NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 18 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: PETER KLEIDMAN, No. 22-55381
Debtor, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-03287-JFW
______________________________
PETER KLEIDMAN, MEMORANDUM*
Appellant,
v.
HILTON AND HYLAND REAL ESTATE,
INC.; JOSHUA ALTMAN; MATTHEW
ALTMAN,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 10, 2023**
Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Peter Kleidman appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment affirming
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment in his adversary proceeding alleging
breach of fiduciary duty by real estate agents. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the district court’s judgment in an appeal
from the bankruptcy court, and apply the same de novo standard of review the
district court used to review the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment. Suncrest
Healthcare Ctr. LLC v. Omega Healthcare Invs., Inc. (In re Raintree Healthcare
Corp.), 431 F.3d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment because
Kleidman failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants
breached a fiduciary duty that they owed to Kleidman. See Gutierrez v. Girardi,
125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 215 (Ct. App. 2011) (setting forth elements of a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty); Carleton v. Tortosa, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734, 740 (Ct. App.
1993) (explaining that a real estate broker’s duty is defined by regulatory statutes
and “the general law of agency, i.e., . . . the terms of the agreement between the
parties”); see also C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213
F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing respective burdens of parties at summary
judgment).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Kleidman’s
objection to the expert declaration of Allan Wallace submitted by defendants in
support of their motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Evid. 704(a) (“An
2 22-55381
opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.”); Primiano
v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 563-64 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and
requirements for admitting expert testimony).
In his opening brief, Kleidman does not challenge—and has therefore
forfeited review of—the district court’s dismissal of his appeal from twelve
additional bankruptcy court orders related to discovery disputes, motions to
dismiss, and scheduling, on the ground that none of the issues he raised were
properly before the district court. See Nev. Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d
1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a pro se appellant waived issues not
supported by argument in opening brief); Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977
(9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “[w]e review only issues which are argued
specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief” and “[w]e will not
manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a
claim, particularly when, as here, a host of other issues are presented for review”).
We do not consider any additional matters not specifically and distinctly
raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the
first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 22-55381