Opinion filed October 19, 2023
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-23-00120-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF S.L.G. AND A.J.G., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 29th District Court
Palo Pinto County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. C50095
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an accelerated appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated
the parental rights of the mother and the father of S.L.G. and A.J.G. Only the father
appealed. On appeal, the father (Appellant) presents two issues in which he
challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
findings. We affirm the trial court’s order.
I. Termination Findings and Standards
The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West 2022). To terminate one’s
parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent
has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) and that
termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. Clear and convincing evidence is
“the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a
firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”
FAM. § 101.007 (West 2019).
In this case, the trial court found that Appellant had committed two of the acts
listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—those found in subsections (D) and (E).
Specifically, the trial court found that (1) Appellant knowingly placed or knowingly
allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the
children’s physical or emotional well-being—subsection (D)—and (2) Appellant
engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in
conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being—
subsection (E). The trial court also found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), that
termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of the
children. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case,
we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine
whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its
finding was true. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009); In re J.P.B., 180
S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient,
we give due deference to the finding and determine whether, based on the entire
record, a factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction about
the truth of the allegations raised against the parent. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In
re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). In this regard and under these standards,
we note that the trial court is the sole arbiter of the credibility and demeanor of
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witnesses and the weight to be afforded their testimony. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498,
503 (Tex. 2014) (citing In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 86–87 (Tex. 2005)).
With respect to the best interest of a child determination, no unique set of
factors need be proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict proof to
any specific factor or factors. In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2001, no pet.). However, courts may use and consider the non-exhaustive
Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72
(Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the
emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional
and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of
the individuals who seek custody; (5) the programs available to assist these
individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by
these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or
proposed placement for the child; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may
indicate that the existing parent–child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any
excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Id.
To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove each
Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one factor
will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2014, no pet.). In fact, the same evidence that proves one or more
statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative evidence
illustrating that termination is in the children’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28
(evidence that supports termination is also probative of the best interest
determination); C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266; In re J.O.C., 47 S.W.3d 108, 115 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2001, no pet.).
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The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the
factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that
termination is in the children’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates
that the parental relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and
well-being of the children. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best interest
analysis evaluates the best interest of the children, not the parent. In re E.C.R., 638
S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479
S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)).
In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or
her past conduct and determine whether termination is in the children’s best interest.
In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied); In re
D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may
infer that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the
children may recur in the future if the children are returned to the possession of the
parent. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no
pet.); May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992,
writ denied). Further, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet
the children’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness by the
parent to meet the children’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.D., 436
S.W.3d at 118; see also In re A.S., No. 11-16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3
(Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
II. Evidence Presented at Trial
The record shows that the Department of Family and Protective Services (the
Department) had been involved with Appellant and the children since 2018. The
children were previously removed from the care of Appellant and the children’s
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mother (S.R.) because bruising was observed on the children and their home was
extremely unsanitary; the children were later returned to Appellant in March 2021.
In August 2021, Department caseworkers and CASA volunteers observed
bruising on A.J.G.’s arms and legs and several handprints “all over her bottom and
back.” Appellant claimed that the bruising developed after he grabbed A.J.G. by the
arms as she was falling; he could not explain what caused the other bruising.
Photographs of A.J.G. depicted the bruising and showed that A.J.G.’s hair was
unkept, matted, and entangled with food. Bruising was also noted on S.L.G.’s shins
and knees. Based on the results of the Department’s investigation, it was determined
that Appellant was responsible for the children’s bruising.
At the time, the Department noted that the condition of the parents’ home was
extremely unsanitary. There was trash outside the home. Dirty clothes were spread
throughout the home. The bathrooms were not clean. Several dogs were confined
in a crate that had excessive dog feces in it. There was an abundance of rat and dog
feces that had accumulated in the children’s bathroom and bedroom. Rat feces was
also observed on the children’s beds and toys. A board in the hallway was “lifted
up” and constituted a safety hazard. Excessive dog hair was in the home, some of
which was found in A.J.G.’s vaginal area when she was later examined at the
hospital. A.J.G. was characterized as a medically fragile child because of her
premature birth and other health conditions; however, Appellant would not attend to
A.J.G.’s medical needs. There were approximately ten snakes inside the home that
Appellant kept as pets. Evidently, Appellant bred rats to feed to the snakes.
There was a history of domestic violence between Appellant and S.R. A
service plan was created, ordered, and issued to Appellant and S.R., and they were
requested to address the domestic violence issues and the unsanitary condition of
their home. Appellant and S.R. made only minimal and sporadic efforts to clean
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their home. They moved to another home in February 2022 but, and despite the
Department’s efforts to implement a “monitored return” arrangement, Appellant’s
pattern of maintaining unsanitary living conditions persisted and did not change. In
fact, when caseworkers from the Department and others visited the home where
Appellant and S.R. lived they noted that (1) the children’s bedroom and the home in
general was dirty and unkept; (2) there was an abundance of trash outside the home;
(3) trash and open garbage bags were on the porch; (4) there was a strong odor of
animal feces and urine inside the home; (5) dog and rat feces accumulations was in
several rooms; (6) the cages where the dogs were confined were dirty and
overflowing with feces; (7) the trash can inside the home was overflowing with trash;
and (8) animal feces had accumulated in the kitchen area, the living room, the
hallway, and a closet. Further, Appellant kept eleven python snakes of different sizes
and lengths in the home. According to the Department and others, the condition of
Appellant’s home was unsafe and unsuitable for children.
The children were, again, removed from Appellant’s and S.R.’s care. The
Department, its caseworkers, and a CASA representative involved in the case
thereafter recommended termination of Appellant’s parental rights based on (1) the
history of physical abuse inflicted upon the children by Appellant, (2) Appellant’s
lack of concern for the children’s physical health and well-being, (3) the ongoing
unsanitary condition of their home (which had not changed since the Department’s
involvement with the family), (4) their inability to maintain a clean and safe
environment for the children, and (5) their failure to follow the court-ordered service
plan.
Since their removal, the children have been in the care of foster parents who
have provided a safe and stable environment for them; the foster parents have also
expressed an interest in adopting the children if the parents’ rights are terminated.
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S.R. testified that she sent pictures of the children’s bruises to a friend and
expressed concern as to what caused the bruising. S.R. also admitted that Appellant
was “aggressive” with the children.
Appellant testified that he could not explain what had caused A.J.G.’s bruising
other than to say that she bruised easily, or that the bruising “probably” was the result
of him holding her by the arm as she attempted to walk or by the children hitting
each other. Nevertheless, he testified that he did not consider the children’s bruising
to be severe enough to require medical treatment. Despite evidence to the contrary,
Appellant claimed that the condition of his home was “sufficient enough” and that
he was able to keep the snakes “locked up” and away from the children. According
to Appellant, he completed parenting classes and as a result he is no longer “as
aggressive” with the children.
III. Analysis
A. Endangering Conduct
In his first issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence to prove grounds (D) and (E). Here, we must only address his challenge
to the trial court’s findings under subsection (D) or (E). See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d
230, 234–35 (Tex. 2019) (addressing due process and due course of law
considerations with respect to appellate review of grounds (D) and (E) and holding
that an appellate court must provide a detailed analysis if affirming the termination
on either of these grounds). Because only one statutory ground is necessary to
support termination, if we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually
sufficient to uphold the trial court’s finding as to either subsection, we need not
address the arguments raised by Appellant as to the remaining subsection. See FAM.
§ 161.001(b)(1); N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 234–35; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
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The record clearly supports the trial court’s finding under subsection (E). The
focus of subsection (E) is parental misconduct. In re J.D.B., 435 S.W.3d 452, 463
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (citing Castaneda v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective &
Regul. Servs., 148 S.W.3d 509, 521–22 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, pet. denied)).
Subsection (E) “refers only to the parent’s conduct, as evidenced . . . by the parent’s
acts . . . [and] the parent’s omissions or failures to act.” In re S.K., 198 S.W.3d 899,
902 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied). Thus, under subsection (E), the relevant
inquiry is whether evidence exists that the endangerment of the children’s well-being
was the direct result of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to
act. In re D.O., 338 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, no pet.).
Additionally, termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a
parent’s single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of
conduct by the parent is required. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 750 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2019, pet. denied); In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2000, pet. denied); In re K.M.M., 993 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999,
no pet.). The parent’s offending conduct need not be directed at the children, nor
must the children actually suffer any injury. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; C.V.L., 591
S.W.3d at 750. Danger to the children’s well-being may be inferred from the parent’s
misconduct alone. C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d at 750. As such, a parent’s conduct that
subjects children to a life of instability endangers the children’s physical and
emotional well-being. In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2004, pet. denied).
Domestic violence in the home can result in an unstable environment for
children. In re O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d 896, 905 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.).
Moreover, exposing children to unsanitary living conditions endangers their physical
and emotional well-being. In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. 1996) (a parent
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endangered the children by allowing them to live in extraordinarily unsanitary
conditions, which included the presence of garbage, animal feces, and roach
infestation); In re K.S.O.B., No. 01-18-00860-CV, 2019 WL 1246348, at *13 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (the children were
living in deplorable conditions and the home was unsanitary and had rancid odors);
In re C.L.C., 119 S.W.3d 382, 392 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.); In re P.E.W.,
105 S.W.3d 771, 777 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (the children were
exposed to unsanitary living conditions); In re K.M.B., 91 S.W.3d 18, 24 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (the children lived in an unsanitary home that
included lice, animal feces, rancid odors, and general filth).
Here, the evidence shows that Appellant engaged in conduct that endangered
the children by physically abusing them, neglecting their medical needs, and
exposing them to continuous, unsanitary, and deplorable living conditions.
Appellant’s pattern of misconduct has persisted over the years with no sign of
improvement. Further, Appellant has demonstrated a preference of caring more for
his animals, reptiles, and himself, than he does for his children. Based on the record
before us, the trial court could have reasonably found and concluded by clear and
convincing evidence that Appellant has engaged in a course of conduct that
endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. Any recent strides or
attempts that Appellant claims to have made to overcome his past conduct and
deficiencies do not negate or excuse his past conduct. See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d
304, 317 (Tex. 2021).
We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to uphold the trial
court’s finding of termination under subsection (E). Accordingly, we overrule
Appellant’s first issue. Because only one statutory ground is necessary to support
termination and because we have upheld the trial court’s finding as to subsection (E),
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we need not address Appellant’s complaint regarding the trial court’s finding as to
subsection (D); although, in light of the evidence in the record before us, and if an
analysis of this ground was required, we are reasonably certain that the trial court’s
finding as to subsection (D) would also be upheld. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1); N.G.,
577 S.W.3d at 234–35; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
B. Best Interest of the Children
In his second issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights
would be in the best interest of S.L.G. and A.J.G.
With respect to the children’s best interest, the evidence, as detailed and set
forth above, shows that Appellant has engaged in a pattern of misconduct—he has
endangered the children, physically abused them, neglected their medical needs, and
exposed them to ongoing, deplorable, and extraordinarily unsanitary living
conditions, even while this case was pending in the trial court below. Additionally,
Appellant has failed to maintain a safe and stable environment for the children.
At the time of the final hearing on termination, both children were living in a
safe and stable foster home and were doing very well there. The foster parents have
also expressed an interest in adopting the children if the parent’s rights are
terminated. Appellant has not demonstrated an ability or a willingness to put the
children’s needs before either his own, his animals, or his reptiles, nor has Appellant
shown that he can provide a safe, stable home and environment for the children.
Further, the Department’s caseworkers and the CASA volunteer involved in this case
testified that it would be in the children’s best interest to terminate Appellant’s
parental rights.
In light of the evidence presented and applying the Holley factors, we hold
that the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that
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termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of S.L.G. and
A.J.G. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Upon considering the record as it relates
to the desires of the children (who are too young to express a preference), the
emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future, the emotional
and physical danger to the children now and in the future, the parental abilities (or
lack thereof) of those involved, the Department’s plans for the children, Appellant’s
history of domestic violence and physical abuse, the inability of Appellant to provide
a safe and stable environment for the children, Appellant’s lack of justification for
his misconduct, and Appellant’s failure to correct the various deficiencies noted by
the Department, we further hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient
to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is
in the best interest of S.L.G. and A.J.G. See id. We defer to the trial court’s finding
as to the children’s best interest, see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27, and we cannot conclude
in this case that the trial court’s finding as to best interest is not supported by clear
and convincing evidence.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
October 19, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
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