ORDER
BY THE COURT:Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors have moved for a stay of remedial proceedings pending an appeal of this Court's order striking down Florida's Third Congressional District [see Johnson v. Mortham, 926 F.Supp. 1460 (N.D.Fla.1996) ]. A stay is "extraordinary relief" for which the moving party bears a "heavy burden" to demonstrate. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1231, 92 S.Ct. 1236, 1241, 31 L.Ed.2d 441 (1971) (Burger, C.J., in chambers). In determining whether a stay should be granted under Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court should consider the following factors: "(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies." Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 2119, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987). A review of these factors in this case weighs heavily against a stay.
First, Defendants and Defendanb-Intervenors have not made a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits. As the Court’s order sets out in great detail, intervening decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States have demonstrated that the DeGrandy court exceeded its limited remedial powers in drawing District Three and in engaging in race-based redistricting under the auspices of the Voting Rights Act. It is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will now reverse its recent line of jurisprudence and find that District Three satisfies the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, it is questionable whether Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors will be irreparably harmed if a stay is not granted. There is sufficient time to adopt a remedial plan that does not offend the Constitution, while still giving opportunities to the candidates to campaign and the public to consider those candidates.1 Moreover, the mere administrative inconvenience the Florida Legislature and Florida elections officials will face in redistricting simply cannot justify denial of Plaintiffs' fundamental rights.2 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1019, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). Finally, any harm that Congresswoman Brown herself will suffer as the result of redistricting is insubstantial compared to the harm that others, including the Plaintiffs, will suffer if the redistricting is not promptly effected.
*1543Third, Plaintiffs will suffer significant and irreparable injury if the stay is granted. Deprivation of a fundamental right, such as limiting the right to vote in a manner that violates the Equal Protection Clause [see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)], constitutes irreparable harm. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2689-90, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976).
Finally, it is clear that the public interest is best served by denying the stay. In awarding or withholding immediate equitable relief, a court should consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and should correspondingly apply equitable principles. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1394, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). In July of 1994, this Court did not hesitate to deny Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction because the 1994 congressional elections were impending and the qualifying period for federal candidates had closed (see Doc. 47). Such is not the situation today. As already discussed, there is sufficient time to ensure that the Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights are vindicated, without unduly trampling on the rights of the congressional candidates and the general public.
Accordingly, Defendants’ and Defendants Intervenors’ motion for a stay of further proceedings (Doc. 199) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED.
. The motion seems to assume that the candidates' qualifying period runs from May 6, 1996, to May 10, 1996. Although this is the period set out by Section 99.061(1), Florida Statutes, the 1990 amendment adding Section 99.061(8) provides:
(8) Notwithstanding the qualifying period prescribed by this section, in each year in which the Legislature apportions the state, the qualifying period for persons seeking to qualify for nomination or election to federal office shall be between noon of the 57th day prior to the first primary, but not later than noon of the 53rd day prior to the first primary.
The statute obviously was intended to provide the candidates and the public additional time during those hectic years when the congressional districts are being redrawn. Thus, even though there may be some technical difference between "reapportionment" and "redistricting, ” we construe the statute as extending the qualifying deadline to 53 days prior to the first congressional primaries—or a deadline of noon on July 12, 1996. To remove any uncertainty, we exercise our authority to extend the qualifying period for all Florida congressional candidates to the dates specified in Section 99.061(8), as set out above. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692-93, 91 S.Ct. 1760, 1762, 29 L.Ed.2d 268 (1971).
. In fact, the DeGrandy court had even less time to adopt a remedial plan before the impending elections in 1992.