J-A24032-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
INTERNATIONAL PROCESSPLANTS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
AND EQUIPMENT CORPORATION : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
METRO INDUSTRIAL WRECKING AND :
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTORS, : No. 386 EDA 2023
INC. :
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 221001596
BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 12, 2023
Metro Industrial Wrecking and Environmental Contractors, Inc.
(“Metro”) appeals from the order confirming an arbitration award against it
and in favor of International ProcessPlants and Equipment Corporation
(“IPP”).1 Metro has also requested a continuance of the oral argument
scheduled for this appeal. We dismiss the appeal and deny Metro’s motion for
continuance as moot.
A summary of the underlying breach of contract dispute between IPP
and Metro is unnecessary to our disposition. We note that on September 14,
2022, an arbitrator found in favor of IPP and entered an award against Metro.
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1 The record contains references to IPP with and without a space between
“Process” and “Plants.” IPP refers to itself without using the space. See IPP’s
Brief at 5. We do the same.
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Metro did not file a motion to vacate the arbitration award within thirty days
of the award. Rather, IPP filed a motion to confirm the award on October 19,
2022.2 Metro then filed a response in December 2022, and, for the first time,
raised objections to the arbitration award. The trial court granted IPP’s motion
to confirm the arbitration award, and Metro timely appealed. Both Metro and
the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The trial court, in its Rule
1925(a) opinion, concluded that Metro waived all objections to the arbitration
award by failing to object within thirty days of the award and, in any event,
failed to state a basis to disturb the arbitrator’s decision. See Trial Court
Opinion, 5/31/23, at 3-4.
In this appeal, Metro’s brief alleges improprieties in the arbitration
proceedings and award. Before attempting to address the merits of Metro’s
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2 Pennsylvania law establishes three types of arbitration by the agreement of
the parties: (1) common law arbitration, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7302(a), 7341-
7342; (2) statutory arbitration under the Uniform Arbitration Act, see 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7301-7320; and (3) statutory arbitration under the Revised
Statutory Arbitration Act, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7321.1-7321.31.
The parties and the trial court have discussed this matter as a common law
arbitration. See Petition to Confirm Award of Arbitration, 10/19/22, at 1
(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7342(b)); Opposition to Petition to Confirm, 12/1/22,
at 1 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7341); Trial Court Opinion, 5/31/23, at 2-3
(discussing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7342(b)). This Court has noted that Revised
Statutory Arbitration Act, “wind[s] down common law arbitration” in favor of
statutory arbitration under the Revised Statutory Arbitration Act. Foster v.
Nuffer, 286 A.3d 279, 285 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). The
Revised Statutory Arbitration Act governs an agreement to arbitrate made on
or after the statute’s July 1, 2019 effective date. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
7321.4(a). The contract giving rise to the underlying breach of contract claims
and the agreement to arbitrate was dated November 2019. Therefore, the
Revised Statutory Arbitration Act appears to govern.
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arguments, we consider whether the defects in its brief require dismissal of
the appeal.
Appellate briefs must conform materially to the requirements of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, and this Court may dismiss an
appeal if the defects in the brief are substantial. See Commonwealth v.
Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017); Karn v. Quick & Reilly
Inc., 912 A.2d 329, 335 (Pa. Super. 2006). It is an appellant’s duty to present
arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. An appellate brief
must support its claims with pertinent discussion, references to the record,
and citations to legal authorities. See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d
766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007); accord Jones v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86, 91 (Pa.
Super. 2005). “This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop
arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080,
1088 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). If a deficient brief hinders this
Court’s ability to address any issue on review, the issue will be regarded as
waived. See id. at 1088-89.
Metro’s brief fails to comply with multiple rules of appellate procedure.
It does not contain: a statement of jurisdiction (see Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1)), a
statement of both the scope of review and the standard of review (see
Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(3)), a statement of the questions involved (see Pa.R.A.P.
2111(4)), a summary of argument (see Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(6)), or separate
argument sections (see Pa.R.A.P. 2111 (a)(8)). Metro’s brief begins with an
opening paragraph followed by a “statement of the facts,” which includes a
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lengthy background of the underlying breach of contact. Metro’s Brief at
unnumbered 1-25 (some capitalization omitted). Metro provides minimal
citations to the portions of the record that it attached to its brief as exhibits.
See id. Metro’s brief then contains a “legal position to vacate the award[,]”
which is devoid of any citations to any legal authorities.3 Id. at unnumbered
26-49. Significantly, Metro’s “legal position” contains no citations to the
record. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (providing that where the argument references
evidence or other matter, it must set forth a reference to the place in the
record where that matter may be found); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(d) (providing that
where a finding of fact is argued, the argument must contain a synopsis of all
evidence on the point, with a reference to the place in the record where the
evidence may be found). Metro fails to acknowledge the trial court’s reasons
for confirming the arbitration award, let alone argue error in the trial court’s
order. This Court will not act as Metro’s counsel by scouring through the
record to find the evidence on which it relies and develop a meaningful
argument. See Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018);
accord Coulter, 94 A.3d at 1088.
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3 Indeed, the only citations to legal authority in Metro’s brief are Metro’s
certification pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2135, which governs the length of an
appellate brief, and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7341, which relates to common law
arbitration.
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Given these deficiencies, this Court is unable to meaningfully review the
issues Metro purports to raise.4 Accordingly, Metro’s failure to conform with
our appellate rule compels the dismissal of the appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101
(providing that “if the defects . . . in the brief . . . are substantial, the appeal
. . . may be . . . dismissed”). In light of our decision, we deny Metro’s motion
for a continuance as moot.
Appeal dismissed. Motion for continuance denied as moot.
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4 We add that we have reviewed the record, the parties’ brief, and the relevant
law and concur in the trial court’s determination that Metro waived its
objections to the arbitration award by failing to challenge it in a timely motion
to vacate. Both common law arbitration and statutory arbitration under the
Revised Statutory Arbitration Act required Metro to file a motion to vacate the
arbitration award within thirty days. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7321.24(b) (noting
that pursuant to the Revised Statutory Arbitration Act, a motion to vacate an
arbitration award must be filed thirty days after the moving party receives
notice of the award or the basis of the challenge becomes known or should
have been known to the movant); E. Allen Reeves, Inc. v. Old York, LLC,
293 A.3d 284, 292 (Pa. Super. 2023) (noting that pursuant to common law
arbitration, “[a] party must raise alleged errors in the arbitration process in a
timely petition to vacate or modify the arbitration award or the claims are
forever waived”) (citations omitted); accord Moscatiello v. Hilliard, 939
A.2d 325, 330 (Pa. 2007) (rejecting a claim that the Federal Arbitration Act
preempted the Uniform Arbitration Act; noting a thirty-day limit for
challenging an arbitration award is appropriate regardless of whether the
agreement to arbitrate was governed by the common law or the Uniform
Arbitration Act). We recognize that the Revised Statutory Arbitration Act
contains more flexible time limitations for filing a motion to vacate an
arbitration award than common law arbitration. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§
7321.24(b) (codifying a discovery rule tolling the time to file a motion to
vacate an arbitration award), 7321.25 (permitting a motion to modify or
correct an award within ninety days on limited grounds under the Revised
Statutory Arbitration Act). However, Metro has not alleged any basis to apply
these more flexible time limitations.
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Date: 10/12/2023
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