2018 WI 62
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2016AP1608
COMPLETE TITLE: Richard Forshee, Judith Timmerman, Verlan E.
Edwards, Robert R. Olson, Mary L. Edwards on
behalf of Verlan & Mary Edwards LLP and Jean
Forshee, Janet A. Olson,
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners,
v.
Lee Neuschwander and Mary Jo Neuschwander,
Defendants-Appellants.
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Reported at 377 Wis. 2d 162, 900 N.W.2d 100
PDC No: 2017 WI App 43 - Published
OPINION FILED: June 5, 2018
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: February 23, 2018
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Sawyer
JUDGE: John M. Yackel
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED: ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs (Opinion filed).
KELLY, J. concurs (joining majority except to
the extent it is inconsistent with this
concurrence), joined by BRADLEY, R. G., J.
(Opinion filed).
DISSENTED: BRADLEY, A. W., J. dissents (Opinion filed).
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For the plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners, there were
briefs filed by Linda I. Coleman, John R. Carlson, and Spears,
Carlson, & Coleman, S.C., Washburn. There was an oral argument
by Linda I. Coleman.
For the defendants-appellants, there was a brief filed by
Anne Berleman Kearney, Joseph D. Kearney, and Appellate
Consulting Group, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Anne
Berleman Kearney.
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the Wisconsin
REALTORS Association by Cori Moore Lamont and Wisconsin REALTORS
Association, Madison.
2
2018 WI 62
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2016AP1608
(L.C. No. 2016CV4)
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
Richard Forshee, Judith Timmerman, Verlan E.
Edwards, Robert R. Olson, Mary L. Edwards on
behalf of Verlan & Mary Edwards LLP and
Jean Forshee, Janet A. Olson, FILED
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners,
JUN 5, 2018
v.
Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Supreme Court
Lee Neuschwander and Mary Jo Neuschwander,
Defendants-Appellants.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed.
¶1 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. Lee and Mary Jo
Neuschwander purchased property on Hayward Lake in Hayward,
Wisconsin. They renovated the large house and began renting it
to vacationers on both short-term and long-term bases. Several
neighboring property owners (the "Neighbors") objected to the
use of the property as a vacation rental. They brought suit in
Sawyer County Circuit Court, claiming that a restrictive
covenant that encumbers all lots in the subdivision of which
No. 2016AP1608
Neuschwanders' property is a part, precludes short-term rentals
of property.1
¶2 The Sawyer County Circuit Court held in favor of the
Neighbors and enjoined Neuschwanders from further short-term
rentals, except for the Birkebeiner weekend.2 The court of
appeals reversed. Forshee v. Neuschwander, 2017 WI App 43, 377
Wis. 2d 162, 900 N.W.2d 100. The Neighbors petitioned for
review, which we granted.
¶3 We review a single issue: Whether the short-term
rental of the Neuschwanders' property constitutes "commercial
activity" under the restrictive covenant that encumbers their
property. We conclude that the term, "commercial activity,"
which is undefined in the covenant, is ambiguous. Therefore, we
narrowly interpret it and conclude that it does not preclude
either short-term or long-term rentals of Neuschwanders'
property. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of
appeals.
I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The Neuschwanders' property was purchased by the
Louisiana Pacific Corporation in 1984 and 1985. It consists of
two lots of a 15-lot subdivision that was originally owned by
1
No objection was made to long-term rentals of the
Neuschwanders' property. Although what would be characterized
as long-term rentals is not apparent from the record before us.
2
The Honorable John M. Yackel of Sawyer County presided.
2
No. 2016AP1608
four individuals. All lots in the subdivision have been
encumbered by a restrictive covenant that provides:
1. No dwelling can be erected on said property
with a living space of less than 1,000 square
feet.
2. There shall be no subdivision of existing
lots.
3. There shall be no commercial activity allowed
on any of said lots.
¶5 Louisiana Pacific built the first house in the
subdivision. It is a large building that Louisiana Pacific used
to provide short stays to clients, vendors, politicians and
employees. The house was used for everything from single-night
events to month-long stays, as well as serving as a corporate
social center.
¶6 In 2014, the Neuschwanders bought the property and
expended a substantial amount of money renovating the large
house. While the Neuschwanders used the property themselves on
occasion, the primary use has been the rental of the property to
vacationers on both short-term and long-term bases through the
website VRBO (Vacation Rental By Owner).3
¶7 Neuschwanders' property consists of two lots equaling
2.2 acres and a large house. It is located on a peninsula in
Lake Hayward in the City of Hayward, Wisconsin. It is
accessible via a narrow, private road that Louisiana Pacific
built. There are a number of other residents in the
3
Vacation Rental By Owner, https://www.vrbo.com.
3
No. 2016AP1608
subdivision, several of whom filed this action. Each of their
homes was built after Louisiana Pacific's construction of the
now-Neuschwander house.
¶8 The Neuschwanders' house is large, about 4,000 square
feet, and able to sleep up to 15 people. When renting the
property, the occupants treat the house in the same way that an
owner would: They sleep, cook, eat, and recreate in their
preferred manner. During the course of renters' stays the
Neuschwanders do not provide any services to renters. For
example, there is no maid or room service of any type.
¶9 The Neighbors' complaint alleged that the restrictive
covenant that proscribes "commercial activity" was violated by
short-term rentals of the property. They sought injunctive
relief to prevent the Neuschwanders from "further violating the
restrictions placed upon [their property]." Upon the parties'
competing motions for summary judgment, the circuit court agreed
with the Neighbors and concluded that short-term rentals of the
Neuschwanders' property violated the restrictive covenant.
¶10 The circuit court explained that the unstated "purpose
of the restrictive covenant was to ensure and maintain a quiet
neighborhood where people would know their neighbors," and that
the Neuschwanders' short-term rentals violated that purpose.
The circuit court enjoined the Neuschwanders from using their
4
No. 2016AP1608
property for short-term rentals except for the Birkebeiner
4
weekend. The Neuschwanders appealed.
¶11 On appeal, the Neuschwanders alleged that the
restrictive covenant is ambiguous and that the circuit court
improperly considered extrinsic evidence in coming to its
conclusion. In a published opinion,5 the court of appeals agreed
with the Neuschwanders, concluding that the restrictive covenant
is ambiguous and that it did not bar short-term rentals.
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's
summary judgment and lifted the injunction on the Neuschwanders'
use of their property.
¶12 The Neighbors sought review of the court of appeals'
decision, which we granted. For the reasons explained
hereafter, we affirm the court of appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶13 We independently review a grant or denial of summary
judgment by applying the same standards used in the circuit
court and the court of appeals, while benefitting from the
discussions of both courts. Sands v. Menard, 2017 WI 110, ¶28,
379 Wis. 2d 1, 904 N.W.2d 789; Dufour v. Progressive Classic
Ins. Co., 2016 WI 59, ¶12, 370 Wis. 2d 313, 881 N.W.2d 678.
4
The circuit court did not explain why the Birkebeiner
weekend was excluded from what it held was proscribed by the
restrictive covenant.
5
Forshee v. Neuschwander, 2017 WI App 43, 377 Wis. 2d 162,
900 N.W.2d 100.
5
No. 2016AP1608
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the movant has established the right to
judgment as a matter of law. Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2015–16);6
Sands, 379 Wis. 2d 1, ¶28.
¶14 Interpretation of a restrictive covenant is a question
of law that we review independently of prior court decisions.
Zinda v. Krause, 191 Wis. 2d 154, 165, 528 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App.
1995). Whether the language employed in a restrictive covenant
is ambiguous is also a question of law that we independently
decide. Id.
B. Restrictive Covenants
1. General principles
¶15 Covenants come in various forms, and are characterized
by the nature of the burden or benefit imposed. Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.3(3) cmt. e. (Am. Law Inst.
2000). A covenant becomes a servitude on the land if either its
burden or its benefit runs with the land. Id. cmt. a. "A
restrictive covenant is a negative covenant that limits
permissible uses of land." Id. § 1.3(3).
¶16 Public policy of the State of Wisconsin "favors the
free and unrestricted use of property." Crowley v. Knapp, 94
Wis. 2d 421, 434, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980). "Accordingly,
restrictions contained in deeds and in zoning ordinances must be
strictly construed to favor unencumbered and free use of
6
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated.
6
No. 2016AP1608
property." Id. (citing McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 Wis. 2d 607,
619, 157 N.W.2d 665 (1968) (further citations omitted)).
Consequently, in order to be enforceable, deed restrictions that
limit the free use of property "must be expressed in clear,
unambiguous, and peremptory terms." Id. at 435.
¶17 In resolving contests about the meaning of a
restrictive covenant in a deed, we do not look for amorphous
general intent, but rather, we determine the meaning of the
restriction by the words actually used. Id. at 438.
Construction of a covenant is necessary when the covenant is
ambiguous. Id. at 434 (citing Bollenbeck v. Vill. of Shorewood
Hills, 237 Wis. 501, 297 N.W.568 (1941)); see also Peterson v.
Gales, 191 Wis. 137, 139-40, 210 N.W. 407 (1926) (construing
"house" as an ambiguous term such that the restrictive covenant
did not prohibit the use of the property as a machine shop). If
the words employed in the restrictive covenant are ambiguous, we
resolve disputes about the meaning of the restriction in favor
of the free use of the property. Crowley, 94 Wis. 2d at 438 n.3
(citing Schneider v. Eckhoff, 188 Wis. 550, 556, 206 N.W. 838
(1926) (providing that because "the language used in the
restriction is doubtful in meaning . . . all doubt, under the
general rule, should be resolved in favor of the free use [of
land]")).
¶18 On the other hand, if the meaning of a restrictive
covenant clearly can be ascertained from the words of the
covenant itself, its restrictions will be enforced. See Zinda,
191 Wis. 2d at 166; see also Voyager Vill. Prop. Owners Ass'n v.
7
No. 2016AP1608
Johnson, 97 Wis. 2d 747, 749, 295 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1980)
(concluding that "camping equipment" clearly included camping
trailers).
2. The restrictive covenant
¶19 Currently, individuals who rent and occupy the
Neuschwanders' residence on both short-term and long-term bases
use the property in a manner similar to how an owner uses his or
her own house. They buy their own food, cook their own meals,
make their own beds and recreate as the house's location
provides, just as a property owner would.
¶20 As we consider those uses, we review a restrictive
covenant that declares that "[t]here shall be no commercial
activity allowed on any of said lots." The key term in the
covenant, as focused on by the parties in their briefs and at
oral argument, is "commercial activity." Therefore, we examine
whether this term precludes short-term rentals of Neuschwanders'
property.
¶21 We consider the term, "commercial activity," not in
isolation, but in the context of the deed's restrictions as a
whole. Zinda, 191 Wis. 2d at 166. However, reviewing
"commercial activity" in the context of the two other provisions
of the restrictive covenant at issue here does not add clarity
to the term we must interpret. We can see that the covenanters
clearly required dwellings to have a minimum size and that lots
could not be subdivided. However, those two provisions provide
no guidance as to what was meant by the "commercial activity"
that the covenant precludes. "Commercial activity" is simply an
8
No. 2016AP1608
undefined term, whether read separately or in the context of the
complete covenant.
¶22 It could be that the drafters were attempting to
prevent a lot from being used as a lakefront restaurant or a
filling station for boats. On the other hand, perhaps a
homeowner could maintain a daycare for preschool children in his
or her home without running afoul of the commercial activity
proscription. Because we are unable to clearly discern the
restrictive covenant's meaning through the text of covenant
itself, we conclude that it is ambiguous. Id. at 165-66 ("The
language in a restrictive covenant is ambiguous if it is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.").
¶23 When we determine the ordinary meaning of undefined
words, a dictionary often is helpful to our construction. Xcel
Energy Servs. v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶30, 349 Wis. 2d 234, 833
N.W.2d 665 (quoting Cty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶23, 315
Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571). We do so here as we construe
"commercial activity" with the aid of its dictionary definition.
¶24 Webster's Dictionary defines "commercial" as "engaged
in work designed for the market," "of or relating to commerce,"
or "characteristic of commerce." Commercial, Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary 226 (1974 ed.). "Commerce," then, refers
to "the exchange or buying and selling of commodities on a large
scale involving transportation from place to place." Commerce,
id.
¶25 These dictionary definitions posit that "commercial
activity" includes some form of buying and selling. However,
9
No. 2016AP1608
the dictionary definition is very nonspecific. One could read
these definitions to mean that "commercial activity" is limited
to products bought or sold and subsequently moved to another
location, thereby excluding purchases and sales that result in
consumption or use of the purchased item or service in a single
place. However, what we take away from our review of dictionary
definitions is that in the context of the entirety of the
restrictive covenant on the Neuschwanders' property, we cannot
clearly decipher the meaning of "commercial activity."
¶26 Case law requires that in order to be enforceable,
deed restrictions "must be expressed in clear, unambiguous, and
peremptory terms." Crowley, 94 Wis. 2d at 435. However, we are
unable to determine precisely what the words in this covenant
preclude. Stated otherwise, the covenant presents no "clear,
unambiguous, and peremptory terms" to follow. Id. Accordingly,
because this restrictive covenant is ambiguous, we must resolve
the contest before us in favor of the property owners' ability
to use their property freely. Id. at 438 n.3.
¶27 Furthermore, support for interpreting "commercial
activity" narrowly as not precluding use of the property for
short-term rentals is provided by the way in which the first
homeowner in the subdivision, Louisiana Pacific, interpreted
"commercial activity" as it used the same property. The record
establishes that since Louisiana Pacific's construction of the
house in the mid-1980s and throughout its ownership, the house
10
No. 2016AP1608
was used by individuals who were not the owners,7 for both short-
term and long-term stays. Under Louisiana Pacific's ownership,
guests would arrive at the house and leave anywhere from hours
later to a full month later. Therefore, because of Louisiana
Pacific's corporate status and because of its use of the house,
Louisiana Pacific's ownership did not further the purpose of
"ensuring a quiet neighborhood where people would know their
neighbors," which the circuit court concluded the restrictive
covenant was enacted to provide. And finally, if the
encumbrance actually were placed on the property to proscribe
short-term stays, as the original owner of the property who
would have been well-aware of the restrictive covenant,
Louisiana Pacific would not have built and maintained the house
as it did.
¶28 Because we cannot specify the precise activities
included in the definition of "commercial activity," we
interpret the covenant narrowly and conclude that short-term
rentals are not prohibited. Therefore, the Neuschwanders are
not precluded from renting their property for short or long
periods of time. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals
decision voiding the injunction issued by the circuit court.
7
It is worth reiterating that Louisiana Pacific is a
corporation whose business operations includes buying products
from suppliers and selling products to vendors and consumers,
and that both suppliers and vendors were entertained at the
property during Louisiana Pacific's ownership.
11
No. 2016AP1608
III. CONCLUSION
¶29 Upon our review, we consider a single issue: Whether
the short-term rental of the Neuschwanders' property constitutes
"commercial activity" under the restrictive covenant that
encumbers their property. We conclude that the term,
"commercial activity," which is undefined in the covenant, is
ambiguous. Therefore, we narrowly interpret it and conclude
that it does not preclude either short-term or long-term rentals
of Neuschwanders' property. Accordingly, we affirm the decision
of the court of appeals.
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is
affirmed.
12
No. 2016AP1608.ssa
¶30 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (concurring). The lead
opinion1 reaches the right conclusion for the wrong reasons. The
decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed, but not
because "commercial activity" is an ambiguous term that is
construed in favor of the free and unencumbered use of the
property.
¶31 Instead, the decision of the court of appeals should
be affirmed because the Neuschwanders did not violate the
unambiguous language of the deed restriction.
¶32 Because the lead opinion incorrectly concludes that
the term "commercial activity" is ambiguous, it fails to address
many of the parties' substantive arguments regarding the
application of the restrictive covenant to the activity in
question, namely, the short-term renting of the Neuschwanders'
property.
¶33 Accordingly, I write separately to set forth the
correct legal analysis that should have been relied upon by the
lead opinion in deciding the instant case.
I
¶34 The lead opinion erroneously concludes that the term
"commercial activity" is ambiguous. It is not.
¶35 A restrictive covenant is ambiguous if its language is
reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Zinda
v. Krause, 191 Wis. 2d 154, 165-66, 528 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App.
1995). "[I]f the intent of a restrictive covenant can be
1
See ¶76 n.1, infra (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting).
1
No. 2016AP1608.ssa
clearly ascertained from the covenant itself, the restrictions
will be enforced." Zinda, 191 Wis. 2d at 166. "Intent" does
not mean "the subjective intent of the drafter," but rather, it
refers to "the scope and purpose of the covenant as manifest by
the language used." Zinda, 191 Wis. 2d at 166. "'[W]here the
language used is clear and unambiguous[,] it will be given its
obvious meaning.'" Bubolz v. Dane Cty., 159 Wis. 2d 284, 294,
464 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoted source omitted).
Importantly, language is not rendered ambiguous simply because
it may be difficult to apply to the facts of a particular case.
Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2008 WI 86, ¶20,
311 Wis. 2d 492, 753 N.W.2d 448.
¶36 The restrictive covenant in the instant case reads as
follows: "There shall be no commercial activity allowed on any
of said lots."
¶37 The term "commercial activity" is reasonably
susceptible to only one interpretation, namely, the
interpretation attributed to it by both the circuit court and
court of appeals. The term "commercial activity" refers to an
activity undertaken with the intent to profit. See Forshee v.
Neuschwander, 2017 WI App 43, ¶6, 377 Wis. 2d 162, 900
N.W.2d 100 (stating that the circuit court defined "commercial"
as "viewed with regard to profit"); Forshee, 377 Wis. 2d 162,
¶11 (using a dictionary to define "commercial activity" to mean
"activity of buying and selling, or activity by which [the
Neuschwanders] make or intend to make a profit"); see also
Black's Law Dictionary 41 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "commercial
2
No. 2016AP1608.ssa
activity" as "[a]n activity, such as operating a business,
conducted to make a profit").
¶38 The term "commercial activity," although breathtaking
in scope,2 does not appear to be reasonably susceptible to more
2
Indeed, the restrictive covenant may be so broad that it
is unenforceable.
Although the drafters of the restrictive covenant may have
intended only to prohibit brick-and-mortar businesses and the
nuisances that come with them (e.g., incessant noise and
traffic), the language they used in the covenant is not limited
to a prohibition on brick-and-mortar businesses.
It is easy to imagine many unobtrusive activities that
could have been conducted on the property in 1982 with the
intent to make a profit that would have been prohibited under a
literal application of the restrictive covenant. For example,
could an attorney work on a case from home and bill for the
time? Could an architect work on a design at home? Could an
artist produce a work of art at home and mail it to the buyer?
These and many other "commercial activities" might be prohibited
under the expansive language of the restrictive covenant, even
though these activities would have had no effect on neighboring
property owners.
Has a restrictive covenant that was broad when it was
written in 1982 become practically boundless with the passage of
time and the development of technology? The advent of the
internet has vastly expanded the universe of activities that can
be conducted in one's home for profit. Can online entertainers
create content from home and upload that content to sites like
YouTube? Can an author write an article and upload it to an
online publication from home? Can an investor trade stock
online from home? Can a person sell belongings on sites like
Craigslist from home?
One might reasonably question whether putting the property
up for sale and showing it to potential buyers would be
prohibited under a literal application of the restrictive
covenant's plain language. However, if the language of the
restriction is unambiguous, the language controls. Tufail v.
Midwest Hospitality, LLC, 2013 WI 62, ¶¶25-26, 348 Wis. 2d 631,
833 N.W.2d 586.
3
No. 2016AP1608.ssa
than one interpretation. Notably, the lead opinion does not
posit a second reasonable interpretation. Instead, the lead
opinion confuses ambiguous language with unambiguous language
that is difficult to apply to the facts of the instant case.3
¶39 Because the language of the restrictive covenant is
reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, I now apply that
unambiguous language to the facts of the instant case.
II
A
¶40 First, it must be determined whether the
Neuschwanders' short-term rentals qualify as "commercial
activity." The short-term rentals constitute "commercial
activity" if the Neuschwanders engaged in the short-term rentals
for the purpose of making a profit.
¶41 The conclusion that the short-term rentals qualify as
"commercial activity" is unavoidable. As the court of appeals
observed, "it is undisputed that the Neuschwanders make money,
and intend to make money, and by inference a profit, by renting
their property to others on a short-term basis."
¶42 Second, in order for the "commercial activity" to be
prohibited by the restrictive covenant, it must be determined
3
See Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2008 WI
86, ¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 492, 753 N.W.2d 448 ("An otherwise
unambiguous provision is not rendered ambiguous solely because
it is difficult to apply the provision to the facts of a
particular case.").
4
No. 2016AP1608.ssa
that the "commercial activity" is taking place "on" the
property.4
¶43 In the instant case, there is no "commercial activity"
taking place on the Neuschwanders' property. The Neuschwanders
are correct that, as a factual matter, the only activity that
occurs on the property is residential, not commercial, in
nature.
¶44 The Neighbors' reliance on the federal district court
decision Gibbs v. Williams is misplaced.5 The court in Gibbs was
tasked with interpreting language that is materially different
than the language at issue in the instant case.
¶45 In Gibbs, the court interpreted a restrictive covenant
that stated that the subject property "shall not at any time be
used for the purpose of any . . . business of any
description . . . ." Gibbs v. Williams, No. 14-cv-420-jdp, 2015
WL 5440628, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 14, 2015) (emphasis added).
¶46 If the property at issue in the instant case were
subject to the language of the restrictive covenant discussed in
Gibbs, the Neuschwanders' short-term rentals would likely
violate the restrictive covenant. The Neuschwanders' property
is being used for commercial activity in that the temporary use
4
There is no reasonable basis for concluding that "on," in
the context of the restrictive covenant, means anything other
than physically on the property.
5
Gibbs v. Williams, No. 14-cv-420-jdp, 2015 WL 5440628, at
*1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 14, 2015).
5
No. 2016AP1608.ssa
and enjoyment of the property is the "thing" being bought and
sold.
¶47 However, the restrictive covenant in the instant case
is interested in the nature of the specific activities that
occur on the property. In the instant case, the Neuschwanders'
activity involves the property, but it is not conducted on the
property. To conclude otherwise would be to impermissibly
rewrite the language of the restrictive covenant.6
B
¶48 The Neighbors cannot rewrite the unambiguous language
of the restrictive covenant so that it focuses on the use of the
property as opposed to focusing on the nature of the activities
that occur on the property.
¶49 However, to the extent the restrictive covenant
directs the court to focus on the use of the property, Wisconsin
courts focus on how the property is used by the occupants rather
than how the property is used by the owners.
¶50 The court of appeals' decisions in State ex rel.
Harding v. Door County Board of Adjustment7 and Heef Realty &
Investments, LLP v. City of Cedarburg Board of Appeals8 are
6
Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 2003 WI 38, ¶12,
261 Wis. 2d 70, 661 N.W.2d 776 (courts cannot insert into a
contract what has been omitted, nor can they rewrite a contract
made by the parties).
7
State ex rel. Harding v. Door Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 125
Wis. 2d 269, 371 N.W.2d 403 (Ct. App. 1985).
8
Heef Realty & Invs., LLP v. City of Cedarburg Bd. of
Appeals, 2015 WI App 23, 361 Wis. 2d 185, 861 N.W.2d 797.
6
No. 2016AP1608.ssa
instructive, even though they involve zoning ordinances rather
than restrictive covenants.
¶51 In Harding, a property owner sought a building permit
that would allow him to build a time-share property owned by 13
families, each of which would have rights to occupy the property
for four weeks per year. Harding, 125 Wis. 2d at 270. The
Board claimed that this proposed use would violate a zoning code
ordinance that restricts the use of the property to single-
family dwellings. Harding, 125 Wis. 2d at 270.
¶52 The court of appeals held that the ordinance did not
unambiguously prohibit the property's use as a time-share. In
so holding, the court focused on how the time-share would be
used by its occupants (i.e., residential use) rather than how
the property was being used by the owners (i.e., commercial
use):
The building's purpose is to provide living quarters
for a family. The proposed building's floor plan has
a kitchen, dining room, and living room in addition to
four bedrooms. The building would be occupied
exclusively by one family. Although a different
family would occupy the building each week, that one
family would occupy the building to the exclusion of
the other twelve families.
Harding, 125 Wis. 2d at 271.
¶53 In Heef Realty, the owners of two homes initiated a
lawsuit when the Board told them that they could not use their
homes for short-term rentals. Heef Realty, 361 Wis. 2d 185, ¶2.
The Board claimed that because the homes were located in a
"single-family residential zone" that permits only "single-
7
No. 2016AP1608.ssa
family dwellings," short-term rentals were not allowed. Heef
Realty, 361 Wis. 2d 185, ¶5.
¶54 The court of appeals held that the zoning ordinance
did not prohibit short-term rentals of the homes at issue. In
so holding, the court of appeals relied heavily on Harding,
noting that "the cases are essentially the same." Heef Realty,
361 Wis. 2d 185, ¶10. Like in Harding, the court of appeals
focused on how the property would be used by its occupants
rather than focusing on the commercial nature of the owners'
short-term rentals:
The properties here are designed for use by one
family, just like the property in Harding. The
Ordinance here permits single-family dwellings in a
single-family residential zone, just like in Harding.
And, just like in Harding, only one family will use
each home at a time.
Heef Realty, 361 Wis. 2d 185, ¶10.9
¶55 The court of appeals in both Harding and Heef Realty
could not have reached the same conclusions if it had focused on
how the property was being used by its owners instead of how the
property was being used by its occupants. The property owners
in both cases were using the properties for commercial purposes
(i.e., renting for profit), not residential purposes.
9
The court of appeals also noted "that the home [in
Harding] was designed with a kitchen, dining room, living room,
and four bedrooms. This focus on the daily living connotation
of 'residential' gibes [sic] with the circuit court's
explanation that what makes a home a residence is its use 'to
sleep, eat, shower, relax, things of that nature.'" Heef Realty
& Invs., LLP v. City of Cedarburg Bd. of Appeals, 2015 WI App
23, ¶12, 361 Wis. 2d 185, 861 N.W.2d 797.
8
No. 2016AP1608.ssa
Nonetheless, because the occupants were using the properties for
residential purposes, the court of appeals in Harding and Heef
Realty both concluded that the ordinances at issue were not
violated by the property owners' commercial use of the property
for short-term rentals.
¶56 The court of appeals decision in Bubolz v. Dane County
is also instructive, even though it does not involve short-term
rentals.10
¶57 In Bubolz, the property-owning defendants were
operating an electrical contracting business out of their home.
Bubolz, 159 Wis. 2d at 291. The property on which their home
was located was subject to a deed restriction that specified
that "[n]ot more than one (1) single family residence shall be
constructed on said premises at a cost of not less than
$20,000.00." Bubolz, 159 Wis. 2d at 290. The property-owning
defendants argued that the restrictive covenant pertained to and
limited only what could be constructed on the property. Bubolz,
159 Wis. 2d at 293. They contended that the restrictive
covenant did not pertain to or limit their use of the property
for a commercial purpose. Bubolz, 159 Wis. 2d at 293.
¶58 The court of appeals rejected the property-owning
defendants' argument. First, the court of appeals held that the
restrictive covenant at issue extended to the use of the
property. Bubolz, 159 Wis. 2d at 294. Then, as it did in
Harding, the court of appeals focused on how the property was
10
Bubolz v. Dane Cty., 159 Wis. 2d 284, 464 N.W.2d 67 (Ct.
App. 1990).
9
No. 2016AP1608.ssa
being used by the occupants. In Bubolz, the occupants happened
to also be the property owners who were conducting the
electrical contracting business out of their home. Thus, in
Bubolz, the occupants/owners were using the property for both
residential and commercial purposes. Bubolz, 159 Wis. 2d at
294. This is in contrast to the occupants of the properties in
Harding and Heef Realty, who used the properties at issue for
residential purposes only.
¶59 Accordingly, to the extent the restrictive covenant
directs the court to focus on the use of the property rather
than on the nature of the activities occurring on the property,
Wisconsin courts focus on how the property is used by the
occupants, not how the property is used by the owners.
III
¶60 In sum, because the lead opinion errs at the outset by
concluding that the term "commercial activity" is ambiguous, it
embarks down the wrong analytical path, leaving many questions
unanswered.
¶61 I concur with the mandate of the court, but I write
separately to set forth the correct legal analysis that the
court would have otherwise had to engage in but for its mistaken
conclusion that the term "commercial activity" is ambiguous.
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No. 2016AP1608.dk
¶62 DANIEL KELLY, J. (concurring). "There shall be no
commercial activity allowed on any of said lots." Sentences
become unnecessarily convoluted when they speak in the passive
voice through split verb phrases, as this one does.
Fortunately, neither of these foibles is, strictly speaking,
ungrammatical.1 And that means the quoted sentence will show us
its plain meaning if we just apply a little grammatical elbow-
grease.
¶63 We start, as would all good grade-school students,
with identifying the sentence's subject. Unfortunately, authors
make this first step more difficult when they use the passive
voice. Such a formulation allows them to hide the actor (the
sentence's grammatical subject) by replacing it with what would
have been the sentence's grammatical object if they had written
the sentence in the active voice. To identify the subject of
this sentence, we first must rearrange it into its active-voice
form so we can find the grammatical object. Thus rearranged,
the restrictive covenant would read: "Lot owners[2] shall allow
no commercial activity on any of said lots." The verb phrase in
this formulation is "shall allow," which makes "commercial
1
We do, however, generally frown on them for their
obscurantism.
2
"Lot owners" were the hidden actors of the restrictive
covenant. Because they were hidden, identifying them requires a
little speculation. But only a little. Lot owners, of course,
are the only ones realistically capable of allowing commercial
activity on the lots, so it's a pretty safe guess that they are
the ones to whom the covenant applies.
1
No. 2016AP1608.dk
activity" the verb's direct object.3 The passive voice
transformation, therefore, moved "commercial activity" to the
subject slot.
¶64 The passive voice not only swaps the sentence's
subject and object, it also transforms the verb phrase ("shall
allow") by adding the verb "to be" while simultaneously putting
the existing verb into the past tense. Here, the author placed
the sentence's subject (commercial activity) in the middle of
the verb phrase, which made it read as follows: "shall be no
commercial activity allowed." But after setting aside the
sentence's subject (commercial activity) for a moment, the verb
phrase easily resolves to "shall be allowed."
¶65 Now that we have accounted for the subject and verb
phrase, we may readily identify the remainder of the sentence as
a simple, but critical, prepositional phrase: "on any of said
lots." Prepositional phrases come in two varieties——adjectival
and adverbial. As the names imply, they provide additional
information about either a noun or a verb. Here, the
prepositional phrase is adjectival because the preposition
provides identifying information about the noun phrase
"commercial activity." That is to say, the prepositional phrase
tells us the sentence does not apply to all "commercial
activity," but only to "commercial activity" as further
3
"[N]o," as it appears immediately before the direct
object, is simply a word of negation. Grammatically, an author
may accomplish the negation either by using "no" in conjunction
with the object to be negated, or "not" in conjunction with the
verb. The meanings are equivalent.
2
No. 2016AP1608.dk
described by the prepositional phrase. The preposition——"on"——
is locational, which tells us the sentence's subject is not
allowed only when it occurs where identified by the
prepositional phrase.
¶66 When we stitch all of this together, the restrictive
covenant says that no "commercial activity" (the subject) "shall
be allowed" (the verb) "on any of said lots" (the adjectival
prepositional phrase). The covenant does not prohibit all
commercial activity, but only so much of it that takes place "on
any of said lots." It says nothing about what may be done
"with" the property, or "to" the property, but only what may be
done "on" the property. That is to say, the covenant's
restriction is locational.
*
¶67 This grammatical exercise makes the restrictive
covenant really quite easy to understand. It also unequivocally
prevents the covenant from saying what the Forshees want it to
say. The Forshees assert that the Neuschwanders engage in
commercial activity when they rent their property (the
"Property"), something they believe the restrictive covenant
expressly forbids. But they can make the covenant say this only
if they ignore either the nature of the activity taking place on
the Property, or the prepositional phrase.
¶68 Because the restrictive covenant is a location-
specific prohibition of commercial activity, our application of
its language must begin with surveying what is happening on the
Property. As the court's opinion aptly describes, renters
3
No. 2016AP1608.dk
"sleep, cook, eat, and recreate in their preferred manner" on
the Property. Majority op., ¶8. If this is the "renting" about
which the Forshees complain, then substituting that activity
into the covenant should produce a meaning that is satisfactory
to them. Here is how it would read: "There shall be no
sleeping, cooking, eating, or recreating commercial activity
allowed on any of said lots." If the Forshees stopped a renter
in the middle of his meal to ask him what he was doing, he would
not say he was renting. He would say he was eating. And if the
renter had the temerity to stop the Forshees in the middle of
their meal to ask what they were doing, they would not say they
were owning. The renters obtained the right to sleep, cook,
eat, and recreate on the Property through the rental
transaction, but "renting" does not describe what they do on the
Property. We could not read the restrictive covenant this way
without disastrous, unintended consequences. If we were to
conclude that what the renters do on the Property comprises
"commercial activity," then the Neuschwanders' neighbors had
best pack their bags because the owners and renters are doing
the same thing.
¶69 Even though the covenant's restrictions only apply to
what occurs "on any of said lots," the Forshees are not actually
interested in what happens there. They are quite adamant, in
fact, that "[w]hat the customers do while on the property is
irrelevant." Instead, they say, it is the Neuschwanders' act of
renting the Property that violates the covenant. If that is
what the covenant prohibits, plugging that activity into the
4
No. 2016AP1608.dk
restrictive covenant should produce the meaning favored by the
Forshees. That substitution would have the covenant read,
"There shall be no renting of the Property commercial activity
allowed on any of said lots." "Renting of the Property," of
course, simply refers to the transaction by which one obtains
the right to use the Property for a defined period of time, just
as purchasing the Property refers to the transaction by which
one obtains ownership of the Property.
¶70 So if the Forshees are right——that "renting" is a
commercial activity to which the covenant refers——then the
covenant would merely prohibit the rental transaction from
taking place on the Property. That, of course, is not what they
want the covenant to say. But it could say that if we ignored
the prepositional phrase. The Forshees' desired effect would
obtain if we further modified the covenant to say, "There shall
be no renting of the Property allowed on any of said lots." But
that would make surplusage of the prepositional phrase, which we
avoid whenever possible. See Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v.
Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶45, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 ("When
possible, contract language should be construed to give meaning
to every word, 'avoiding constructions which render portions of
a contract meaningless, inexplicable or mere surplusage.'"
(quoted source omitted)).
¶71 The restrictive covenant's plain meaning simply does
not say what the Forshees want it to say. No grammatical
reading of the covenant could prevent the Neuschwanders from
renting their property——so long as the renters do not engage in
5
No. 2016AP1608.dk
"commercial activity" while residing there. The Forshees do not
appear to be claiming that activities like sleeping, cooking,
eating, and recreating are commercial in nature. Nor could
they——if such activity is commercial, the Forshees could no more
engage in it than the renters.
¶72 After applying a few rules of grammar to the
restrictive covenant, the sentence disclosed more than enough of
its plain meaning to resolve this case. Instead of employing
this grammatical analysis, the court sought a comprehensive
definition of "commercial activity." When it was unable to
discover one, it declared the phrase ambiguous, and used a rule
of construction to resolve the covenant's language against the
Forshees. If we should find our covenant construction efforts
in extremis, we certainly may have resort to this lifeline. We
shouldn't grab for it, however, unless we really are in
extremis. We weren't, and we could have (and should have)
stated the covenant's meaning without it. Therefore, I
respectfully concur and join the majority except to the extent
it is inconsistent with this concurrence.
¶73 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL
BRADLEY joins this concurrence.
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No. 2016AP1608.awb
¶74 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). The restrictive
covenant at issue provides, "There shall be no commercial
activity allowed on any of said lots." Although the application
of the phrase "commercial activity" in some contexts may render
the statute ambiguous, it is not ambiguous here.
¶75 The Neuschwanders purchased the property in 2014,
renovated it, and have primarily rented it out to vacationers.
Lead op., ¶6. In 2015, the Neuschwanders received $55,784.93 in
rent including taxes and paid $4,973.81 in room tax to the City
of Hayward.
¶76 To run such a lucrative enterprise is, in my view,
plainly "commercial activity." It relates to commerce and has
profit as its chief aim. Accordingly, I reach a conclusion
contrary to the lead opinion1 and respectfully dissent.
1
I use the term "lead" opinion for two reasons. First, I
am concerned that without this cue, the reader may mistakenly
believe that the lead opinion has any precedential value.
Although six justices join in the mandate of the opinion to
affirm the court of appeals (Roggensack, C.J., joined by
Abrahamson, J., Ziegler, J., Gableman, J., Rebecca Grassl
Bradley, J., and Kelly, J.), it represents the reasoning of only
three justices (Roggensack, C.J., joined by Ziegler, J., and
Gableman, J.). Justices Abrahamson, Rebecca Grassl Bradley and
Kelly joined in the mandate, but they would rely on contrary
reasoning.
Although set forth in three separate opinions, four
justices disagree with the reasoning of the lead opinion.
Contrary to the lead opinion, four justices determine that the
restrictive covenant is unambiguous (Abrahamson, J., Ann Walsh
Bradley, J., Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., and Kelly, J.).
(continued)
1
No. 2016AP1608.awb
I
¶77 The lead opinion concludes that the term "commercial
activity" as used in the restrictive covenant is ambiguous.
Lead op., ¶¶21-22. It therefore construes the words in favor of
the property owners' ability to use their property freely. Id.,
¶26. Accordingly, in the lead opinion's view, the restrictive
covenant does not prohibit any short-term or long-term rentals
of the Neuschwanders' property. Id., ¶28.
¶78 A restrictive covenant will be enforced if the
intention of the parties is clearly shown in the covenant.
Voyager Vill. Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Johnson, 97 Wis. 2d 747,
749, 295 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1980). Intent does not refer to
the subjective intent of the drafter, but to the scope and
purpose of the covenant as manifest by the language used. Zinda
v. Krause, 191 Wis. 2d 154, 166, 528 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App. 1995).
¶79 Further construction of a covenant is only necessary
when it is ambiguous. Voyager Village, 97 Wis. 2d at 749. In
interpreting the language of a restrictive covenant, we apply
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words. See Tufail v.
Midwest Hosp., LLC, 2013 WI 62, ¶28, 348 Wis. 2d 631, 833
Second, I use the term "lead" opinion because although it
is undefined in our Internal Operating Procedures, its use here
is consistent with past description. We have said "that a lead
opinion is one that states (and agrees with) the mandate of a
majority of the justices, but represents the reasoning of less
than a majority of the participating justices." State v. Lynch,
2016 WI 66, ¶143, 371 Wis.2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (Abrahamson & Ann
Walsh Bradley, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(citing Hoffer Props., LLC v. State, Dep't of Transp., 2016 WI
5, 366 Wis.2d 372, 874 N.W.2d 533).
2
No. 2016AP1608.awb
N.W.2d 586; Solowicz v. Forward Geneva Nat'l., LLC, 2010 WI 20,
¶34, 323 Wis. 2d 556, 780 N.W.2d 111 (explaining that ordinary
contract rules apply to interpreting the terms of a restrictive
covenant).
¶80 "Commercial activity" is susceptible to a clear
definition. As the lead opinion does, I turn to the dictionary
for assistance. The dictionary includes as definitions of
"commercial" the rather obvious "[o]f or relating to commerce"
and the more incisive "[h]aving profit as a chief aim."
American Heritage Dictionary 380 (3d ed. 1992). I accept the
plain meaning of these words, and therefore determine that the
covenant is unambiguous.
¶81 Applying the restrictive covenant's unambiguous
language to the specific activity in this case, I conclude that
the short-term vacation rental activity here is prohibited. The
record in this case indicates that the Neuschwanders profited
handsomely from the rental of their house. They further paid
substantial room tax to the City of Hayward and have held the
property out as a lodge available for rent in advertisements.
¶82 A profit motive was the entire basis of the
relationship. The Neuschwanders did not operate the property as
a single or two family dwelling. It was advertised to sleep up
to 15 people with a maximum of eight cars, regardless of the
family relationship. Instead, they conducted a short term
transient lodging business and used the property as part of that
business enterprise. Both the Neuschwanders and their renters
engaged in this enterprise. The very presence of the renters on
3
No. 2016AP1608.awb
the property is the result of a commercial exchange. Absent
payment, renters would not be able to engage in any activities
on the property, such as eating, sleeping, and recreating.
¶83 Additionally, the Neuschwanders acquired the property
in the first instance through a 1031 tax exchange. See 26
U.S.C. § 1031. A 1031 tax exchange is a process by which
certain properties may be exchanged without the I.R.S.
recognizing a gain or loss. See id. The catch is that the
property exchanged must be "held for productive use in a trade
or business or for investment." Id. By seeking the tax
advantage that accompanies a 1031 exchange, the Neuschwanders
tacitly acknowledge that the property is used for "business," or
in other words, "commercial activity."
II
¶84 Although I conclude that the Neuschwanders' rental of
their property is circumscribed by this restrictive covenant
because their activity relates to commerce and has profit as its
chief aim, I do not reach my conclusion without pause.
¶85 As the lead opinion observes, the breadth of the
restrictive covenant at issue raises concern. See lead op.,
¶22. It could be read to proscribe selling homemade crafts,
writing a blog post for compensation, or keeping any kind of
home office. On the other hand, it also could be that these
activities would be considered de minimus or "incidental to
4
No. 2016AP1608.awb
their occupation of the premises as their single family
residence."2 But these facts are not before us.
¶86 Although some activities may be close calls as to
whether they constitute "commercial activity," the
Neuschwanders' vacation rental is not a close call. The
language of the covenant is unambiguous and its application to
the Neuschwanders does not render an absurd result.
¶87 The breadth of the restrictive covenant, however, is
not the only concern. So, too, is the apparent breadth of the
lead opinion's holding. Its interpretation of "commercial
activity" has ramifications well beyond the facts of this case.
Likely there are a myriad of restrictive covenants that use the
same or a similar phrase. Are all of those now void? The lead
opinion seems to provide a blanket statement favoring the
property owner's rights over the rights of others. Yet, it
supports its conclusion with only a truncated analysis that does
not consider the larger context in which it fits.
¶88 The breadth of the lead opinion's holding stands in
contrast to the dearth of its analysis. Without sufficient
explanation, the lead opinion extols the property rights of the
2
See Bubolz v. Dane Cty., 159 Wis. 2d 284, 295-96, 464
N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1990) (injunction against violation of
restrictive covenant did not prohibit a residents from engaging
in business activities that are "incidental to their occupation
of the premises as their single family residence."); see also
Joyce v. Conway, 7 Wis. 2d 247, 251, 96 N.W.2d 530 (1959)
(explaining that acquiescence to past violations does not
deprive affected property owners of the right to enforce later
violations of a restrictive covenant).
5
No. 2016AP1608.awb
Neuschwanders at the expense of other rights and other property
owners.
¶89 Pivotal to the lead opinion's analysis is its premise
that "[p]ublic policy of the state of Wisconsin 'favors the free
and unrestricted use of property.'" Lead op., ¶16 (quoting
Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 434, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980)).
But what about the public policy of this state that favors
freedom to contract? Because of the import of freedom to
contract, courts in the past have supported the right of
property owners to create and enforce covenants affecting their
own property. See Solowicz, 323 Wis. 2d 556, ¶¶34-35. Which
right should prevail under these circumstances and why? The
lead opinion does not explain.
¶90 Likewise, the lead opinion fails to explain why the
property right of the Neuschwanders should prevail over the
property rights of their neighbors. Concerns have arisen
regarding traffic, noise, and other disturbances. Here the
property is comprised of a house located on 2.2 acres. What
about the rights of those where the rental is not so distant,
but rather the front doors are separated by only a few feet?
The lead opinion is silent.
¶91 Although espousing to be written narrowly,3 the lead
opinion instead appears to write large, without consideration or
analysis of the competing rights and implications of its
decision. This is particularly problematic because the rapid
3
See lead op., ¶3.
6
No. 2016AP1608.awb
development of the short-term rental industry appears to have
outpaced the development of the law.4 State and local
legislative bodies5 as well as courts6 have only recently been
grappling with the weighty issues that attend to this
enterprise.
¶92 Some courts addressing issues akin to that which we
address today employ an analysis and reach a conclusion similar
to that set forth in this dissent. See Eager v. Peasley, __
N.W.2d __, 322 Mich. App. 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017); Vonderhaar
4
See, e.g., Fruchter v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of
Hurley, 133 A.D.3d 1174, 1175 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) ("The Town
Code does not appear to have been updated to consider the
ramifications from the emergence of the so-called 'sharing
economy,' which includes the type of house sharing or short-term
rentals recently made popular by various platforms on the
Internet . . . .").
5
See 2017 Wis. Act 59, §§ 985L, 985r (creating Wis. Stat.
§ 66.0615(1)(bs) and (5)); Wis. Stat. § 66.0615(5) (requiring
"lodging marketplaces" to register with the department of
revenue, and to collect sales and use tax, as well as room tax,
if applicable); see also Wis. Stat. § 66.0615(1)(bs) (defining
"lodging marketplace" as "an entity that provides a platform
through which an unaffiliated 3rd party offers to rent a short-
term rental to an occupant and collects the consideration for
the rental from the occupant."); see also Vanessa Katz,
Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1067
(2015).
6
As an example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently
accepted review of Slice of Life, LLC v. Hamilton Twp. Zoning
Bd., 164 A.3d 633 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017), review granted 180 A.3d
367 (Pa. 2018). There, the question to be addressed is set
forth as: "Whether the Commonwealth Court disregarded the
binding precedent of this Court, set forth in the case Albert v.
Zoning Hearing Bd. of North Abington Twp., 578 Pa. 439, 854 A.2d
401 (2004), by finding that the purely transient use of a
property as part of a commercial short-term vacation rental
business was a permitted use in a residential zoning district?"
7
No. 2016AP1608.awb
v. Lakeside Place Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., No. 1021-CA-002193-MR,
unpublished slip op. (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2014). Others
embrace a contrary path and conclusion. See Santa Monica Beach
Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v, Acord, 219 So.3d 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2017); Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Cmtys. Ass'n, 327 P.3d 614
(Wash. 2014).
¶93 As new arguments are developed, new fact situations
presented, and new legislation passed, the law will continue to
evolve in this area. Restrictive covenants will be only one
part of this evolution, as they intersect and overlap with the
enforcement of local zoning ordinances that attempt to regulate
this rapidly growing enterprise. There will inevitably be more
litigation surrounding short-term rentals.
¶94 This court paints with a broad brush where a more
nuanced analysis is required. Lest by the apparent breadth of
its decision, the lead opinion unintentionally provides
inflexible answers to questions not yet presented. A more
nuanced analysis, at least recognizing the important rights it
is subjugating, together with an explanation of why, may provide
guidance to future courts and litigants as they grapple with the
developing issues that attend this burgeoning industry.
¶95 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I
respectfully dissent.
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1
Richard Forshee v. Lee Neuschwander
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date filed: 2018-06-05
Citations: 914 N.W.2d 643, 2018 WI 62, 381 Wis. 2d 757
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion