In my judgment, Special Term did not err, on the law or on the facts, when it held that “[b]y its terms, the May agreement clearly indicated that the parties intended that an assignment of the lease of each of the six theatres be obtained”; “that the parties did not intend that the May agreement itself constituted such an assignment”; and that “[biased on the credible evidence presented at the trial and the law regarding construction of forfeiture * * * there was no assignment of the sublease”. Hence, I am unable to agree with so much of the majority opinion as holds that the May, 1980 agreement “constituted an assignment of Mann’s sublease”.
However that may be, it is abundantly clear from the record that both the May, 1980 agreement and the successor January, 1981 agreement put Mann in violation of so much of paragraph 11 of the lease as provided that the tenant “shall not * * * permit any part of the demised premises to be used by others, whether voluntarily or * * * otherwise, without the prior written consent of Landlord in each instance”. This restriction is extremely broad in scope and takes in agreements, irrespective of the name bestowed on them by the parties, such as the two agreements between Mann and Brighton giving Brighton unfettered use of the premises, which are not forbidden by the assignment and sublease language of paragraph 11.
The notice sent to Mann which declared Mann in default gave Mann a cure period not provided for in the lease. While it may be argued that a strict technical reading of the notice limits its effectiveness to an assignment or subletting of the premises, on balance I am of the view that the notice adequately apprised Mann of the fact that the landlord knew that a new entity was in possession of the theatres, although the landlord was unaware of the legal basis for the occupancy, and informed Mann that the condition to be cured was the elimination of the operation of the theatres by an independent entity. Therefore, although I do not agree that there was an assignment, I concur with the majority in holding that the judgment appealed from should be modified and that there should be *479a declaration that the ground lease has been violated. I also agree with the majority that time to cure the violation still remains.
Mollen, P. J., and Mangano, J., concur with Lazer, J.; Niehoff, J., concurs in the result, in a separate opinion.
Judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered August 19,1981, modified, on the law, by deleting all but the fifth decretal paragraph and substituting therefor a provision declaring that paragraph 11 of the ground lease has been violated by the agreements of May 2, 1980 and January 1, 1981, and that the tenancy interests may cure the violation within the time remaining in the cure period computed from the time they obtained the temporary restraining order. As so modified, judgment affirmed, without costs or disbursements. The time within which the appellant may cure the violation will commence to run upon service on it of a copy of the order to be made hereon, with notice of entry.