concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that the third and fifth allegations raised in defendant’s motion to dismiss were merely conclusory generalizations, insufficient to raise a constitutional question, but I also reach that conclusion as to defendant’s second and fourth allegations. “Where the constitutional validity of a statute .is assailed the objection must be specific and complete. It is not enough merely to assert in a vague and general fashion that constitutional safeguards are violated. The particular respect in which the statute violates some constitutional limitation must be pointed out and preserved for review in order to obtain a determination of such questions by this court.” (Biggs v. Cummins (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 512, 516.) I concur also in the finding that we need not decide whether the Act’s inspection provisions violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches, but I do so for the reason that the issue, not having been presented to the trial court, is not properly raised for the first time on appeal. People v. Moore (1969), 43 Ill.2d 102, 106.
However, in my judgment, the exemption of municipalities with a population of 1,000,000 or over from the operation of the Act constitutes an unreasonable and arbitrary classification.
The majority, as I understand it, holds that because Chicago has a higher population density than any other city in the State, special problems in relation to law enforcement exist which justify the differences in regulating copper sales between Chicago and the remainder of the State. I cannot agree. For although this court has previously sustained legislative classifications applicable only to the city of Chicago, “[e] ach case and each statute must be separately considered and the problem must be resolved by the application of certain time-tested principles to the particular situation.” Du Bois v. Gibbons (1954), 2 Ill.2d 392, 398.
We have frequently held that legislative classification based upon population is valid if there is a reasonable basis for the classification in relation to the objectives sought to be accomplished by the statute. (Shepard v. Liquor Control Com. (1969), 43 Ill.2d 187; People ex rel. Adamowski v. Wilson (1960), 20 Ill.2d 568; Supervisors of Boone County v. Village of Rainbow Gardens (1958), 14 Ill.2d 504; Du Bois v. Gibbons (1954), 2 Ill.2d 392. In the absence of such relationship, however, it is equally well established that legislative classification on the basis of population is discriminatory and invalid. Shepard v. Liquor Control Com. (1969), 43 Ill.2d 187; Giebelhausen v. Daley (1950), 407 Ill. 25; Kremers v. City of West Chicago (1950), 406 Ill. 546.
The clear purpose of the Act is to obstruct the trafficking of stolen copper through “copper dealers” by requiring registration of copper purchases of 50 pounds or more within 3 days after the date of purchase and segregation of such purchases for a period of not less than 7 days from the date of purchase. A knowing failure to comply with the Act subjects the copper dealer to a maximum fine of $1,000 and up to 6 months imprisonment, or both. Each day of noncompliance constitutes a separate offense.
Defendant contends that the exemption of copper dealers in municipalities with populations of 1,000,000 or more (Chicago) from these stringent requirements and liabilities bears no rational relationship to the objectives of the Act. In response, the State suggests several possible justifications for the classifications. First, it is noted that a comprehensive Chicago ordinance regulating junk dealers was already in effect at the time this Act was passed which “the legislature no doubt determined *** was sufficient to meet the purpose of the State legislation.” This suggestion is directly contradicted by the inclusion in the Act of a provision expressly exempting those municipalities which provide for the registration of copper purchases by resolution, ordinance or regulation which substantially complies with the substantive provisions of the Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1969, ch. 121/4, par. 327.) If the legislature had determined that the existing Chicago ordinance was in substantial compliance, the additional exemption on the basis of population was superfluous.
Secondly, the State argues that “the problem of theft of copper from communication and power utilities, and its sale to junk dealers, [is] basically different as between metropolitan Chicago and thinly settled rural areas elsewhere in the State.”
In support of this contention, the State cites: the difficulty of inspection and surveillance of unlicensed junk shops in sparsely populated areas; the greater opportunity of successfully disposing of stolen copper at remote, cross-roads junk yards, the reduced risk of apprehension for theft of utility lines extending over large rural areas; and the relative lack of concern by the Chicago scrap dealers with the purchase of small quantities of copper. Wholly apart from the fact that the classification in question does not differentiate between metropolitan Chicago and “thinly populated rural areas,” but rather between the city of Chicago and the entire balance of the State, it seems to me that the classification bears no “discernible relationship to the realities of life.” Harvey v. Clyde Park District (1964), 32 Ill.2d 60, 67.
Considering the high crime rate, the greater access to industrial copper supplies, and the large number of scrap metal and copper dealers in the city of Chicago (cited by defendant but as to which, in any event, judicial notice would be appropriate), there is, in my opinion, no reasonable basis for the classification in question in relation to the objectives of the Act. It would seem that, if necessary anywhere, this legislation would be most helpful in an area such as Chicago, parts of which are heavily populated by industrial users of copper. Accordingly, in my opinion the exemption of municipalities with populations of 1,000,000 or more is unconstitutional.
However, “[t] he fact that a part of an act is unconstitutional does not require that the remainder shall be held void unless all parts are so connected together as to depend upon each other.” (Lee v. Retirement Board (1964), 31 Ill.2d 252, 255.) “Where that part of an act which is unconstitutional so limits and qualifies the remaining portion that the latter, when stripped of the unconstitutional provision, is essentially different in its effect and operation from what it would be were the whole law valid, the act must be held invalid as a whole.” (Lee, at 255-6.) Applying this test to the Copper Purchase Registration Law, it is clear that the elimination of the exemption of Chicago on the basis of population does not require the entire Act to be held invalid. The essential operation and effect of the Act is unchanged and, in fact, Chicago may retain its exempt status if, as alleged by the State, its ordinance substantially complies with the Act and a certificate of exemption is issued by the Department of Law Enforcement. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1969, ch. 12½, par. 327.) Since, in my judgment, the unconstitutional provision of the Act is severable, I would reverse the trial court judgment holding the entire Act invalid as applied to defendant and remand the cause for trial on the merits.