NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 17 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID FLORENCE, No. 22-15012
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:19-cv-00331-DAD-
BAM
v.
S. KERNAN, Secretary of CDCR; R. M. MEMORANDUM *
DIAZ, Under Secretary; K. J. POGUE,
Under Secretary; K. ALLISON, Director of
CDCR; B. KIBLER, Chief Deputy Warden,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 10, 2023**
Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner David Florence appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing for failure to state a claim his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
alleging claims under the First and Eighth Amendments. We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Florence’s action because Florence
failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be
construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)
(requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation in the prison context); Castro v.
County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir. 2016) (requirements for
establishing liability on the basis of custom or policy); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d
1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (requirements for a First Amendment retaliation claim
in the prison context).
Because Florence’s claims in this action and a prior action arose from
separate occurrences and were therefore unrelated, we reject as meritless
Florence’s contention that he should have been allowed to proceed on all of his
claims in the same action.
AFFIRMED.
2 22-15012