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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
SHARRON LOWRY :
:
Appellee : No. 2404 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered August 29, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001539-2022
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED OCTOBER 26, 2023
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the
motion of Appellee, Sharron Lowry, to dismiss all charges against him under
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
February 25, 2021, the Commonwealth charged Appellee with possessing a
controlled substance with intent to deliver, criminal conspiracy, possessing a
firearm by a prohibited person, possessing a firearm with an altered
manufacturer’s number, carrying a firearm without a license, possession of a
controlled substance, carrying a firearm in public, and possessing an
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instrument of crime.1 After several continuances, a preliminary hearing was
conducted on March 1, 2022. On August 26, 2022, Appellee filed a motion to
dismiss the charges pursuant to Rule 600. On August 29, 2022, the court
held a hearing on Appellee’s Rule 600 motion, after which the court granted
Appellee relief. The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal on
September 19, 2022. The court subsequently ordered the Commonwealth to
file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b), and the Commonwealth timely complied on September 29, 2022.
The Commonwealth raises one issue on appeal:
Did the [trial] court err by dismissing all charges under Rule
600, where statewide and local court orders unambiguously
suspended Rule 600(C) for a judicial emergency from the
date the criminal complaint was filed through October 1,
2021, and where only 149 days between October 1, 2021
and the date that the [trial] court dismissed the charges
were includable?
(Commonwealth’s Brief at 4).
Our standard of review of a Rule 600 decision is as follows: “In general,
a trial court’s [ruling on] a Rule 600 motion is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion; however, it is subject to plenary review when the dispositive
question implicates legal issues.” Commonwealth v. Malone, 294 A.3d
1247, 1248 (Pa.Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d
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1 See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903(c), 6105(a)(1),
6110.2(a), 6106(a)(1); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6108, and
907(a), respectively.
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709, 718 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal granted, 2023 WL 6416182 (Pa. Oct. 3,
2023)).
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in granting
Appellee’s motion to dismiss because the court improperly applied a due
diligence analysis and failed to exclude from the speedy trial calculation the
time where Rule 600 had been suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Specifically, the Commonwealth argues that although 550 calendar days had
passed between the filing of the complaint and the dismissal of charges, most
of that time was excludable. Relying on this Court’s holdings in Lear, supra
and Malone, supra, the Commonwealth insists that the statewide judicial and
local orders unambiguously suspended Rule 600 without qualification until
October 1, 2021; therefore, the trial court was required to exclude the first
218 days of pre-trial proceedings. When those days are taken into
consideration, along with the 181 days after October 1, 2021 that the trial
court found were attributable to excusable delay, the Commonwealth
maintains that only 149 days had passed, well within Rule 600’s requirements.
The Commonwealth concludes the trial court erred in granting the Rule 600
motion, and this Court must reverse and remand for further proceedings. We
agree relief is due.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 provides, in relevant part:
(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial
(1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed
to commence on the date the trial judge calls the case
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to trial, or the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere.
(2) Trial shall commence within the following time
periods.
(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint
is filed against the defendant shall commence within
365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.
* * *
(C) Computation of Time
(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at
any stage of the proceedings caused by the
Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to
exercise due diligence shall be included in the
computation of the time within which trial must
commence. Any other periods of delay shall be
excluded from the computation.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (B), only periods of
delay caused by the defendant shall be excluded from
the computation of the length of time of any pretrial
incarceration. Any other periods of delay shall be
included in the computation.
(3)(a) When a judge or issuing authority grants or
denies a continuance:
(i) the issuing authority shall record the identity
of the party requesting the continuance and the
reasons for granting or denying the
continuance; and
(ii) the judge shall record the identity of the
party requesting the continuance and the
reasons for granting or denying the
continuance. The judge also shall record to
which party the period of delay caused by the
continuance shall be attributed, and whether
the time will be included in or excluded from the
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computation of the time within which trial must
commence in accordance with this rule.
(b) The determination of the judge or issuing authority
is subject to review as provided in paragraph (D)(3).
(D) Remedies
(1) When a defendant has not been brought to trial
within the time periods set forth in paragraph (A), at
any time before trial, the defendant’s attorney, or the
defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion
requesting that the charges be dismissed with
prejudice on the ground that this rule has been
violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the
attorney for the Commonwealth concurrently with
filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing on the
motion.
* * *
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
In March 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, our Supreme
Court issued several statewide judicial emergency orders that, among other
things, suspended Rule 600 until at least June 1, 2020.2 In Lear, supra, this
Court discussed the implications of the COVID-19 related statewide judicial
orders suspending Rule 600. Specifically, this Court considered how the
statewide orders, and the local emergency orders in Montgomery County,
affected a defendant’s motion to dismiss for Rule 600 purposes. We held:
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2 See In re Gen. Statewide Judicial Emergency, 659 Pa. 27, 230 A.3d
1015 (2020). The Supreme Court also authorized president judges of judicial
districts to declare judicial emergencies and suspend Rule 600 on March 16,
2020. See In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 658 Pa. 426,
228 A.3d 1281 (2020). COVID-19 related court orders are available at:
https://www.pacourts.us/ujs-coronavirus-information.
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If an order unambiguously suspends Rule 600
without qualification, then the period of the
suspension is added to the run date without
considering the Commonwealth’s diligence.
[Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743, 751 (Pa.Super.
2022)]. Alternatively, if an order characterizes a delay as a
court postponement, then that period is only excluded if the
trial court determines after a hearing that the
Commonwealth exercised due diligence through the life of
the case. [Commonwealth v. Harth, ___ Pa. ___, 252
A.3d 600 (2021)].
Lear, supra at 719 (emphasis added).
In Malone, supra, this Court applied the holding in Lear to the orders
issued by the President Judge of Philadelphia County that suspended Rule 600
from March 17, 2020 until October 1, 2021:
The first such order, Administrative Order No. 9 of 2020,
issued on March 17, 2020, declared a judicial emergency in
the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania from March 17,
2020 to April 1, 2020, and unambiguously provided:
“Additionally, the operation of Rule of Criminal Procedure
600 shall be suspended in the First Judicial District
during the period of the local judicial emergency.”
Order, 3/17/20. On April 1, 2020, Philadelphia County
extended the March 17, 2020 emergency declaration until
May 1, 2020, and again stated that “[t]he operation of Rule
of Criminal Procedure 600 shall be suspended in the
First Judicial District during the period of local judicial
emergency.” Order, 4/1/20. On April 22, 2020,
Philadelphia County extended Administrative Order No. 9 of
2020 from May 1, 2020 “through the close of business on
May 29, 2020.” Order, 4/22/20. Following a request by
Philadelphia County for an extension of the judicial
emergency, our Supreme Court issued an order stating:
“[W]e grant the President Judge’s request to continue
suspending Rules of Criminal Procedure 600 and
1013...through August 31, 2021.” Order, No. 21 EM 2020,
7/2/21. Philadelphia County, on August 20, 2021, again
requested that our Supreme Court suspend Rule 600, after
which the Supreme Court issued an order stating, “The
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President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County is authorized to suspend Rule of
Criminal Procedure 600...through October 1, 2021.” Order,
No. 21 EM 2020, 8/23/21. Accordingly, Rule 600 was
unambiguously suspended in Philadelphia County
from March 17, 2020 through October 1, 2021[.]
Malone, supra at 1250-51 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Thus, the
Malone Court held that because Rule 600 was unambiguously suspended
from March 17, 2020 through October 1, 2021, “that time period is to be
added to the run date without considering the Commonwealth’s due
diligence.” Id. at 1251 (citing Lear, supra at 720).
Instantly, the trial court relied on Harth, supra and considered whether
the Commonwealth had met its obligation to act with due diligence throughout
the life of the case. Specifically, the trial court recognized that 550 days had
elapsed between the filing of the complaint and the Rule 600 hearing. Of this
time, the court found that only 147 days were excludable.3
Nevertheless, the trial court erred in its calculation by not excluding the
days where Rule 600 was unambiguously suspended by statewide and local
judicial orders. Appellee’s case fell under the jurisdiction of the First Judicial
District in Philadelphia, where Rule 600 was unambiguously suspended from
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3 The court found that the 98 days from October 5, 2021 to January 11, 2022
were excludable because of a court continuance. The court also found that 31
days from January 11, 2022 through February 11, 2022 were excludable
because a police witness for the Commonwealth was sick. The court further
found that the 18 days from February 11, 2022 to March 1, 2022 were
excludable based on a defense continuance.
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March 17, 2020 through October 1, 2021. See Malone, supra. Accordingly,
all days that fell within that time were to be added to the run date without
considering the Commonwealth’s due diligence during that time. See id. at
1252; Lear, supra at 720.
Here, the Commonwealth filed its criminal complaint against Appellee
on February 25, 2021, while Rule 600 was unambiguously suspended.
Appellee filed his motion to dismiss on August 26, 2022, and the trial court
granted the motion and dismissed the charges against Appellee on August 29,
2022. As of August 29, 2022, only 332 days had elapsed since the October
1, 2021 expiration of the Rule 600 suspension.4 Accordingly, Appellee’s Rule
600 motion was premature, and the trial court erred in granting it. Therefore,
we reverse the order granting Appellee’s Rule 600 motion and reinstate the
charges.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is
relinquished.
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4 Moreover, when accounting for the other time the court decided was
excludable that took place after expiration of the Rule 600 suspension, even
fewer days had elapsed for Rule 600 purposes.
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Date: 10/26/2023
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