(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion now places the burden for proving actual violations of the law on those employees for whom whistle-blower protections were enacted. In doing so, it ignores an apposite federal court interpretation of the same federal statute at issue. The jury’s finding of a good faith report of suspected violations is then set aside by the majority after the trial court denied Mierotron’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial.
When the trial court has denied a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, our standard of review is to determine whether there is any evidence in the record tending to sustain the verdict. See Pouliot v. Fitzsimmons, 582 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Minn.1998). While the majority claims that its conclusions in this matter are a “matter of law,” it appears to substitute its conclusions for the findings of the jury on “the critical question of whether those reports were made in good faith.”
The jury, properly instructed by the trial court, answered that critical question. The jury, in its special verdict form, found that Obst had made a good faith report of a suspected violation of law to Microtron and Keith Horton. It also found that Obst was terminated because, in good faith, he reported a suspected violation to both Mi-crotron and Horton. The majority, after its own analysis of the content of the report and the reporter’s purpose in making the report, coupled with a technical review of 49 U.S.C. § 30118(c)(1), concludes as a matter of law that Obst could not have made a good faith report of a suspected violation.
However, federal courts interpreting the same federal statutes have reached the opposite conclusion on this matter of law. In a similar whistle-blower action under New York law, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York concluded that allegations that a manufacturer of motor vehicle component parts failed to follow agreed-on performance testing procedures could constitute a defect within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. § 30102(2). See Clarke v. TRW, Inc., 921 F.Supp. 927, 935 (N.D.N.Y.1996).
In Clarke, the plaintiffs alleged that they had been wrongfully discharged under New York Labor Law § 740 for reporting to their supervisors testing and manufacturing deficiencies in motor vehicle component parts. 921 F.Supp. at 930-31. Specifically, two plaintiffs alleged that they were retaliated against and discharged from employment for reporting their employer’s failure to follow testing and'manufacturing specifications that the employer and its customer agreed on. See id. New York Labor Law § 740 requires that a plaintiff in a whistle-blower action allege an actual violation of “a law, rule or regulation” to sustain an action. Clarke, 921 F.Supp. at 933.
The central question in Clarke was whether the plaintiffs’ alleged facts were sufficient to support a claim that their employer had violated 49 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1) or 30118(c)(1). 921 F.Supp. at 933-35 (noting that section 30116(a)(1) requires a manufacturer to repurchase defective motor vehicle equipment and section 30118(c)(1) requires the manufacturer to notify the secretary of transportation of such defective equipment). The employer argued that there was not “an actual violation of the law” nor did the practice “pres ent[ ] an actual danger to the public health or safety.” Clarke, 921 F.Supp. at 933. It further argued that because the allegations only related to testing and manufacturing procedures, they did not allege “defects” *206as defined by 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(2). See Clarke, 921 F.Supp. at 934. The court disagreed and found that the allegations of “fundamental construction and testing defects” met the definition of defect in section 30102(a)(2), “because that definition includes defects in construction or material of vehicle components.” Clarke, 921 F.Supp. at 934. Thus, these allegations were sufficient to allege violations of 49 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1) and 30118(c)(1), See Clarke, 921 F.Supp. at 934.
The present situation is analogous to that in Clarke, but without us having to accept the complaint as being true. While in this case we address whether the district court erred in failing to grant-judgr ment notwithstanding the verdict, our analysis is similar to that in Clarke with the benefit of the jury having, found the allegations to be true. In Clarke, the proposed complaint, alleging that a New York manufacturer’s products suffered from “fundamental construction and testing defects,” was held to be sufficient to sustain a whistle-blower claim that the employer’s actions violated section 30118(c)(1).
Similarly,- the jury’s finding of a- good faith report of a suspected violation should be sustained under these facts. There is evidence in the record demonstrating that it was Obst’s purpose to expose the fact that Microtron was not following the agreed-upon control plan or testing proce7 dure, something that Ford Motor Company was not aware of and that Microtron was intent on keeping from Ford. There was also. evidence of defects in the construction of the components and that Obst reasonably believed that Microtron’s failure to follow the control plan, or -at least that Microtron’s attempts to conceal this failure from Ford, violated federal law.. It is significant that while the majority turns to a federal case to support its contentions regarding Obst’s purpose, the majority disregards a federal case resolving the specific issue, before it.
Additionally, the majority does not address the fact that the jury also found that Obst was fired for making this report. The record clearly supports this conclusion as well. Evidence was introduced showing that the Ford contract accounted for nearly half of Microtron’s sales. Obst also testified that he was told that not shipping these products to Ford was “not an option” and that Ford would shut Microtron down if they found out that proper inspection procedures were not being followed. There is also evidence in the record that Microtron supplied false information to Ford to conceal its failure to follow the control plan.
The majority, citing generally to a 1987 case from the Western District of Michigan, Wolcott v. Champion Intern. Corp., 691 F.Supp. 1052, 1059 (W.D.Mich.1987), claims to look at Obst’s purpose for making his report, at the time he made it, to determine whether that report was made in good faith. (In Wolcott, the report related to protecting jobs, not to protecting the overall public.) We have never adopted this rule before and the whistle-blower statute does not mandate that we do so now. The majority’s analysis on this point is based on its own factual determination about Obst’s purpose in -his communications with Microtron. However, we are not finders of fact. Rather, our standard of review requires us only to look to the record to determine whether there are any facts tending to support the verdict. See Pouliot, 582 N.W.2d at 224. The majority concludes that because “knowledge of the defect he reported was widespread,” Obst failed to prove he reported an'illegality within the whistleblower statute. However, just because others may have known about the defect and deficient testing procedures does not nullify Obst’s purpose nor change the requirement to notify the U.S. Secretary of Transportation. Importantly, the majority “assumes, without deciding,” that, “the defects reported to Microtron would trigger the notification requirements of section 30118.” At a minimum, the record on his purpose is a dispute as to the facts that the jury decided. *207As such; the findings of the jury must upheld. be
The majority also claims that Minnesota’s whistle-blower statute does not contain any protection for a report made by an employee for activity that in and of itself is not a violation of the law, regardless of the employee’s good faith belief that it was a violation. I read no such requirement in Hedglin. 582 N.W.2d at 902-03. In Hedglin, we held it was irrelevant whether there were any actual violations; the only requirement is that the reports of state law violations were made in good faith. Id. at 902. After concluding that two of the three claims implicated obvious violations of the law, we did not address whether a cause of action would have existed for a claim that, while certainly implicating public policy concerns, did not appear to violate any statute. See Hedglin, 582 N.W.2d at 903.1 Importantly, the only federal court interpreting this same statute on very similar facts came to the same legal conclusion that Obst came to: that construction and testing defects were sufficient to allege violations of 49 U.S.C. § 30118(c)(1). See Clarke, 921 F.Supp. at 934.
Microtron’s conduct in this matter supports the jury’s finding that Obst’s report of testing defects was made in a good faith belief that it was a violation of the law. Microtron knowingly deviated from a control plan designed to assure the shipment of safe parts. Numerous defective parts were shipped. False information was mailed to Ford and 49 U.S.C. § 30118(c)(1) requires the secretary of transportation to be notified by the manufacturer of defective equipment “related to motor vehicle safety.” Defective windshield wipers relate to motor vehicle safety as conceded by the majority. This report not only implicates a violation of 49 U.S.C. §§ 30112 and 30118(c)(1), but it may also implicate other statutes.
If, as the majority has done, we are going to engage in this type of an after the fact detailed legal analysis, judging a lay person’s understanding of the law, to overturn a jury verdict clearly supported by the record, then we should consider all other possible violations of law presented by the facts. Clearly, there was law supporting Obst’s rationale for reporting and he was penalized for making the disclosures. Therefore, we should defer to the findings of the jury in this matter and reverse the court of appeals.
. We have not decided whether the whistle-blower statute also contains the common law protections for reports made in the interests of public policy or whether such claims are properly brought under a common law action for wrongful discharge. I would not have us decide this question today.