FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OCT 11 2023
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: LINDA L. GARMONG, No. 22-15885
Debtor, D.C. No. 3:19-cv-00490-RCJ
______________________________
GREGORY O. GARMONG, MEMORANDUM*
Appellant,
v.
MAUPIN, COX & LEGOY,
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 6, 2023**
Las Vegas, Nevada
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: RAWLINSON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and PREGERSON,***
District Judge.
Gregory Garmong (Garmong) appeals the district court’s order denying his
motion for attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district court’s
order concerning attorney’s fees. See Chan Healthcare Grp., PS v. Liberty Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 844 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2017). We review the district court’s
denial of attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. See Grancare, LLC v. Thrower
by and through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 2018). “We will reverse a
district court decision only if it is premised on clearly erroneous findings of fact or
erroneous determinations of law.” Id. at 547-48 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), “[a]n order remanding the case may require
payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as
a result of the removal.” “[A]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award
attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an
objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. . . .” Chan Healthcare Grp., 844
F.3d at 1141 (citation omitted).
***
The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson, United States District Judge for
the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Garmong’s motion
for attorney’s fees because Maupin, Cox & Legoy (Maupin) did not “lack[ ] an
objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Id. (citation omitted). The
bankruptcy court held that it had ancillary jurisdiction over Garmong’s action
based on “its inherent power to interpret and enforce the settlement agreement
incorporated into the Settlement Order over which it specifically retained
jurisdiction.” The bankruptcy court concluded that the settlement agreement was
“directly at issue” in Garmong’s action. The district court agreed, holding that
Garmong’s “argument that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction [was] without
merit because an exercise of jurisdiction by a bankruptcy court to enforce its own
orders arises in or is related to the bankruptcy case and is thus within” the
bankruptcy court’s “statutory jurisdiction.”
Although in a prior appeal we ultimately disagreed with the jurisdictional
analyses conducted by the bankruptcy court and district court, we did not hold that
Maupin’s removal of Garmong’s state court action was foreclosed by our
precedent. See Garmong v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy (In re Garmong), No. 20-
17520, 2021 WL 6102184, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2021) (unpublished). Notably,
we additionally held that, “[e]ven assuming the bankruptcy court retained
jurisdiction over a settlement agreement between Garmong and [Maupin], such
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retention [did] not confer removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1452, and the
parties fail[ed] to identify any other statutory basis for removal.” Id. (citation
omitted). Based on the plausible jurisdictional considerations raised in this case,
we are unable to conclude that Maupin “lacked an objectively reasonable basis for
seeking removal.” Chan Healthcare Grp., 844 F.3d at 1141 (citation omitted); see
also Grancare, LLC, 889 F.3d at 552 (explaining that “[r]emoval is not objectively
unreasonable solely because the removing party’s arguments lack merit, or else
attorney’s fees would always be awarded whenever remand is granted”) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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