SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING
Mr. JUSTICE BROWN*delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff s petition for rehearing, to which defendants filed an answer, submitted arguments and cases not previously presented to this court in support of the original appeal.
In effect, plaintiff contends that the original opinion was in error when it stated that the issue had not been expressly considered in any Illinois decision. Plaintiff urges that our supreme court had considered the issue in numerous cases as follows: Downey v. Industrial Com., 44 Ill. 2d 28 (1969); Wellman-Lord, Inc. v. Industrial Com., 48 Ill. 2d 533 (1971); Holiday Inns of America v. Industrial Com., 48 Ill. 2d 528 (1971); Nichols v. Industrial Com., 49 Ill. 2d 431 (1971); Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Com., 50 Ill. 2d 2 (1971); Stockton v. Industrial Com., 69 Ill. 2d 120 (1977); City of Rockford v. Industrial Com., 69 Ill. 2d 597 (1978).
We have reviewed each of the cited cases and we believe there is no similarity between the remand order in each of the aforesaid cases and the remand in the instant case for a hearing de novo.
Plaintiff contends that Colaw v. University Civil Service Merit Board, 37 Ill. App. 3d 857 (1975), is directly in point. In Colaw, the case was remanded by the circuit court to the administrative agency for the purpose of making additional findings of fact without hearing additional evidence. Again, that is not comparable to a remand for a hearing de novo.
Likewise, we see no comparability between the practice formerly involved in this State in master in chancery cases and the instant case.
It is not to be forgotten that the remand in the instant case was for a hearing de novo which means “trying the matter anew the same as if it had not been heard before and as if no decision had been previously rendered.” (2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law §698, at 597 (1967).) Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. rev. 1951), at page 483, defines de novo as “[a]new; fresh; a second time.”
There is nothing in the remand order of the trial court, nor have we been directed to anything in the record which suggests that the trial court considered the order as a temporary remand. It was possible that after remand the plaintiff might be satisfied with the defendants’ decision. Thus no new appeal would follow.
Finding nothing in the record or any contrary authority, we adhere to our original opinion. The petition for rehearing is denied.
DOWNING and PERLIN, JJ„ concur.
Justice Brown participated pursuant to assignment by the Illinois Supreme Court.