane, but chose to turn back into the lane where he had been driving before discovering the disabled car ahead of him. When respondent turned back into the other lane, he knew, or should have known, the party or parties *807from that disabled car might be assembled nearby or walking in the area.
Lookout, speed and control were elements submitted to the jury. In Reese, the Supreme Court said:
* * * the court implicitly or expressly submitted to the jury three elements of negligence with respect to Roger Henke —lookout, control, and speed. Whether the jury found that he was negligent in any one or combination of these acts or omissions, manifestly his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.
Id. at 156, 152 N.W.2d at 67 (emphasis supplied).
It is a conceded fact in this case that respondent could have continued in the unobstructed lane after passing the disabled car. Had he done so, there would have been no accident or injury to this plaintiff. Id. at 155, 156, 152 N.W.2d at 66, 67.
For reasons not apparent in this record, the jury must have determined that plaintiffs misconduct was more serious than that of respondent. “This, however, cannot be the basis for exonerating one tort-feasor and holding the other liable.” Id. at 156, 152 N.W.2d at 67. Plaintiff was at least entitled to have the jury consider the comparative fault of both himself and that of respondent.
The holding of Reese was followed in a well reasoned opinion in Bergemann v. Mutual Service Insurance Co., 270 N.W.2d 107 (1978).
The holding of this court in Betz v. Nelson, 867 N.W.2d 922 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), does not control the decision here, although I note in passing that Reese is quoted with approval in Betz. If Reese is no longer to be followed, the holding of that case ought to be expressly overruled by the Supreme Court.
The jury’s answer to Question 2 should be changed to “yes” as a matter of law. A new trial is required on the comparative fault issue.