(special concurrence).
I concur in the result reached by the majority but write separately to distinguish this case from State v. Saavedra, 396 N.W.2d 304 (N.D.1986), and to note my exception to the majority’s suggestion that procedurally the motion to suppress “may be questionable” [majority opinion page 682]. I believe there is nothing inherently objectionable about proceeding by way of a motion to suppress evidence of criminal conduct, other than the fact that the motion is unlikely to be granted because of State v. Saavedra.
In State v. Saavedra, supra, we followed the precedent established by State v. Indvik, 382 N.W.2d 623 (N.D.1986), and held that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress evidence of Saave-dra’s disorderly conduct because Saave-dra’s independent and intervening conduct broke the chain of causation and dissipated the taint of prior illegality. We reasoned that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is not served by extending the rule to suppress evidence of independent crimes occurring in response to an unlawful search or seizure, where there is no flagrant police misconduct. State v. Saavedra, supra at 305. The precedent established in State v. Saavedra, supra, is in accord with a line of cases in which courts have refused to extend the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence of independent crimes taking place as a reaction to an unlawful arrest or search. See State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d 1380, 1387 (Me.1985); *685State v. Kittleson, 305 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Minn.1981); Commonwealth v. Saia, 372 Mass. 53, 57-58, 360 N.E.2d 329, 332 (1977); State v. Burger, 55 Or.App. 712, 716, 639 P.2d 706, 708 (1982). See also 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.4(j) (2 ed. 1987).
In this case, I believe the defendant attempts to raise two separate issues, although not delineated as such or clearly set forth in the briefs on appeal. Kunkel’s primary argument is the same as the one made by Saavedra, that his fourth amendment rights were violated and therefore any evidence of his subsequent conduct must be suppressed. The second argument' is made in Kunkel’s reply brief where he relies upon § 12.1-05-06, NDCC, in an attempt to justify his conduct. While I agree with the majority that the justification argument is really a defense, I view it as an issue separate and apart from Kunkel’s fourth amendment argument. Because the justification argument was made to and rejected by the jury, it needs no further discussion.
Kunkel’s fourth amendment argument, in my view, was appropriately raised by a motion to suppress, as were Indvik’s and Saavedra’s. However, in State v. Saavedra, supra, the State conceded the illegality of the search and seizure and our analysis proceeded from that premise. In this case, there is no fourth amendment violation because there was valid consent to the officers’ entry. The majority correctly disposed of the case based upon the threshold issue of consent. Because the officers’ entry was legal, there is no “Saavedra ” issue. If the entry were unreasonable, i.e., unconsented to, State v. Saavedra would compel the same result, affirmance of the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.