concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the majority’s decision to reverse and remand for determination of Shuai’s bail, I respectfully disagree with its denial of Shuai’s motion to dismiss. Based on the facts and charging information before me, I would dismiss both the murder and attempted feticide Counts as charged by the State.18
A charging information must allege the elements of the crime such that the accused is sufficiently apprised of the nature of the charges against him so that he may anticipate the proof and prepare a defense in advance of trial. Zitlaw v. State, 880 N.E.2d 724, 730 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied. To further this end, the information must be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged in plain and concise language without unnecessary Repetition. Truax v. State, 856 N.E.2d 116, 123 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). A trial court considering a motion to dismiss an indictment or information in a criminal case need not rely entirely on the text of the charging information but can hear and consider evidence in determining whether a defendant can be charged with the crime alleged. Zitlaw, 880 N.E.2d at 730.
Here, as noted by the majority, the State charged Shuai with murder by killing a viable fetus on December 23, 2010, by ingesting rat poison when she was approximately thirty-three weeks pregnant, causing A.S. to be born in distress and subsequently die, pursuant to I.C. § 35-42-1-1(4). In Count II, Shuai was charged with attempted feticide because she knowingly terminated a human pregnancy with an intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus, in accordance with I.C. §§ 35-^42 — 1—6; 35-41-5-1. To determine whether Shuai was *633charged appropriately, as concluded by the majority, I am faced with a question of statutory interpretation.
Interpretation of a statute is a pure question of law and is reviewed de novo. Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.’ The primary goal in interpreting the meaning of a statute is to determine and effectuate legislative intent. Id. We therefore look to the plain language of the statute and attribute the common, ordinary meaning to terms found in everyday speech. Id. Where the General Assembly has defined a word, however, this court is bound by that definition. Id. Moreover, it just as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say. Id. A court may not read into a statute that which is not the expressed intent of the legislature. Id. Most importantly, criminal statutes cannot be enlarged by construction, implication, or in-tendment beyond the fair meaning of the language used , and should be strictly construed against the State. Id. Even though an act may fall, within the spirit of the statute, it will not constitute a crime unless it is also within the words of the statute. Id.
A. General Legislative History
Prior to 1980, the Homicide laws included, in this order, the following categories: (1)murder; (2) causing suicide; (3) voluntary manslaughter; (4) involuntary manslaughter; (5) reckless homicide; and (6) feticide. The first five statutes in the Homicide chapter focused on a person knowingly or intentionally killing another human being, vdth “human being” defined by I.C. § 35-41-1-14 as “an individual who has been born and is alive.” The sixth statute — feticide—was viewed as an extension of the laws of Homicide to cover the situation in which the victim is not a “human being,” but a fetus. See Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1189 (Ind.1992). Consistent with this grouping of Homicide laws, our courts have applied the feticide statute in cases where third-parties harm pregnant women and cause death to the fetus they carry. See id.; see also Perigo v. State, 541 N.E.2d 936 (Ind.1989) (defendant beat his pregnant girlfriend, killing her and her fetus).
In 1997, in response to the highly publicized shooting of a pregnant woman resulting in the stillborn birth of her eight-and-a-half month old fetus, the legislature made changes to several Indiana statutes while, at the same time, it left the eighteen-year-old feticide statute intact. See P.L. 261-1997. During this round of statutory revisions, the legislature focused on the murder statute and added a new subsection 4 which covered the murder of a viable fetus: As such, the revised murder statute read as follows:
A person who:
(1) knowingly or intentionally kills another human being;
(2) kills another human being while committing, or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, consumer product tampering, criminal deviate con- ■ duct, kidnapping, rape, robbery, human trafficking, promotion of human trafficking, sexual trafficking of a minor, or carjacking;
(3) kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit:
(A) dealing in or manufacturing cocaine or a narcotic drug (I.C. § 35-48-4-1);
(B) dealing in or manufacturing methamphetamine (I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1);
(C) dealing in a schedule I, II, or III • controlled substance (I.C. § 35-48-4- ■ ¾;
*634(D) dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance (I.C. § 35-48^-3); or
(E) dealing in a schedule V controlled substance or
(4) knowingly or intentionally kills a fetus that has attained viability; commits murder, a felony.
I.C. § 35-42-1-1. Likewise, 'both the manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter statutes were amended to include the killing of a viable fetus. See I.C. §§ 35-42-1-3; -4. In each statute, viability was defined as “the ability of a fetus to live outside the mother’s womb.” I.C. § 16-18-2-365. The legislature also revised the aggravated battery statute to include the circumstance when battery results in the “loss of a fetus,” as a Class B felony. I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5(c).
Approximately ten years later, in April of 2008, a bank robber shot bank teller Katherine Shuffield, who was then five months pregnant with twins, resulting in the twins’ death. The State presented a proposal to the legislature to amend Indiana’s murder statute by removing the requirement of viability, thereby allowing a third-party to be prosecuted for the death of a fetus at any stage of its development. Refusing to change the murder statute as requested, the legislature responded by amending the feticide statute instead, changing its status from a Class C felony to a Class B felony and thus substantially increasing the crime’s sentence.
B. Application
1. Murder
Now, for the first time in Indiana’s history, and without any notice whatsoever, the State decided to prosecute a woman for murder of her child based on her conduct during her pregnancy. According to the charges brought by the State, Shuai, when thirty-three weeks pregnant, knowingly or intentionally killed a viable fetus on December 23, 2010, by ingesting rat poison, pursuant to I.C. § 35-42-1-1(4). However, the facts reflect that on December 23, 2010, Shuai did not kill a viable fetus; rather, she gave birth to A.S. on December 31, 2010. The State did not present any evidence that Shuai did anything to endanger A.S. after her birth. A.S. died on January 3, 2011. The State now contends that the categories of “viable fetus” and “another human being,” as both are defined in the murder statute, can be used interchangeably with the focus being on Shuai’s actions, not A.S.’s legal status.
Whenever Indiana’s General Assembly sought to criminalize conduct affecting unborn children, it did so specifically. As noted above, prior to 1997, a defendant could only murder “another human being;” with “human being” defined as “an individual who has been born and is alive.” See § 35-41-1-14. In 1997, the legislature opted to extend the statute to the case of the unborn child, and did so by creating a new category of murder victims. Rather than to redefine the term of “human being” to include a fetus, the legislature in a new fourth category declared murder to include the killing of a viable fetus. Nowhere in Indiana’s laws is the term “human being” or “person” used as a substitute for, or as inclusive of, a conceptas or fetus (be it viable or non-viable). Therefore, I conclude that when the legislature determines to confer legal personality on a fetus for certain limited purposes, it expresses that intent in specific, explicit, and appropriate terms; the corollary, of course, is that when the legislature speaks generally of a human being or person, it impliedly but plainly excludes a fetus. By arguing that A.S.’s legal status as a viable fetus and as a human being are interchangeable, the State disregards legislative reality and impermissibly attempts to *635enlarge the murder statute. I conclude that by charging Shuai with the intentional killing of a viable fetus, the State failed to establish the essential element of that crime, i.e., that A.S. was a viable fetus. Rather, because Shuai gave birth to A.S., a human being who lived until January 3, 2011, the murder charge should be dismissed.
2. Attempted Feticide
In Count II, the State charged Shuai with attempted feticide because she tried to “knowingly terminate a human pregnancy with an intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus” when she ingested rat poison, a Class B felony. See I.C. § 35-42-1-6; 35-41-5-1. As noted above, throughout its history, Indiana courts have applied the feticide statute to situations where a third party killed a non-viable fetus. In effect, the current feticide statute was enacted as a reaction to the killing of non-viable twin fetuses by a bank robber. The State now urges us to apply the feticide statute to a pregnant woman’s prenatal conduct.
In 1835, Indiana enacted a statute relating to the procurement of a miscarriage which targeted third parties who cause a woman to miscarry. See Ind.Rev.Stat. Ch. XXVI, § 3, p. 224 (1838). Fifty years later, in 1881, a misdemeanor statute was enacted directed specifically at pregnant women, which provided that
Every woman who shall solicit of any person any medicine, drug, or substance or thing whatever, and shall take the same, or shall submit to any operation or other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure a miscarriage, except when by a physician for the purpose of saving the life of mother or child, shall be fined not more than $500 nor less than ten dollars, and imprisoned in the county jail not more than twelve months or less than 30 days, and any person who in any manner whatever unlawfully aids or assists any such woman to be a violation of this section, shall be liable to the same penalty.
1894 Ind. Acts, ch. 651, § 1997. Significantly, even with the possibility of holding a woman criminally liable for her own prenatal conduct which procured a miscarriage, the misdemeanor statute was only applied to third parties who performed or procured the miscarriage.19 In 1977, both miscarriage statutes were repealed.
The only recent Indiana case in which the State has charged a pregnant woman for prenatal conduct which endangered her unborn child was in the realm of neglect of a dependent. In Herron, the State unsuccessfully prosecuted a woman for ingesting cocaine during her pregnancy, which caused harm to her child after his birth. Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008, 1009 (Ind.App.2000), trans. denied. We rejected the State’s argument and found that the plain language of neglect of a dependent statute contemplated “only acts that place one who is a dependant at the time of the conduct at issue in a dangerous situation— not acts that place a future dependent in a dangerous situation.” Id. at 1011. The Herron court concluded that the applicable statutes “do not criminalize conduct that occurs prior to a child’s birth.” Id.
The State now applies the feticide statute in an end-run around the abolished miscarriage statutes and Herron’s conclusion in an attempt to criminalize the prenatal behavior of a pregnant woman. In light of Indiana’s long-standing statutory and case law history, I conclude that it was never the intention of the legislature that *636the feticide statute should be used to criminalize prenatal conduct of a pregnant woman. Rather, the statute should only be applied to third-party conduct which endangers or harms a non-viable fetus. Moreover, it is axiomatic that courts are obligated to avoid construing a particular statute so as to achieve an absurd or unreasonable result. If the feticide statute is interpreted as advocated by the State and applied to women’s prenatal conduct, it could have an unlimited scope and create an indefinite number of new ‘crimes.’ For example, many over-the counter cold remedies and sleep aids contain warnings that pregnant women should not use them without medical supervision, yet doing so cannot constitute a crime. It is also common knowledge that smoking and alcohol use during pregnancy may cause harm to the fetus. It is illogical to punish such prenatal behavior to the exclusion of other behaviors, if the focus is on resulting harm to the fetus. In short, the State’s interpretation might lead to a slippery slope whereby the feticide statute could be construed as covering a full range of a pregnant woman’s behavior. Courts must construe statutes with an eye toward reason and logic and dictated by legislative intent. Here, by condoning the State’s argument, the majority fails to do so.
Finally, I am mindful that it is not the purpose of the court to make legislation in the guise of judicial interpretation or construction. Whether to impose a legal duty or obligation on a pregnant woman to her unborn child and the extent of that obligation is a matter only for the legislature and is to be made after thorough investigative study and debate of all the implications of its decision.
I would dismiss both charges.
. While the majority claims that Shuai "only argues for the dismissal of the murder charge in her appeal,” it is abundantly clear from Shuai’s discussion of the attempted feticide charge in her appellate briefs that she advocates for the dismissal of both charges. Op. p. 625-26.
. See, e.g., Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338 (Ind. 1881); Traylor v. State, 101 Ind. 65 (Ind. 1885); Seifert v. State, 160 Ind. 464, 67 N.E. 100 (1903); Carter v. State, 172 Ind. 227, 87 N.E. 1081 (1909); Swanson v. State, 52 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. 1944).