I respectfully dissent.
In Government Code section 31000.61 (section 31000.6), the Legislature has provided an efficient and economical procedure for having counsel appointed for an assessor who has a conflict of interest with a board of supervisors. Unfortunately, the majority adopts an unnecessarily cramped, literal reading of the statute. Thus, the majority requires the assessor, who does not have counsel, to pursue a full-blown traditional mandamus action simply to get counsel appointed. There is no need to create this additional time-consuming and expensive litigation.
Where, as here, the majority’s literal, “plain meaning” reading of the statute produces a result that cannot be what the Legislature intended, the “plain meaning” rule must give way. “[T]he ‘plain meaning’ rule does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose or whether such a construction of one provision is consistent with other provisions of the statute. The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible. [Citation.] Literal construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299], followed in People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59, 69 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 233, 851 P.2d 27].)
“(a) Upon request of the assessor or the sheriff of the county, the board of supervisors shall contract with and employ legal counsel to assist the assessor or the sheriff in the performance of his or her duties in any case where the county counsel or the district attorney would have a conflict of interest in representing the assessor or the sheriff.
“(b) In the event that the board of supervisors does not concur with the assessor or the sheriff that a conflict of interest exists, the assessor or the sheriff, after giving notice to the county counsel or the district attorney, may initiate an ex parte proceeding before the presiding judge of the superior court. The county counsel or district attorney may file an affidavit in the proceeding in opposition to, or in support of, the assessor’s or the sheriffs position.
“(c) The presiding superior court judge that determines in any ex parte proceeding that a conflict actually exists, must, if requested by one of the parties, also rule whether representation by the county counsel or district attorney through the creation of an ‘ethical wall’ is appropriate. The factors to be considered in this determination of whether an ‘ethical wall’ should be created are: (1) equal representation, (2) level of support, (3) access to resources, (4) zealous representation, or (5) any other consideration that relates to proper representation. m... HO
“(e) If the presiding judge determines that a conflict of interest does exist, and that representation by the county counsel or district attorney through the creation of an ethical wall is inappropriate, the board of supervisors shall immediately employ legal counsel to assist the assessor or the sheriff.” (Italics added.)
*502A reasonable interpretation of section 31000.6 allows a trial court to do precisely what the trial court did here. I would affirm the trial court, except that I would allow the assessor to choose his own counsel.
Background
In April 2005, Fremont Medical Center (Fremont) merged into Rideout Memorial Hospital (Rideout). After the merger, Rideout claimed a welfare exemption from real property taxes on the parcel previously owned by Fremont. Sutter County Assessor Michael V. Strong denied the exemption for the 2006-2007 tax year because Rideout failed to timely record its interest in the property. Even after Rideout recorded its interest in the property, problems relating to the vesting of title caused Strong to deny the welfare exemption for the 2007-2008 tax year.
In May 2008, Rideout filed for a tax refund with the Sutter County Board of Supervisors (the board). Assessor Strong submitted letters to the board, explaining the reasons for the denial of the exemptions and his opposition to the issuance of any refund. The board held two closed sessions before authorizing full reftind of the 2007-2008 taxes and refund of half the 2006-2007 taxes on the real property formerly owned by Fremont.
Strong subsequently learned that Sutter County and the Fremont-Rideout Health Group had previously entered into a medical service contract allowing the county to make reimbursements at less than market rates for inpatient services. However, the contract specified that the subsidized rate would double if any property tax were assessed on Rideout’s real property.
During an open meeting by the board in August 2009, Strong requested that independent legal counsel be retained for him in the matter of Rideout’s property tax refund. At the meeting, the board denied the request for reasons not revealed in the record. A week later, Strong gave notice to county counsel that he would apply for appointment of independent counsel to the presiding judge of the Sutter County Superior Court, in accordance with section 31000.6.
Strong’s ex parte application to appoint independent counsel was heard in September 2009. County counsel was present and urged the court to deny the request for counsel, stating: “I’m simply asking you to make the finding that this request for [an] attorney is not in the performance of the assessor’s duties that’s to set aside an action of the Board of Supervisors. A taxpayer suit can *503be brought but not by the assessor in the performance of his duties but by the assessor as a taxpayer.” County counsel further stated, “I can see no other purpose for appointing counsel other than for a lawsuit.”
County counsel acknowledged his inability to provide conflict-free representation to Strong on the matter of the Rideout refund request. Counsel stated, “I would agree that I cannot represent the assessor in a lawsuit against the Board of Supervisors.” To this, counsel added, “No ethical wall is possible in a five-attorney office.”
After the hearing, the trial court issued an order and judgment that states, in pertinent part:
“1. The court finds that Assessor Michael V. Strong is acting within the performance of his duties in seeking to set aside the Compromise and Release Agreement entered into between Sutter County and Rideout Memorial Hospital;
“2. The court finds that a conflict of interest exists between County Counsel and Assessor Michael V. Strong in seeking to set aside the above-referenced agreement between the County and Rideout Memorial Hospital; and
“3. The court finds that an ethical wall cannot be created pursuant to Government Code section 31000.6(c) such that would enable another member of the County Counsel’s office to represent Assessor Michael V. Strong in this matter;
“4. The court finds that the ‘Office of the County Counsel, Sutter County’ was improperly joined as a party respondent in this matter;
“5. It is ordered that ‘Office of the County Counsel, Sutter County’ shall be stricken as a respondent in this proceeding and shall not appear in the caption of any future papers filed in this proceeding;
“6. It is ordered that the Sutter County Board of Supervisors shall select and employ independent legal counsel at the expense of Sutter County to represent Assessor Michael V. Strong in seeking to overturn the Compromise and Release Agreement entered into between Sutter County and Rideout Memorial Hospital.”
The Board’s Appeal
A
Although the majority characterizes section 31000.6 as “a prompt method for resolving a dispute between a board of supervisors and an assessor over *504the narrow issue of whether a conflict of interest precludes county counsel from representing both parties in connection with a particular matter,” the majority opinion renders the section unfit to completely resolve any dispute between an assessor and a board of supervisors.2 (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 499.) According to the majority, section 31000.6 empowers the trial court “to resolve only the very narrow question of whether county counsel has a conflict of interest that prevents county counsel from representing the assessor and, if so, whether an ethical wall can be created . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 491.) When a board of supervisors believes county counsel can provide conflict-free counsel to an assessor, the majority leaves section 31000.6 unable to support the granting of any relief by a trial court that finds independent legal counsel to be necessary. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 489-90, 494.) To obtain an order directing the appointment of independent counsel, an assessor must then file, in propria persona, a petition for writ of mandate. The majority may believe that “[ojnly one proceeding is necessary.” (Id. at p. 493.) However, a trial court’s declaration of a right to independent counsel without an order for the appointment of counsel will not satisfy the assessor who wants to file an actual challenge to an improper tax refund. The majority’s cumbersome two-case requirement conflicts with the language and intent of section 31000.6.
The real mischief results when a board of supervisors opposes appointment of independent counsel for an assessor on any ground other than lack of conflict by the office of county counsel. Here, the majority faults Assessor Strong for failing to engage in statutory interpretation of section 31000.6 to determine that the section is inapplicable before preparing and litigating a mandamus action—all without the benefit of legal counsel. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 492.) The majority announces that “because there was never a disagreement between Strong and the board about whether county counsel had a conflict of interest, section 31000.6 did not provide Strong with any avenue of relief.” (Ibid., italics added.) In effect, the majority requires assessors to seek the type of judicial relief that comports with the particular rationale advanced by the board for denying independent counsel. I see no reason to allow a board’s rationale for denying counsel to determine whether the assessor may seek an efficient remedy or must navigate the complexities of writ proceedings.
In short, the majority opinion leaves section 31000.6 unhelpful when a board disagrees that county counsel has a conflict in representing the assessor *505and irrelevant when the board advances any other rationale for the denial of independent counsel.
It does not have to be this way.
B
Subdivision (a) of section 31000.6 instructs a board of supervisors to retain independent legal counsel when requested by an assessor on account of county counsel’s conflict of interest. Subdivision (b) provides the assessor with a simple and expeditious manner of resolving a situation in which the board of supervisors believes that independent counsel is unnecessary. After giving notice, the assessor may initiate an ex parte proceeding before the presiding judge of the superior court.
Allowing the assessor to proceed in an ex parte manner indicates that the matter should be resolved expeditiously. Ex parte proceedings allow for quick resolution of issues. (Cf., e.g., People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 263 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 528 [238 Cal.Rptr. 475].) The assessor’s entitlement to the preferential route of submitting the request directly to the presiding judge further indicates the efficient and prompt nature of the proceeding contemplated by section 31000.6. The majority does not argue to the contrary.
C
The majority effectively requires an assessor to file a new and separate action to secure counsel after successfully showing that county counsel has a conflict of interest that cannot be remedied by implementation of an “ethical wall” in county counsel’s office. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 495.) Under this approach, a separate petition for writ of mandate is necessary because the trial court lacks power to do anything under section 31000.6 other than to find that county counsel actually has the irremediable conflict alleged by the assessor. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 495-^-96.) The majority expects tremendous legal acumen from a tax assessor who has not yet acquired the right to legal counsel. The majority chides Assessor Strong, charging that he “should have known, from reading the statute, that section 31000.6 applies only to such disputes” that involve the limited question of “whether a conflict of interest existed.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 494.) Thus, the majority holds that “Strong needed to pursue a writ of mandate in a regularly noticed proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 492.)
*506I do not think expertise in statutory interpretation should be expected of an assessor who may be working without any legal advice. Moreover, petitions seeking mandate relief are not easy to prepare—even for members of the bar. Justice Gilbert has aptly observed, “Those who have tried to extract a coherent set of rules from cases and treatises on writs have found it easier to comprehend a ‘washing bill in Babylonic cuneiform.’ (Gilbert & Sullivan, Pirates of Penzance (1879).)” (Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1272 [258 Cal.Rptr. 66].) Yet, the majority imposes the task on assessors in order to secure legal counsel. In this case, it is a mere fortuity that Strong happened upon legal counsel willing to prepare an ex parte application, appear in superior court, and pursue both an appeal and cross-appeal—all without guarantee of payment.
Construing section 31000.6 as requiring two legal proceedings to secure counsel for legal proceedings effectively renders section 31000.6 useless because the assessor would be wiser to ignore section 31000.6 by seeking mandate relief in the first instance in every case. (But see Ruiz v. Sylva (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 199, 209 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 351] [“A statute should not be construed in a manner that renders it superfluous.”].)
I would not blame the assessor for attempting to avail himself of the expediency promised by section 31000.6. At the time Strong gave notice of his intent to file an application under section 31000.6, he knew that the board had denied his request for independent counsel. But Strong did not know county counsel would admit an irremediable conflict but nonetheless continue to oppose the application.
Nonetheless, the majority assigns error to Strong for failing to discern that the board’s true reason for denying counsel was a belief that Strong was not acting within the scope of his duties in seeking to overturn the tax refund to Rideout. Section 31000.6 did not require Assessor Strong to guess at the board’s reason for denying his request for independent legal counsel. The proper focus under the statute is on whether the assessor is acting in the scope of his or her duties in pursuing legal action for which county counsel cannot provide representation rather than on what rationale the board might tender for denying counsel. The problematic nature of the majority’s approach is illustrated by its acceptance of county counsel’s3 argument that Assessor Strong’s duties did not include the filing of a legal action to challenge improper tax refunds. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 493-494.)
*507Case law establishes that the legal action apparently planned by Strong is within the duties of a county tax assessor. An assessor has the duty to ensure that all property is correctly taxed. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§51.5 [correction of base year values and clerical errors], 616 [requiring assessor to annually attest he or she has made “ ‘diligent inquiry and examination to ascertain all the property within the county subject to assessment by me, and that it has been assessed on the roll, according to the best of my judgment, information, and belief, at its value as required by law’ ”], 5097.2 [specifying grounds on which the assessor may grant tax refunds].) If the assessor believes that a tax refund has been wrongly granted, the assessor has the duty to seek correction of the error—even if the refund was granted by the county’s board of supervisors. (Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1, 8, 17-18 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 715] (Plaza Hollister).)
Plaza Hollister, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 1, involved an action for tax refund that was filed in superior court by a corporate taxpayer against the county. (Id. at p. 7.) A stipulated judgment was entered, representing a compromise between the taxpayer and the board of supervisors. (Id. at pp. 7-8, 11-12.) The assessor intervened and attacked the stipulated judgment on procedural and substantive grounds. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the assessor’s motion to vacate the judgment, concluding that the board had an absolute right to settle actions for refund of taxes. (Id. at p. 12.) The assessor appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed. (Id. at p. 8.)
The Plaza Hollister court (Plaza Hollister, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 1), acknowledged that a board of supervisors has authority to decide “valuation questions concerning individual assessments on the local roll.” (Id. at p. 23.) Even so, a board’s authority to grant refunds is not unfettered, but must be exercised in a manner consistent with statute. (Ibid.) Accordingly, judicial review of the board’s settlement for statutory compliance was appropriate. (Id. at p. 23 & fn. 15.)
The Plaza Hollister court (Plaza Hollister, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 1), also held that the assessor had the prerogative to challenge a compromise of an action for tax refund that he believed to be unauthorized by law. (Id. at pp. 17-18.) Plaza Hollister explains that “the Assessor, in his official capacity, has a sufficient interest under our tax system to have standing to bring a motion to vacate a judgment on the ground it is void where the judgment revises the base-year value reached by the Assessor and reduces assessments on the local roll prepared by the Assessor.” (Id. at p. 18.)
*508In Plaza Hollister, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 1, the Court of Appeal ultimately concluded that the stipulated judgment erroneously relied upon an unsubstantiated method of cash equivalent analysis for the property valuation at issue. (Id. at p. 25.) Moreover, the tax refund had not been timely and properly claimed. (Id. at p. 36.) Consequently, the Plaza Hollister court reversed the stipulated judgment. (Ibid.)
Plaza Hollister teaches that an assessor has the right to challenge a compromise for tax refund entered into between a board of directors and a taxpayer. Moreover, the assessor may resort to legal action to seek correction of substantive and procedural errors in the granting of a tax refund. (Plaza Hollister, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 25, 36; see also Shubat v. Sutter County Assessment Appeals Bd. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 794, 797 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 1] (Shubat) [considering an assessor’s challenge to determination of taxable property value on procedural and substantive grounds].) Accordingly, the rationale that Strong has no right to challenge the board’s compromise with Rideout for a tax refund has no merit.
In accepting the bogus excuse tendered by the board, the majority overlooks the portion of the record that suggests the board’s true reason for denying independent counsel. The majority’s recitation of the facts ignores Strong’s declaration that Sutter County had a contract with Rideout that would automatically double the special rate for inpatient hospital services paid by the county if Rideout were taxed on its real property. Strong further declared, “I am informed and believe that the County supports this contract.” Strong’s declaration suggests that the board unlawfully compromised on the tax refund to preserve its special rate for inpatient hospital services provided by Rideout.
Indeed, county counsel’s opposition in the trial court labored to recharacterize the tax refund granted by the board to Rideout as a litigation compromise unrelated to tax considerations. After receiving Strong’s notice of intent to apply for independent counsel under section 31000.6, county counsel filed written opposition on behalf of the board that argued: “It is indisputable that the Board and only the Board or its delegee, may allow, settle, or compromise claims against the county. The Assessor asserts that the Board usurped his authority to grant or deny welfare exemptions. This is not the case. The Board did not purport to grant or deny the welfare exemption to Rideout. Rather the Board resolved a vigorously disputed claim after consideration of factors such as probability, or lack thereof, of success in litigation, the legal validity of the claim, and economic factors, such as the potential cost to the county in terms of damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.”
*509If we are going to impute to Strong the knowledge of the reason for the board’s rejection of his request for counsel, we should do so acknowledging the evidence in the record. Here, it indicates that the board granted the refund for considerations unrelated to tax rules.
More importantly, the majority’s focus on the rationale given by the board deflects attention from the key considerations imposed by section 31000.6. I see nothing in section 31000.6 that allows the type of argument presented by a board to eviscerate the assessor’s statutory right to expedient relief. Nonetheless, the majority holds that “[i]f, as here, the assessor and the board of supervisors disagree over whether the purpose for which the assessor seeks legal assistance is within the performance of his duties—with the assessor insisting it is and the board of supervisors insisting it is not—then a regularly noticed mandamus proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure is the appropriate proceeding.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 493.) I cannot believe that the Legislature intended to allow bogus arguments and smokescreen rationales by a board of supervisors to insulate their decisions from the purview of section 31000.6.
D
I wholeheartedly agree with the majority that “[tjhere is no reason a county should have to fund its assessor’s litigation against its board of supervisors to establish the assessor’s right to a county-funded attorney in a matter in which, in the end, it is determined the assessor does not have a right to a county-funded attorney.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 493, italics omitted.) That is why the question of whether an assessor has requested legal representation on a matter concerning the performance and duties of the assessor’s office directly relates to the question of whether the assessor requires the services of independent counsel. Because section 31000.6 allows the trial court to consider whether a matter is within the scope of the assessor’s duties, a court is able to reject a request for counsel when the assessor is faced with adverse action by the county or district attorney that affects the assessor only in his or her personal capacity.4
On this point, it is worthwhile to note that section 31000.6 contemplates consideration of whether the assessor is acting within the scope of his or her duties when it provides, in subdivision (a), that “the board of supervisors shall contract with and employ legal counsel to assist the assessor or the sheriff in the performance of his or her duties in any case where the county *510counsel or the district attorney would have a conflict of interest in representing the assessor or the sheriff.” (Italics added.) In harmony with subdivision (a) of section 31000.6, the trial court must be able to deny the application by finding no need for independent counsel when the need for legal representation does not pertain to the assessor’s official duties. Thus, the better statutory construction for section 31000.6 is that the section allows a trial court to order conflict-free counsel to be retained for an assessor whenever the assessor properly demonstrates the need for independent counsel.
The majority rejects this construction by denying that there is “any authority for the court to order in the ex parte proceeding that the board of supervisors actually employ independent legal counsel for the assessor.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 491.) This holding eviscerates the utility of subdivisions (b) through (e) by allowing the trial court to recognize a right without being able to provide for a remedy. Moreover, it ignores the import of subdivision (a) of section 31000.6.
Here, Strong was acting within the duties of his office to ensure that all due taxes were properly collected. As in Plaza Hollister and Shubat, the assessor had the right to bring a legal action to cancel a refund or improper valuation he believed to have been improperly granted. (Plaza Hollister, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 25, 36; Shubat, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 797.)
To bring a legal action challenging the board’s compromise with Rideout, Assessor Strong requires legal advice and representation. To this end, subdivision (a) of section 31000.6 instructs the board of supervisors to appoint independent counsel whenever an assessor requests such representation due to county counsel’s conflict. It therefore follows that, when the trial court concludes that county counsel has a conflict not remediable by an ethical wall, the board of supervisors must retain independent counsel. A board of supervisors should not be allowed to thwart both sections 31000.6 and the trial court’s finding of a need for independent counsel until a petition for writ of mandate is filed by a county assessor in propria persona.
The Assessor’s Cross-appeal
In his cross-appeal, Strong argues the trial court erred when it ordered “[t]he Sutter County Board of Supervisors shall select and employ independent legal counsel... to represent Assessor Michael V. Strong . . . .” At oral argument, county counsel conceded the issue. I would accept the concession.
*511Conclusion
On the record presented, the bad guys win this lawsuit. The majority makes bad law and reaches a bad result. I would affirm the judgment (order) of the trial court, except that I would allow the assessor to choose his own counsel.
In pertinent part, Government Code section 31000.6 provides:
As the majority notes, this statute also applies to requests for independent counsel by county sheriffs and to instances in which the district attorney cannot provide conflict-free representation. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 488, fn. 4.)
The record does not indicate that the board itself ever adopted the reasoning advanced by county counsel in opposing the application for appointment of independent counsel.
As noted in footnote 2, ante, section 31000.6 also applies to instances in which the district attorney has a conflict of interest vis-a-vis the assessor.