/FnTEv
^ IN CLimCt OFFICE X This opinion was filed for record
•UPMBC COURT,81ME OF WMKMOtON
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ri47E FEB 0 7 20191
GMIEFJUSTKE
SUSAN L. CARLSON
SUPREME cbURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 95632-4
Respondent,
En Banc
JOHN DOUGLAS MAYFIBLD,
Petitioner. Filed: fEB 0 7 2019
YU,J.—This case concerns an exception to the federal exclusionary rule
known as the attenuation doctrine. The attenuation doctrine provides that evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is
not subject to the exclusionary rule if"the connection between unconstitutional
police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some
intervening circumstance." Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061,
195 L. Ed. 2d 400(2016). We are asked whether the attenuation doctrine is
compatible with article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution and our
state exclusionary rule.
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
We have repeatedly held that our state exclusionary rule is considerably
broader than the federal exclusionary rule. Nevertheless, our exclusionary rule
does not automatically require suppression of all evidence that would not have
been discovered but for a prior violation of article I, section 7. Because our state
exclusionary rule does not operate on a strict "but for" causation basis, it is not
categorically incompatible with the attenuation doctrine. However, to comply with
the heightened protections of article I, section 7, the attenuation doctrine must be
narrow and apply only where intervening circumstances have genuinely severed
the causal connection between official misconduct and the discovery of evidence.
It is clear that there were no intervening circumstances sufficient to satisfy
the attenuation doctrine in this case as a matter of law. We therefore hold that
petitioner John Mayfield's motion to suppress must be granted, and we reverse and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 3, 2015, Derek Salte came home to find an unfamiliar truck
parked in his driveway, with a man (later identified as Mayfield) asleep in the
driver's seat. Salte told Mayfield to leave, threatening to call the police if he did
not. Mayfield started the truck's engine and tried to put it in reverse, but the truck
would not move. Eventually, Mayfield got out of the truck through the passenger
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
door and ran away, leaving the door open with the engine and windshield wipers
still running. Salte called the police, and Deputy Andy Nunes responded.
Deputy Nunes turned off the truck's engine, placed the keys on the driver's
seat, and closed the passenger door. He "did not search for or observe anything
within the truck's passenger compartment." Clerk's Papers(CP)at 19. He then
determined that the truck was registered to Mayfield and had not been reported
stolen. Around this time. Deputy Nunes spotted Mayfield walking on the other
side of the street, and Salte identified him as the person who was in the truck.
Deputy Nunes believed that Mayfield was trying to walk past them without making
contact, which Deputy Nunes thought was odd behavior for the truck's apparent
owner. He therefore crossed the street to talk to Mayfield.
Mayfield initially said he was parked in Salte's driveway because he needed
to use the restroom in the church next door but later said he was there because he
was having vehicle problems. Mayfield explained that he ran away because he
was afraid that Salte was about to assault him. At the suppression hearing. Deputy
Nunes testified that he did not suspect Mayfield of committing any crime, of being
under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, or of being armed or dangerous.
Nevertheless, Deputy Nunes thought the situation seemed strange.
A second officer, Sergeant Corey Huffme, arrived to assist while Deputy
Nunes asked for Mayfield's identification and checked for outstanding warrants.
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
No warrants were discovered, but Deputy Nunes learned that Mayfield "was a
convicted felon, was on active [Department of Corrections] supervision, and had
prior contacts in regards to controlled substances." Id.
Deputy Nunes then asked Mayfield about recent drug use, which Mayfield
denied. Deputy Nunes asked for consent to conduct a pat-down search and told
Mayfield he could refuse. Mayfield consented, and Deputy Nunes found $464 in
cash, bundled in a way that made him suspect "the money was the result of drug
transactions." Id. Deputy Nunes then asked for consent to search the truck,
informing Mayfield he had the right to refuse and the right to limit or revoke his
consent. Mayfield consented. Deputy Nunes discovered methamphetamine in the
truck and arrested Mayfield.
Mayfield was charged with one count of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver. He moved to suppress the money and the
methamphetamine, arguing that Deputy Nunes unlawfully seized him without
reasonable suspicion and that his consent to search was vitiated by the unlawful
detention. The State contended that the attenuation doctrine provided an exception
to the exclusionary rule in this case.
The trial court concluded that Mayfield was unlawfully seized "when
Deputy Nunes began asking questions about [his] drug use, whether he would have
anything illegal on his person, and when he sought permission to conduct a pat-
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
down search." Id. at 20. However, the court denied the motion to suppress,
concluding that the evidence was attenuated from the unlawful seizure because
Deputy Nunes gave Ferrier" warnings before Mayfield consented to the search of
his truck. The court did not separately address the money discovered on
Mayfield's person, and the parties did not ask for clarification on that point. The
jury convicted Mayfield as charged.
On appeal, Mayfield argued that the attenuation doctrine is incompatible
with article I, section 7. In the alternative, he argued that Ferrier warnings alone
are insufficient to satisfy the attenuation doctrine. In a split opinion, the Court of
Appeals declined to reach Mayfield's state constitutional argument because he did
not conduct a GunwalP analysis. State v. Mayfield, No. 48800-1-II, slip op. at 5-7
(Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2018)(unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/
pdf/D2%2048800-l-II%20Unpublished%200pinion.pdf. The majority further
held that the federal attenuation doctrine was satisfied "[bjecause Ferrier warnings
were an intervening circumstance and there was not purposeful or flagrant police
'State V. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 960 P.2d 927(1998). Ferrier applies "when police
officers conduct a knock and talk for the purpose of obtaining consent to search a home, and
thereby avoid the necessity of obtaining a warrant." M at 118. To obtain valid consent, police
must "inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to
consent to the search and that they can revoke, at any time, the consent that they give, and can
limit the scope of the consent to certain areas of the home." Id. Mayfield's case does not require
us to determine whether Ferrier warnings are required where police seek consent to search a car,
rather than a home, and we do not purport to do so.
^ State V. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
misconduct." Id. at 10. One judge dissented on the basis that "[a] Gunwall
analysis is not required every time article I, section 7 is applied in a new context."
Id. at 14(Bjorgen, C.J., dissenting). We granted Mayfield's petition for review.
ISSUES
A. Was Mayfield's argument that the attenuation doctrine is incompatible
with article I, section 7 sufficiently briefed on appeal?
B. If Mayfield's state constitutional argument was sufficiently briefed, is
the attenuation doctrine compatible with article I, section 7?
C. If the attenuation doctrine is compatible with article I, section 7, is it
satisfied in this case?
ANALYSIS
It is well established that article I, section 7 often provides broader
protections than the Fourth Amendment. As such, we reaffirm that no Gunwall
analysis is needed to justify an independent state law analysis of article I, section 7
in new contexts. Mayfield's appellate briefing was therefore sufficient, and his
argument that the attenuation doctrine is incompatible with our state exclusionary
rule should be considered on its merits.
Carefully and narrowly applied, the attenuation doctrine is not categorically
incompatible with article I, section 7. However, we hold as a matter of
independent state law that the attenuation doctrine can apply only where the State
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
proves that the causal chain between official misconduct and the discovery of
evidence has been genuinely severed by intervening circumstances. That standard
is not satisfied here, so Mayfield's motion to suppress must be granted.
A. A Gunwall analysis is not required to justify an independent state law
analysis of article I, section 7 in new contexts
In Gunwall, we set forth six nonexclusive factors to guide the threshold
inquiry of'"whether, in a given situation, the Washington State Constitution
should be considered as extending broader rights to its citizens than the United
States Constitution.'" Blomstrom v. Tripp, 189 Wn.2d 379, 400, 402 P.3d 831
(2017)(quoting Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 58). In this case, Mayfield's appellate
briefing did not include a threshold Gunwall analysis. We nevertheless hold that
Mayfield sufficiently briefed his state constitutional claim and that he is entitled to
have that claim considered on its merits.
We recognize that our cases have been somewhat unclear on the need to
conduct a threshold Gunwall analysis. We therefore take this opportunity to
reaffirm that no Gwwwa//analysis is required to justify an independent state
constitutional analysis of article I, section 7 in new contexts.^ Courts and parties
^ We confine our holding to article I, section 7 and do not reach the broader question of
whether a Gunwall analysis is needed to justify an independent state constitutional analysis of
other provisions of the Washington State Constitution.
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
may assume an independent state analysis is justified and move directly to the
merits of the article I, section 7 claim presented.
"It is well established that article I, section 7 qualitatively differs from the
Fourth Amendment and in some areas provides greater protections than does the
federal constitution." State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 462, 158 P.3d 595
(2007)(citing State v. McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 29, 60 P.3d 46(2002)).
Therefore, we have previously held that when a new issue arises pursuant to article
I, section 7, parties and courts are not required to conduct a Gunwall analysis
before engaging in an independent state law analysis on the merits. Id. at 463
{ciiing State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 259, 76 P.3d 217(2003)). Instead,
"the focus is on whether the unique characteristics ofthe state
constitutional provision and its prior interpretations actually compel a
particular result." This involves an examination ofthe constitutional
text, the historical treatment ofthe interest at stake as reflected in
relevant case law and statutes, and the current implications of
recognizing or not recognizing an interest.
Id. (citation omitted)(quoting City ofSeattle v. McCready, 123 Wn.2d 260, 267,
868 P.2d 134 (1994)). This approach is reflected in several of our prior cases that
considered federally recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule on an
independent state law basis without first conducting a Gunwall analysis. State v.
Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 179-84, 233 P.3d 879(2010)(rejecting the good faith
exception); State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 631-36, 220 P.3d 1226(2009)
(rejecting the inevitable discovery doctrine); State v. Gaines, 154 Wn.2d 711,717-
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
22, 116 P.3d 993(2005)(adopting the independent source doctrine). And in our
most recent case to consider whether the attenuation doctrine is compatible with
article I, section 7, both the lead opinion and the dissent addressed the merits
without any Gunwall analysis. State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 259 P.3d 172
(2011)(plurality opinion).
Mayfield's appellate briefing followed this precedent. He did not conduct a
Gunwall analysis, but he presented argument and cited authorities supporting his
specific claim that the attenuation doctrine is incompatible with article I, section 7
based on the constitutional text, relevant precedent, and the differences in history
and purpose between our state exclusionary rule and the federal exclusionary rule.
The State opposed Mayfield's state constitutional argument on the merits, without
suggesting it was inadequately briefed or procedurally barred."^
However, the Court of Appeals declined to reach the merits, concluding that
Mayfield's appellate briefing was insufficient because he did not conduct a
Gunwall analysis. Mayfield, No. 48800-1-II, slip op. at 5-7; see also State v.
Witkowski, 3 Wn. App. 2d 318, 339-41, 415 P.3d 639(Sutton, J., concurring),
review denied, 191 Wn.2d 1016(2018). The majority's analysis implies that
^ In its supplemental brief to this court, the State cites RAP 2.5 and notes that Mayfield
did not raise a state constitutional argument at the trial court level. We nevertheless reach the
merits of Mayfield's state constitutional argument because it is an important, unresolved
question oflaw and the State did not raise RAP 2.5 until after we granted review.
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
Blomstrom reimposed a Gunwall requirement when applying article I, section 7 in
new contexts. We clarity that it did not.
Blomstrom considered whether article I, section 7 allows random urinalysis
testing to be imposed as a condition of pretrial release for individuals arrested for
alleged driving under the influence. 189 Wn.2d at 383-84. The majority did
conduct an abbreviated Gunwall analysis before turning to the merits. Id. at 401-
02. However, it did not suggest that the failure to do so is fatal to an otherwise
fully argued article I, section 7 claim, nor did it undertake the analysis required to
reverse our precedent holding that Gunwall is unnecessary when applying article I,
section 7 in new contexts. The parties in Blomstrom did not dispute the need for a
Gunwall analysis, so this court did not make any holding on that issue.^
We reaffirm that a Gunwall analysis is not required to justify an independent
analysis of article I, section 7 in new contexts. We also reaffirm that on the merits,
it is not sufficient for parties to simply "mention our state constitution in their
briefs" and note that article I, section 7 is often more protective than the Fourth
Amendment. State v. Rojo Armenta, 134 Wn.2d 1, 10 n.7, 948 P.2d 1280(1997).
Parties must provide argument and relevant authorities supporting the specific
^ Amicus objected to performing a Gunwall analysis in Blomstrom because, according to
amicus, our precedent held that article I, section 7 is not more protective than the Fourth
Amendment regarding the privacy rights of pretrial defendants. Blomstrom, 189 Wn.2d at 400
n.l7. We conducted a Gunwall analysis over this objection, not because we intended to
reimpose a Gunwall requirement but because amicus misread our precedent. Id.
10
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
outcome they seek in light of"the constitutional text, the historical treatment of the
interest at stake as reflected in relevant case law and statutes, and the current
implications of recognizing or not recognizing an interest." Chenoweth, 160
Wn.2d at 463. Mayfield did so, and we therefore consider his state constitutional
argument on the merits.
B. A narrowly applied attenuation doctrine is not categorically incompatible
with article I, section 7
Article I, section 7 and its corresponding exclusionary rule provide uniquely
heightened privacy protections. Unlike many other jurisdictions, the primary
purpose of Washington's exclusionary rule is not to deter official misconduct
under threat of suppression. Deterrence is a benefit of our state exclusionary rule,
but its primary purpose is to protect the individual right to privacy and to provide a
certain remedy when that right is violated. We have therefore adopted a broad
exclusionary rule and rejected several exceptions recognized by other jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, our precedent recognizes that our exclusionary rule does not operate
on a strict "but for" causation basis. In narrow circumstances, evidence may be
admissible even if the evidence likely would not have been discovered but for a
prior article I, section 7 violation.
The underlying purpose ofthe attenuation doctrine is to prevent the
exclusionary rule from operating on a "but for" basis, which is consistent with
article I, section 7. However, a broadly applied attenuation doctrine allows the
11
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
State to benefit from the misconduct of its officials by failing to exclude illegally
seized evidence, which is not at all consistent with article I, section 7. This tension
has made it difficult to determine whether the attenuation doctrine applies as a
matter of independent state constitutional law. In our most recent case to consider
the question, three justices would have adopted the attenuation doctrine as applied
by federal courts, four justices would have rejected the attenuation doctrine
entirely, one justice concurred in result only, and one justice would not have
reached the issue.® Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907. The applicability of the attenuation
doctrine as a matter of state constitutional law therefore remains an open question.
After examining the history, purpose, and operation of the attenuation
doctrine and our state exclusionary rule, we hold that they are not categorically
incompatible with each other. However, we strongly caution that in order to
comply with article I, section 7, the attenuation doctrine must be carefully and
narrowly applied. The State must prove that intervening circumstances gave rise to
a superseding cause that genuinely severed the causal connection between official
misconduct and the discovery of evidence. If the State fails to meet its burden then
the attenuation doctrine cannot apply, regardless of whether the official misconduct
® Other cases have declined to reach the issue because it was unnecessary, not raised, or
inadequately briefed. State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 533, 545 n.4, 303 P.3d 1047(2013)(plurality
opinion); State v. Ibarra-Cisneros, 172 Wn.2d 880, 885 n.2, 263 P.3d 591 (2011); Armenta, 134
Wn.2d at 10 n.7.
12
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
was flagrant and purposeful, and regardless of whether suppression is likely to
deter similar misconduct in the future.
1. Washington courts apply a broad exclusionary rule based on
independent state law
In order to determine whether and how the attenuation doctrine might apply
to our state exclusionary rule, we must first explore the historical development,
purposes, and scope of the exclusionary rule in Washington. Doing so reveals a
long-standing commitment to an independent exclusionary rule that broadly
protects the right to individual privacy.
The history of our state exclusionary rule starts with the federal exclusionary
rule. The United States Supreme Court first indicated that federal courts should
suppress illegally seized evidence in 1886, referring "to the use of the evidence
there seized as 'unconstitutional.'" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647, 81 S. Ct.
1684,6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961)(quoting v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638,6
S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886)). The federal exclusionary rule was further made
explicit in the 1914 case of Weeks v. United States, which recognized that
[i]f letters and private documents can thus be [illegally] seized and
held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution.
13
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
232 U.S. 383, 393, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652(1914). Denying a defendant's
motion to suppress illegally seized evidence was thus "a denial ofthe
constitutional rights of the accused" and could not be permitted. Id. at 398.
The federal exclusionary rule was first held applicable to the states in 1961.
Mapp,367 U.S. at 660. Washington, however, adopted an independent state
exclusionary rule almost 40 years earlier, in 1922. State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash.
171, 189, 203 P. 390 (1922). The facts presented in Gibbons well illustrated the
need for an exclusionary rule to protect individual rights. A county sheriff
suspected the defendant possessed liquor, which was illegal at the time. The
sheriff telephoned for a search warrant but, instead of waiting for a warrant to be
issued, ordered the defendant to drive to the sheriffs office at gunpoint. On arrival
at the sheriffs office, the sheriff removed a suitcase from the defendant's car and
found several bottles of whiskey inside.
Easily concluding that the sheriffs actions were unconstitutional, we
considered whether the whiskey could nevertheless be used as evidence in the
defendant's trial for felony unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. We held it
could not because regardless of whether the federal exclusionary rule applied to the
states, the Washington State Constitution's protections against unlawful searches
and compelled self-incrimination required an exclusionary rule at least as robust as
the federal rule. Id. at 184(quoting WASH. CONST, art. I, §§ 7, 9).
14
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
Washington was in the minority of states when it adopted the exclusionary
rule, as most states followed English common law and refused to suppress any
relevant evidence, even if it was illegally obtained. State v. Buckley, 145 Wash.
87, 89, 258 P. 1030(1927). Our minority position was subject to significant
criticism. A prominent commentator asserted that states that had adopted the
exclusionary rule were infected with a '"contagion of sentimentality'" resulting
from the "'heretical influence of Weeks v. United States State v. Rousseau, 40
Wn.2d 92, 98, 241 P.2d 447(1952)(Finley, J., concurring in result)(quoting 8
John Henry Wigmore,Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2184, at 31 (3d
ed. 1940)). There were calls from within this court to either abandon the
exclusionary rule or make "some reasonable modification or exception" on the
basis that "it often and unreasonably may obstruct prosecution and confer
immunity upon undeserving law violators." Id. at 99. However, this court
consistently reaffirmed that "[i]t is the duty of courts to protect citizens from
unwarranted, arbitrary, illegal arrests by officers of the law," and there could be
"no doubt that the exclusionary doctrine of the Weeks case ... is the law of this
Jurisdiction." State v. Young, 39 Wn.2d 910, 917,239 P.2d 858(1952); State v.
Smith, 50 Wn.2d 408, 409, 314 P.2d 1024(1957)(italics omitted).
Our exclusionary rule thus has its basis in independent state law.
Nevertheless, for many years our state exclusionary rule was similar in scope to the
15
State V, Mayfield, No. 95632-4
federal exclusionary rule. Sanford E. Pitler, Comment, The Origin and
Development of Washington's Independent Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional
Right and Constitutionally Compelled Remedy, 61 WASH.L. Rev. 459, 486-87
(1986). This was so because when we first adopted the exclusionary rule, the
federal rule was broadly protective, holding "in no uncertain language, that it is
beneath the dignity of the state, and contrary to public policy, for the state to use
for its own profit evidence that has been obtained in violation of law." Buckley,
145 Wash, at 89 (citing 5c»y<7, 116 U.S. 616; Weeks, 232 U.S. 383; Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,40 S. Ct. 182,64 L. Ed. 319(1920);
Gouled V. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261,65 L. Ed. 647(1921); Amos
V. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 S. Ct. 266,65 L. Ed. 654(1921); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145 (1925)). Because the federal
exclusionary rule was so broad, there was no need for Washington to
independently define the contours of its own exclusionary rule. Pitler, supra, at
487.
However, the federal exclusionary rule is no longer the broad doctrine it
once was. Over time, federal courts have increasingly limited the exclusionary
rule by narrowly focusing on the federal rule's purpose of deterring Fourth
Amendment violations. This narrow focus has allowed for exceptions to the
federal exclusionary rule in cases where suppression appears unlikely to deter
16
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
official misconduct in the future. Washington has repeatedly rejected calls to
similarly narrow our own exclusionary rule.
Our first clear departure from federal law occurred when we held that the
exclusionary rule applies to evidence discovered in a search incident to an arrest
based on an unconstitutional stop-and-identify statute. State v. White, 97 Wn.2d
92, 109-10, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).^ The United States Supreme Court had recently
reached the opposite conclusion, holding that "[n]o conceivable purpose of
deterrence would be served by suppressing evidence" in such a case. Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979). We held
that such a result "is justifiable only if one accepts the basic premise that the
exclusionary rule is merely a remedial measure for Fourth Amendment violations."
White, 97 Wn.2d at 109. We squarely rejected that premise as applied to article I,
section 7 and reiterated that for our state exclusionary rule, "the emphasis is on
protecting personal rights rather than on curbing governmental actions." Id. at 110.
Suppression is an integral component ofthe right to privacy itself, and "whenever
the right is unreasonably violated, the remedy must follow." Id.
^ We have since clarified that Whitens holding applies only to an arrest made pursuant to a
statute that is '"so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional by virtue of a prior dispositive judicial
holding that it may not serve as the basis of a valid arrest.'" State v. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 311,
341 n.l9, 150 P.3d 59(2006)(internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting White, 97 Wn.2d at
103). However, we have consistently adhered to White's reasoning when considering whether to
recognize a new exception to our state exclusionary rule. Afana, 169 Wn.2d at 180; Winterstein,
167 Wn.2d at 631-34.
17
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
We similarly declined to adopt the federal inevitable discovery doctrine,
which "allows admission of illegally obtained evidence if the State can 'establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means.'" Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 634
(quoting Mx v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377
(1984)). This exception is based on the view that if evidence would have been
discovered regardless of official misconduct,"then the deterrence rationale has so
little basis that the evidence should be received." Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
We rejected that view, again reiterating that a primarily deterrence-based
rationale for the exclusionary rule "is at odds with the plain language of article I,
section 7, which we have emphasized guarantees privacy rights with no express
limitations." Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 635. Therefore,"balancing of interests
should not be carried out when evidence is obtained in violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights." Id. at 632. We concluded that the inevitable discovery
doctrine carmot be compatible with article I, section 7 because "the inevitable
discovery doctrine is necessarily speculative and does not disregard illegally
obtained evidence." Id. at 634.
We also rejected the good faith exception, which provides that evidence will
not be suppressed "when a search or seizure was unconstitutional but the police
officer's belief that it was constitutional was objectively reasonable at the time."
18
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
Afana, 169 Wn.2d at 180. Federal courts recognize the good faith exception
because "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system." Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 144, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009).
Again, we reaffirmed that "[ujnlike its federal counterpart, Washington's
exclusionary rule is 'nearly categorical.'" Afana, 169 Wn.2d at 180(quoting
Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 636). "In contrast to the Fourth Amendment, article I,
section 7 emphasizes 'protecting personal rights rather than . . . curbing
governmental actions.'" Id. (alteration in original)(quoting White, 97 Wn.2d at
110). Therefore, our state exclusionary rule does not allow any exception that
"does not disregard illegally obtained evidence." /State v. Mayfield
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Date filed: 2019-02-07
Citations: 434 P.3d 58, 192 Wash. 2d 871
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion