Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC2023-0719
____________
GERNARD D. CHESTNUT,
Petitioner,
vs.
RICKY D. DIXON, etc.,
Respondents.
October 26, 2023
PER CURIAM.
Gernard Chestnut, an inmate in state custody, filed a pro se
petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction. 1 We
denied the petition, retained jurisdiction, and directed Chestnut to
show cause why he should not be sanctioned for his repeated
misuse of our limited resources. Chestnut v. Dixon, No. SC2023-
0719, 2023 WL 4990924 (Fla. Aug. 4, 2023); see Fla. R. App. P.
9.410(a) (Sanctions; Court’s Motion). Chestnut responded to our
show cause order. We now find that Chestnut has failed to show
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.
cause why he should not be barred, and we sanction him as set
forth below.
Chestnut was convicted in the Circuit Court of the Second
Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida, of attempted
second-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon in case number 372010CF000410AXXXXX. He was sentenced
by the circuit court to life in prison on the second-degree murder
count and to 15 years’ imprisonment on the possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon count. The First District Court of Appeal
affirmed his convictions and sentences on August 14, 2014.
Chestnut v. State, 145 So. 3d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
Since 2011, Chestnut has engaged in a pattern of vexatious
filing of meritless pro se requests for relief in this Court related to
his convictions and sentences. Including the petition in this case,
-2-
Chestnut has filed 31 2 pro se petitions with this Court. 3 The Court
has never granted Chestnut the relief sought in any of his filings
here; each of the petitions was transferred, dismissed, or denied.4
His petition in this case is no different. Chestnut argued that
his conviction was unlawful because the jury was incorrectly
instructed and he believed he was entitled to relief under
Montgomery v. State, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010). He complained that
the district court denied his Montgomery claim and dismissed his
petition under Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2004). These
are the same arguments Chestnut raised in Chestnut v. Dixon, No.
SC2022-1391, 2023 WL 141953 (Fla. Jan. 10, 2023). Because this
2. Days before the Court issued the show cause order in this
case, Chestnut filed two more petitions with this Court, case
numbers SC2023-1083 and SC2023-1087, that were not included
in the list of 29 cases in the show cause order but have since been
dismissed.
3. Chestnut v. Dixon, No. SC2023-0719, 2023 WL 4990924
(Fla. Aug. 4, 2023).
4. Although Chestnut repeatedly cites to this Court’s July 10,
2019, order in Chestnut v. Inch, No. SC2019-0657, 2019 WL
3026897 (Fla. July 10, 2019), as a basis for this Court finding a
manifest injustice in his case, we transferred the case to the district
court for consideration and specifically stated in the order that
“[t]he transfer of this case should not be construed as an
adjudication or comment on the merits of the petition . . . .”
-3-
Court had already considered these arguments and determined
Chestnut was not entitled to relief and this Court generally follows a
policy of denying extraordinary writ petitions that seek the same
relief that the Court has previously addressed in prior petitions filed
by the petitioner, the Court denied the petition under Topps v.
State, 865 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2004), and directed Chestnut to show
cause why he should not be barred from filing any further pro se
requests for relief in this Court.
Chestnut filed a response to the show cause order in which he
continues to challenge his conviction and assert his Montgomery
claim, arguing that the district court improperly dismissed his case
under Baker. In his response, he failed to express any remorse for
his repeated misuse of this Court’s limited resources nor
acknowledge the frivolous nature of his repeated filings. Upon
consideration of Chestnut’s response, we find that he has failed to
show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. Therefore,
based on Chestnut’s extensive history of filing pro se petitions and
requests for relief that were meritless or otherwise inappropriate for
this Court’s review, we now find that he has abused the Court’s
limited judicial resources. See Pettway v. McNeil, 987 So. 2d 20, 22
-4-
(Fla. 2008) (explaining that this Court has previously “exercised the
inherent judicial authority to sanction an abusive litigant” and that
“[o]ne justification for such a sanction lies in the protection of the
rights of others to have the Court conduct timely reviews of their
legitimate filings”). If no action is taken, Chestnut will continue to
burden the Court’s resources. We further conclude that Chestnut’s
habeas petition filed in this case is a frivolous proceeding brought
before the Court by a state prisoner. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat.
(2023).
Accordingly, we direct the Clerk of this Court to reject any
future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Gernard
Chestnut related to case number 372010CF000410AXXXXX, unless
such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar. Furthermore, because we have found Chestnut’s petition to be
frivolous, we direct the Clerk of this Court, pursuant to section
944.279(1), Florida Statutes (2023), to forward a copy of this
opinion to the Florida Department of Corrections’ institution or
facility in which Chestnut is incarcerated.
No motion for rehearing or clarification will be entertained by
this Court.
-5-
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.
Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Gernard D. Chestnut, pro se, Raiford, Florida,
for Petitioner
No appearance for Respondent
-6-