Thomas Bevel v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2022-0210
____________

THOMAS BEVEL,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

October 26, 2023

PER CURIAM.

Thomas Bevel appeals his two death sentences, which were

imposed by the trial court for the second time following this Court’s

grant of postconviction relief and remand for a new penalty phase.

See Bevel v. State, 221 So. 3d 1168, 1185 (Fla. 2017). We have

jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons we

explain, we affirm Bevel’s death sentences.

I. BACKGROUND

Bevel was convicted in 2005 of the first-degree murders of his

friend and roommate, Garrick Stringfield, and Stringfield’s thirteen-
year-old son, Phillip Sims, and the attempted murder of Feletta

Smith, whom Bevel and Stringfield knew from childhood. Bevel v.

State, 983 So. 2d 505, 513 (Fla. 2008). This Court summarized the

facts of Bevel’s crimes in the original direct appeal as follows:

Thomas Bevel, who was twenty-two years old at the time
of the crime[s], resided with Garrick Stringfield, who was
thirty. The two were close friends, such that Stringfield
referred to Bevel as “nephew” or “Tom Tom” and Bevel
referred to Stringfield as “Unc.” On February 28, 2004,
both men were at a street parade in Jacksonville where
they ran into Feletta Smith, whom they both knew from
their childhood. Smith exchanged telephone numbers
with Stringfield and made plans to meet later that
evening.
After leaving the parade, Bevel and Stringfield
purchased a bottle of gin and went back to Stringfield’s
house later in the evening. Because Stringfield was going
out, he asked Bevel to wait for his thirteen-year-old son,
Phillip Sims, who was being dropped off by his mother,
Sojourner Parker. Although Parker noticed that
Stringfield’s car was not in the driveway when she arrived
at the house, she was unconcerned because Bevel, a
person she considered Stringfield’s roommate, answered
the door and let her son inside.
Around 9 p.m., Stringfield met Smith at a
Walgreens store and she followed him back to his house.
When they arrived at Stringfield’s house, Bevel and Sims
were playing video games in the living room where Smith
and Stringfield joined them. Although no illegal drugs
were being consumed, Smith stated that Bevel and
Stringfield were drinking gin out of the bottle and she
had a half cup of gin and grapefruit juice. At some point,
Smith and Stringfield went into his bedroom to watch
television. Stringfield showed Smith an AK-47 rifle that
he kept under his bed and, because Smith was scared of
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it, he handed the gun to Bevel who removed it from the
room. Stringfield and Smith remained in the bedroom
with the door closed. Smith said that she last saw Sims
playing video games in the living room.
Bevel then drove Stringfield’s car to a BP gas station
to meet his girlfriend, Rohnicka Dumas, took her to a bar
where he purchased another bottle of gin, and brought
her back to the house. When they returned, Stringfield
and Bevel went into the backyard, Dumas went inside,
Smith remained in Stringfield’s bedroom, and Sims
continued to play video games in the living room.
Stringfield and Bevel then came back into the house and
each had a gun in his possession; Stringfield was
carrying a smaller handgun and Bevel had the AK-47 rifle
that Stringfield had handed to him earlier in the evening.
Bevel and Dumas went into the other bedroom, located
across the hall from Stringfield’s room, and talked.
Bevel then left the bedroom with the AK-47 rifle in
his hand. He went to Stringfield’s bedroom, where Smith
and Stringfield were lying in bed nearly asleep, knocked
on the door and said, “Unc, open the door.” Stringfield
got up from the bed, unarmed, and opened the door in
his pajamas. Bevel immediately shot Stringfield in the
head and he instantly fell to the floor in the doorway.
Smith began screaming and Bevel yelled, “Bitch, shut up”
while he shot her several times as she lay in the bed.
Smith became quiet and pretended to be dead. She
testified that there was “no doubt in [her] mind” that
Bevel was the shooter. Rohnicka Dumas corroborated
Smith’s testimony. She observed Bevel pick up the rifle,
go out into the hallway, knock on Stringfield’s bedroom
door and say, “Unc, look here.” She testified that
multiple shots were fired, during which she heard both
the woman in the other room screaming and Bevel yell,
“Bitch, shut up.”
Bevel then went into the living room where Sims
was still sitting on the sofa with the television remote in
his hand and shot him twice, once grazing his arm and
chest and once in the face. Subsequently, Bevel returned
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to the bedroom where Dumas had been and they walked
out the front door. Bevel locked the burglar bar door, a
barred security gate located on the outside of the front
door to the house, and drove away in Stringfield’s car
with Dumas sitting in the passenger seat. While driving
to Dumas’s house, Bevel held the AK-47 rifle under his
chin and stated that he did not mean to kill the boy
(Sims), but had to because he was going to be a witness.
Bevel abandoned Stringfield’s car near Dumas’s house.
Smith was eventually able to reach 911 by using
Stringfield’s cell phone. Because Smith was unable to
give the police an exact address, it took some time for the
police and rescue to find the house. Ultimately, rescuers
were able to transport her to the hospital where she
stayed for almost a month while undergoing multiple
surgeries for various gunshot wounds to her pelvis and
upper legs.
After hiding for almost a month, Bevel was finally
found by officers from the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office on
March 27, 2004. Bevel was informed of his
constitutional rights and indicated his understanding of
each right by signing the rights form. The police
questioned Bevel on two occasions over the course of
twenty-four hours. During these two interviews, Bevel
gave four different versions of the story but ultimately
confessed to the murders.
Although Bevel confessed to murdering Stringfield
and Sims, his version of events was contrary to the
testimony of both Smith and Dumas. Bevel stated that
he and Stringfield had been fighting recently about
money that Stringfield believed he was owed and that
Bevel feared that Stringfield was going to try and kill him.
He said that when he brought Dumas back to the house
that night, Stringfield began to get angry, saying that he
should have killed Bevel a long time ago. While Dumas
and Smith were in opposite bedrooms, the fight escalated
until Stringfield was pointing the handgun at Bevel and
Bevel had picked up the AK-47 rifle. Then, Stringfield
went into his bedroom and, when Bevel heard a clicking
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 noise that sounded like a magazine being loaded into the
handgun, Bevel moved towards the room and shot
Stringfield when he reached the door. Bevel said the gun
went off several times but he did not mean to shoot
Smith.

Id. at 510-11 (second alteration in original).

In 2017, on appeal from the denial of his motion for

postconviction relief, this Court reversed and remanded for a new

penalty phase after concluding that counsel was ineffective during

the penalty phase and that Bevel was entitled to relief under Hurst

v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from in part by State v.

Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020), for the death sentence imposed

for Stringfield’s murder. Bevel, 221 So. 3d at 1172, 1177, 1185.

Both Bevel and the State presented witnesses at the second

penalty phase. Particularly relevant to this appeal, Bevel presented

testimony from three expert witnesses: Steven Gold, Ph.D., a

psychologist specializing in trauma; Robert Ouaou, Ph.D., a

psychologist with a specialization in neuropsychology; and Geoffrey

Negin, M.D., a diagnostic radiologist. After hearing the evidence,

the jury unanimously found that the proposed aggravators—prior

violent felony (based on a prior attempted robbery conviction and

the contemporaneous murder and attempted murder) as to both
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murders and that the murder was committed for the purpose of

avoiding arrest as to Sims’s murder—were proven beyond a

reasonable doubt and unanimously voted to sentence Bevel to

death for each murder. None of the jurors found that any of the

mitigating circumstances were established by the greater weight of

the evidence. The trial court ultimately agreed with the jury that

the aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and

afforded each very great weight. As to the statutory mitigating

circumstances, the trial court agreed with the jury that Bevel had

not established that he committed the murders while under the

influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 1 and that

Bevel’s age of twenty-two at the time of the offenses was not

mitigating. As to the proposed other factors in Bevel’s background

that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty under

section 921.141(7)(h), Florida Statutes (2021), the trial court found

1. Although the trial court in its sentencing order and the
parties in their briefing refer to this mitigator as being under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional distress, the statute
actually refers to extreme mental or emotional disturbance. This
Court believes this to be an inadvertent scrivener’s error and will
use only the term “disturbance” in discussion of this mitigator.

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as follows: IQ of seventy-one (little weight); Bevel’s childhood was

impacted by the trauma of his mother’s death at age twelve (little

weight); Bevel’s father did not actively participate in his life and

subsequently died due to heroin use (no weight); Bevel’s childhood

and teenage years were plagued by witnessing repeated acts of

violence and substance abuse within his family (no weight); Bevel

was essentially raised by his grandmother, who attempted to raise

multiple grandchildren with very little financial or emotional

resources (no weight); Bevel grew up in the eastern part of

downtown Jacksonville, where drug selling, gunshots, violence, and

substance abuse were common (no weight); Bevel was brought into

the criminal lifestyle at a young age by his then criminal role

models (no weight); Bevel was heavily influenced by the much older

Garrick Stringfield (no weight); Bevel was shot multiple times in

2001 in front of his grandmother’s house (no weight); Bevel, in spite

of his traumatic childhood, has repeatedly shown the capacity for

love and kindness (no weight); Bevel has exhibited good jail conduct

as well as appropriate courtroom behavior (no weight); Bevel

responds well in structured environments (no weight); Bevel

confessed to his crimes and has shown immediate and repeated
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remorse (not established/no weight); Bevel continues to impact the

lives of his family members and has developed a nurturing, caring

relationship with his daughter (no weight); Bevel suffers from brain

damage which affects his decision making (little weight); Bevel was

raised in a strong religious faith (no weight).

In sentencing Bevel to death, the court gave great weight to

the jury’s death recommendation and “wholly agree[d] with the

jury’s verdicts based on an assessment of the aggravating factors

and mitigating circumstances presented and their respective

weights.” The court concluded that “the aggravating factors heavily

outweigh[ed] the mitigating circumstances[] and that death is the

only proper penalty for the murders.” This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Bevel raises five issues. First, Bevel argues that the trial court

abused its discretion in disregarding the “unrefuted” expert

testimony that he was under extreme mental and emotional

disturbance at the time of the murders. In other words, he believes

that the trial court erred in failing to find that he established the

applicability of the statutory mitigating circumstance that “[t]he

capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
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influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” section

921.141(7)(b), Florida Statutes, based on his diagnoses of post-

traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. Bevel also asserts

that the trial court’s sentencing order improperly focused on

causation and dismissed Bevel’s personal and medical history as

“self-reported” without acknowledging corroboration in the record.

Dr. Gold, a psychologist specializing in trauma, met with Bevel

in 2014 and reviewed educational, medical, and legal records. Dr.

Gold testified that Bevel suffered from depression and PTSD.

During cross-examination, the following exchange occurred between

the prosecutor and Dr. Gold:

Q So the bottom line is you did not interview [Bevel] or
ask him what happened regarding both of these murders
and attempted murder, correct?

A No, I did not.

....

Q [S]ince you didn’t focus on interviewing the
defendant regarding what happened, what I am trying to
ask and making sure the record is clear is that you are
not stating -- your opinion is not that he was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
correct?

A He was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance. He had PTSD. He had
depression.
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Q So you believe he -- at the time he committed these
murders he was under the influence of extreme or
emotional -- extreme mental or emotional disturbance?

A I believe that throughout his life he was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
That would include the time of the murders.

Q So how can you make that assessment if you don’t
even ask him about the murders?

A If someone is diagnosed with cancer and you were
to ask me did the person have cancer when they
committed the murders my answer would be, yes, cancer
doesn’t come and go. PTSD doesn’t come and go. The
type of major depression that Mr. Bevel has had since he
was a child did not come and go. He -- he had these
diagnoses at the time of the murders. What I am not
saying is the diagnoses made him do it.

....

Q So you are saying that when he shot this 13-year-
old young boy he shot him because he was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
correct?

A You keep restating what I am telling you what I am
not stating. I am not saying he committed these offenses
because he had these diagnoses. Did these diagnos[e]s
impair his functioning, yes. Am I saying we can explain
away the offense based on these diagnoses? I am not.
He was impaired at the time, yes. There is a difference.

Q Why do you say he was impaired at the time he
committed both murders and the attempted murder?

A Because you asked me was he impaired at that
time. He was impaired through most of his life from
childhood.

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 Q So he is impaired as he sits here today?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So at any time there can be an outburst you
are saying?

A I am saying that any time somebody has cancer, if it
hasn’t resolved they have cancer. Mr. Bevel -- Mr. Bevel’s
PTSD is very unlikely to have resolved without treatment.
His major depression is very unlikely to have resolved
without treatment. Within a reasonable degree of
certainty as a professional I can say as he sits here he is
impaired by PTSD and major depression.

The trial court’s analysis and rejection of this mitigator

spanned nearly four pages of the sentencing order and included a

summary of the relevant law, a summary of the relevant testimony

of the three experts on whom Bevel relied in his attempt to establish

this mitigator, a recounting of Dr. Gold’s diagnoses, and the

numerous traumatic events in Bevel’s life that he reported to Dr.

Gold.

In ultimately rejecting the mitigator, the court concluded that

“[a]though Dr. Gold opined that Defendant suffers from PTSD, no

evidence exists that Defendant suffered from PTSD at the time of

the murders or that the PTSD caused Defendant to commit the

offenses while at that time suffering extreme mental or emotional

distress [sic].” The trial court noted that Dr. Gold did not discuss
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the murders with Bevel, and that his evaluation of Bevel occurred

approximately nine years after the murders. The trial court also

noted that Bevel engaged in purposeful, thoughtful, and deliberate

conduct at the time of the murders, admitting that he killed Sims to

eliminate him as a witness and securing the burglar bar on the door

of the house after the murders in the hope of delaying discovery of

the bodies.

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rejection of

this mitigator. We have previously upheld the rejection of the

extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator in cases where

there was expert testimony, even uncontroverted expert testimony,

of its existence. For example, in Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747,

755 (Fla. 1996), Foster presented expert testimony that he was

under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance

and argued on appeal that since this expert testimony was

uncontroverted, the trial court should have found the statutory

mitigator established. In upholding the rejection of this mitigator,

this Court wrote:

The decision as to whether a mitigating
circumstance has been established is within the trial
court’s discretion. Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404 (Fla.
- 12 -
 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 999 (1993). Moreover,
expert testimony alone does not require a finding of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance. See
Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987). Even uncontroverted
opinion testimony can be rejected, especially when it is
hard to reconcile with the other evidence presented in the
case. See Wuornos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1000, 1010 (Fla.
1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1069 (1995). As long as the
court considered all of the evidence, the trial judge’s
determination of lack of mitigation will stand absent a
palpable abuse of discretion. Provenzano, 497 So. 2d at
1184.

679 So. 2d at 755. This Court found no error in Foster despite

uncontroverted evidence of extreme mental or emotional

disturbance because “the trial court considered all of the evidence

presented, and it was not a palpable abuse of discretion for the trial

court to refuse to find the statutory mitigator of extreme emotional

disturbance.” Id. at 756.

Here, the trial court also thoroughly considered the evidence

presented. The only evidence that Bevel might have been under the

influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of

the murders was Dr. Gold’s testimony that because Bevel had

begun suffering with depression and PTSD many years before the

murders and because those conditions do not “come and go,” he

was, in Dr. Gold’s opinion, “throughout his life . . . under the

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influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” “includ[ing

at] the time of the murders.” But Dr. Gold did not explain why

depression or PTSD might have caused “extreme mental or

emotional disturbance” at the time of the murders. When asked

what could have triggered a manifestation of PTSD at the time of

the murders, Dr. Gold responded that he did not know because he

did not assess Bevel about that. In sum, Dr. Gold’s opinion that

Bevel qualified for the extreme mental or emotional disturbance

mitigator was based on the fact that he had diagnoses of depression

and PTSD based on events that happened in his childhood and, as

a result, he is “impaired” every moment of his life. Under Dr. Gold’s

theory, any capital defendant who had ever been diagnosed with

depression or PTSD would qualify for this mitigator.

In Nelson v. State, 850 So. 2d 514, 529-30 (Fla. 2003), this

Court discussed the rejection of uncontroverted expert testimony

regarding the extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator:

This Court has defined the circumstances under
which a trial court may reject a mitigator:
Whenever a reasonable quantum of
competent, uncontroverted evidence of
mitigation has been presented, the trial court
must find that the mitigating circumstance
has been proved. A trial court may reject a
- 14 -
 defendant’s claim that a mitigating
circumstance has been proved if the record
contains competent substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s rejection of the
mitigating circumstance.
Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 385 (Fla. 1994) (citation
omitted).
We considered the issue of expert opinion testimony
in Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994), stating:
Walls contends that the trial court
improperly rejected expert opinion testimony
that he was suffering extreme emotional
disturbance and that his capacity to conform
his conduct to the law’s requirements was
substantially impaired. In Florida as in many
states, a distinction exists between factual
evidence or testimony, and opinion
testimony . . . .
. . . Certain kinds of opinion testimony
clearly are admissible—and especially qualified
expert opinion testimony—but they are not
necessarily binding even if uncontroverted.
Opinion testimony gains its greatest force to
the degree it is supported by the facts at hand,
and its weight diminishes to the degree such
support is lacking. A debatable link between
fact and opinion relevant to a mitigating factor
usually means, at most, that a question exists
for judge and jury to resolve.
Id. at 390-91 (citations omitted). Thus, the trial court
was entitled to evaluate and disregard Dr. Dee’s opinion
if the trial court felt that the opinion was unsupported by
facts. The testimony that Nelson was “seeing things” on
the day of the murder, that he suffered from
hallucinations, and that he suffered from depression for
many years provided perhaps the most relevant evidence
to support this mitigator. However, the record reflects
that the source of this evidence was largely Nelson’s self-

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 reports to Dr. Dee, and that the trial court basically
rejected Dr. Dee’s uncontroverted expert opinion.

Nelson, 850 So. 2d at 529-30. Based on the witnesses’ testimony

that Nelson was acting normally before and after the murder, this

Court concluded that “there was competent, substantial evidence

refuting the allegation that Nelson was under extreme mental or

emotional disturbance” and upheld the trial court’s rejection of the

mitigator. Id. at 530.

In Nelson, the evidence offered to support the extreme mental

or emotional disturbance mitigator was that Nelson suffered from

depression for many years and he told his mental health expert that

he was “seeing things” on the day of the murder and that he

suffered from hallucinations. Id. And this evidence was

controverted by witnesses who testified that Nelson was acting

normally before and after the murders. Id.

Here, Dr. Gold’s opinion that Bevel qualified for the extreme

mental or emotional disturbance mitigator was based solely on

Bevel’s longstanding diagnoses of depression and PTSD, but Dr.

Gold’s opinion is difficult to reconcile with the fact that he did not

discuss the murders with Bevel or assess his mental or emotional

- 16 -
state at the time of the murders, and that Bevel—as described in

his confession—engaged in purposeful conduct at the time of the

murders, including killing Sims to eliminate him as a witness and

securing the burglar bar on the door of Stringfield’s house after the

murders. Further, although Dr. Gold did testify when asked

directly that Bevel was under the influence of extreme mental or

emotional disturbance at the time of the murders, Dr. Gold also

testified several times that Bevel was simply “impaired” at all times,

including the time of the murders, by his depression and PTSD.

But mere “impairment” cannot be equated with the “extreme

disturbance” required to establish the mitigator; thus, Dr. Gold’s

opinion as to the extent that the depression and PTSD affected

Bevel’s baseline mental or emotional state and therefore his mental

or emotional state at the time of the murders is not entirely clear.

Under the circumstances before us, there is competent,

substantial evidence in the record to support the rejection of this

mitigator. Moreover, the trial court did consider all of the evidence,

and its determination—which reflected the same conclusion

reached by the jury—that the extreme mental or emotional

disturbance mitigator was not established by the greater weight of
- 17 -
the evidence will “stand absent a palpable abuse of discretion,”

Foster, 679 So. 2d at 755 (quoting Provenzano, 497 So. 2d at 1184),

which is simply not present here.

As to Bevel’s complaint that the resentencing order improperly

focused on causation, we disagree. The trial court simply

accurately noted that “Dr. Gold emphasized during his testimony

that Defendant’s PTSD did not cause him to commit the offenses

but increased the likelihood Defendant would engage in criminal

behavior.” And as to his complaint that the trial court dismissed

Bevel’s personal and medical history as “self-reported” without

acknowledging corroboration in the record, even assuming that the

trial court did overlook corroboration in the record, any

corroboration of Bevel’s personal and medical history would not

have undermined the trial court’s conclusion that this mitigator

was not established by the greater weight of the evidence that Bevel

was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of

the murders. Dr. Gold did not testify that he reviewed any records

pertaining to Bevel’s mental state at the time of the murders.

Finally, even if we were to conclude that the trial court erred in

rejecting this mitigator, we would find any error harmless. In light
- 18 -
of the fact that the mitigation that was established was not

extensive or weighty, even if the trial court had found this mitigator

established and afforded it greater weight than any other mitigator,

the additional mitigation that this circumstance would have

provided would not have tipped the scale such that the mitigation

would have outweighed the aggravation, requiring the imposition of

life sentences for the murders.

Bevel next argues that the trial court erred in denying his

requests that the jury be instructed that regardless of its findings

regarding the aggravators and mitigators, it may always consider

mercy in determining whether Bevel should be sentenced to death.

The trial court denied these requests for special instructions and

instead read Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 7.11,

informing jurors that “[r]egardless of the results of each juror’s

individual weighing process—even if you find that the sufficient

aggravators outweigh the mitigators—the law neither compels nor

requires you to determine that the defendant should be sentenced

to death.”

“A trial court’s denial of special jury instructions is reviewed

for abuse of discretion.” Snelgrove v. State, 107 So. 3d 242, 255
- 19 -
(Fla. 2012). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Bevel’s requested special instructions. We have repeatedly

determined that Standard Jury Instruction 7.11 adequately informs

jurors of the applicable legal standard. E.g., Woodbury v. State, 320

So. 3d 631, 656 (Fla. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1135 (2022);

Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 210 (Fla. 2020). We have even

referred to the relevant provision in this instruction as the “mercy

instruction.” See Woodbury, 320 So. 3d at 656 (quoting Reynolds v.

State, 251 So. 3d 811, 816 n.5 (Fla. 2018)). “Thus, the court did

read an instruction on mercy, and although [the defendant] might

have preferred the wording of his proposed instruction, Standard

Jury Instruction 7.11 is not ambiguous when it comes to

addressing the jurors’ options.” Id. Bevel is not entitled to relief on

this claim.

Bevel also argues that the trial court erred in precluding any

argument to the jury about the proportionality of his possible

sentence. The trial court did not err in its ruling. “The jury’s

responsibility in the process is to make recommendations based on

the circumstances of the offense and the character and background

of the defendant.” Herring v. State, 446 So. 2d 1049, 1056 (Fla.
- 20 -
1984), receded from on other grounds by Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d

526, 533 (Fla. 1987). It is not to compare the facts of the case

before it to the facts of other cases or to compare the aggravation

and mitigation applicable to the defendant before it to the

aggravation and mitigation applicable to other defendants.

Bevel’s remaining arguments are similarly without merit.

Bevel acknowledges that his argument that the jury’s determination

regarding the sufficiency and weight of aggravating factors should

be subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt is contrary to

precedent from this Court and states that this issue is being raised

only to preserve it for federal review. Bevel is correct that we have

repeatedly reaffirmed our conclusion that determinations regarding

the sufficiency and relative weight of the proven aggravators are not

subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., McKenzie v. State,

333 So. 3d 1098, 1105 (Fla.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 230 (2022);

Joseph v. State, 336 So. 3d 218, 227 (Fla.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct.

183 (2022); Davidson v. State, 323 So. 3d 1241, 1247-48 (Fla.

2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1152 (2022). As to his argument that

Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it

does not limit the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and
- 21 -
violates the Eighth Amendment due to the elimination of

comparative proportionality review in Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d

544, 549 (Fla. 2020), and an overprovision of aggravating factors,

we have consistently rejected similar arguments, e.g., Joseph, 336

So. 3d at 227 n.5 (declining to address claim that Florida’s death

penalty statute is unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently

narrow the class of individuals eligible to receive the death penalty

on the ground that this Court has repeatedly rejected the same

argument); Covington v. State, 348 So. 3d 456, 480 (Fla. 2022)

(rejecting claim that elimination of proportionality review in

Lawrence rendered Florida’s capital sentencing scheme

unconstitutional); Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2, 15-16 (Fla. 2020)

(rejecting claim that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is

unconstitutional because the number of aggravating factors does

not sufficiently narrow the class of individuals who are eligible to

receive the death penalty), and Bevel makes no novel or compelling

argument that would warrant reconsideration of the numerous

recent decisions of this Court.

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 III. CONCLUSION

Having concluded that none of Bevel’s claims warrant relief

from his death sentences, we affirm.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and
FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
SASSO, J., did not participate.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LABARGA, J., concurring in result.

Because I continue to adhere to my dissent in Lawrence v.

State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), wherein this Court abandoned

this Court’s decades-long practice of comparative proportionality

review in the direct appeals of sentences of death, I can only concur

in the result.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
Adrian G. Soud, Judge
Case No. 162004CF004525AXXXMA

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis,
Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee,
Florida,

for Appellant

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Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Doris
Meacham, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach,
Florida,

for Appellee

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