concurring.
I fully concur in the decision to affirm partial summary judgment in favor of the Estate of Clinton Gray (the Estate) and deny summary judgment in favor of Capitol Construction Services, Inc. I write separately to explain my view that my vote in this case does not conflict with my vote in Hunt Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Garrett, 938 N.E.2d 794 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), which was vacated and is currently before our Supreme Court upon the grant of Hunt Construction Group’s (Hunt’s) petition for transfer. See Hunt Constr. Grp. v. Garrett, 950 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind.2011) (petition for transfer granted and opinion at 938 N.E.2d 794 vacated).
In Hunt, Shannon D. Garrett was an employee of Baker Concrete Construction, Inc., working at a jobsite at which Hunt served as construction manager. Garrett was injured when she was struck by a piece of forming material that was being removed by another employee of Baker Concrete. Garrett sued Hunt on grounds that it had assumed a nondelegable duty to her through its contract with the owner of the property on which the jobsite was located, and on grounds that it had assumed a duty to her through its conduct. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Garrett on both grounds with regard to the question of duty. I dissented from the panel’s decision that the trial court properly ruled against Hunt on the question of its liability via contract.
The majority in that case concluded that Hunt was liable under the contract between Hunt and the owner of the jobsite because the contract contained provisions that gave Hunt “significant duties regarding safety on the jobsite.” Hunt Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Garntt, 938 N.E.2d at 804. I dissented upon my view that the majority essentially ignored provisions in the contract that clearly limited Hunt’s liability for jobsite safety, thereby negating the element of duty with respect to the claims of the subcontractor’s employee. Such limiting language included the following: (1) Various documents stated that Hunt’s duties were undertaken “[wjithout assuming the safety obligations and responsibilities of the individual contractors,” one of whom was Baker Concrete, id. at 805; (2) one provision provided that Hunt “shall not have control over or charge of or be responsible for ... safety precautions and programs in connection with the Work of *309each of the Contractors, since these are the Contractor’s responsibilities”, id.; (3) the contract provided that Baker Concrete would “remain the controlling employer responsible for the safety programs and precautions” applicable to its work and that Hunt’s contractual responsibilities would “not extend to direct control over or charge of the acts or omissions of [Baker Concrete]”, id. Finally, I noted that all of the foregoing provisions were included in the contract between Hunt and the jobsite owner. That contract also provided that Hunt’s services were for the sole benefit of the owner and not the employees of a separate contractor on the project. I observed that, while “this duty may have coincidentally benefited the workers on-site, it does not alter the fact that Hunt Construction’s obligations under its contract with the Owner were intended to benefit the Owner, not the workers of other contractors.” Id. at 805-06. I concluded that the limiting provisions recited above clearly conveyed the parties’ intent that Hunt was not responsible for project safety and that such responsibility remained with the individual subcontractors, in that case, Baker Concrete. Hunt Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Garrett, 938 N.E.2d 794 (Friedlander, J., dissenting).
I continue to adhere to the view that a general contractor or construction manager may shield itself from liability arising from a duty of care to onsite subcontractor employees, even when certain provisions of its contract with the owner charge it with duties pertaining to onsite safety measures, including enforcing OSHA safety requirements and offering safety programs. It does this by inserting language into the relevant contracts explicitly disclaiming duties concerning onsite safety with respect to all parties except the owner, most notably including subcontractors. It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will agree with my view as expressed in Hunt.
With respect to the instant case, however, the relevant contracts contained none of the limiting provisions I found disposi-tive in Hunt. For this reason, I fully concur in the affirmance of partial summary judgment in favor of the Estate and denial of summary judgment in favor of Capitol Construction.