IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-10176
Summary Calendar
ARNOLD BELL; PATRICK JAMES REEDOM; DONALD WILLIS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
CITY OF FORT WORTH ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees,
----------------------------
DONALD WILLIS, Petitioner's middle initial is "D",
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF FORT WORTH, TX.,
Defendant-Appellee,
-----------------------------
PATRICK JAMES REEDOM Et Al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
CITY OF FORT WORTH CDC COMMITTEE Et Al.
Defendants-Appellees,
-----------------------------
DONALD WILLIS, and all black agencies applicants for CDBG
grants with the Fort Worth and HUD, both past and present,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT; SHIRLEY
LEWIS; CARLOS RENTIA; CITY OF FORT WORTH; KATIE WORSHAM;
MELODEE HUMBERT; JERRY JENSEN; CARLOS MELENDEZ,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 96-10176
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:95-CV-004-A
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July 26, 1996
Before JOHNSON, GARWOOD and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Arnold Bell, Patrick James Reedom, and Donald Willis named
the City of Fort Worth and several of its employees as defendants
in a civil suit alleging discrimination against black applicant
in the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) process. On
February 26, 1996, the district court entered a final judgment
dismissing “all plaintiffs’ claims against all defendants except
for plaintiffs’ claims against the city for damages, court
supervision of the City of Fort Worth CDBG grant process, and
immediate financing of the Oakland Incubation Project for $5
million dollars, for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 5309 and Title
VI.”
Appellants argue that the district court judge erred by
failing to recuse himself because he granted the defendants’
motion to amend the scheduling order in the case without allowing
the appellant 20 days to respond. Other than making general and
conclusional allegations of bias, the appellants have produced
nothing that would cause a reasonable man to doubt the district
court's impartiality. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); Levitt v. Univ. of
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.
No. 96-10176
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Texas at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 226 (5th Cir.)(citations
omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 984 (1988). The district court
did not abuse its discretion by refusing to recuse himself from
this case. United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1165 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985).
On appeal, Bell, Reedom, and Willis do not specifically
challenge any of the district court’s conclusions that supported
the grant of summary judgment. Rather, the appellants focus
their argument on whether the district court erred in granting
summary judgment after amending the scheduling order without
allowing twenty days for the appellants to respond. This court
ordinarily defers to the district court in the management of its
own docket. See Union City Barge Line v. Union Carbide Corp.,
823 F.2d. 129, 135 (5th Cir. 1987)(district court has broad
discretion to control its own docket). The appellants have not
shown that the district court abused its discretion in amending
the scheduling order.
This appeal is without arguable merit and thus frivolous.
See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983).
Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. All
outstanding motions are DENIED.
Bell, Reedom, and Willis are hereby cautioned that any
additional frivolous appeals filed by them or on their behalf
will be met with sanctions. To avoid sanctions, Bell, Reedom,
and Willis should review all pending appeals to ensure they are
not frivolous.
APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS DENIED; SANCTIONS WARNING.