IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CELINE BRIGGS, §
§ No. 446, 2022
Respondent Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ File No. 22-06-08TN
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES §
FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND § Petition No. 22-11940
THEIR FAMILIES/DIVISON OF §
FAMILY SERVICES, §
§
Petitioner Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: September 20, 2023
Decided: October 30, 2023
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
ORDER
On this 30th day of October, 2023, after consideration of the briefs and the
record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Celine Briggs1 (“Mother”), appeals from a Family Court
order dated November 4, 2022, terminating her parental rights as to her child born
March 27, 2021 (the “Child”). Mother raises two issues on appeal. First, she argues
that the Family Court abused its discretion when it found that she failed to plan for
1
The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to the appellant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
7(d).
the Child’s “physical needs or mental and emotional health and development” under
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5). Second, she contends the Family Court abused its discretion
by improperly weighing the evidence while evaluating best interests factors three,
five, six, and eight under 13 Del. C. § 722(a) and ultimately finding that termination
was in the best interests of the Child. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that
the Family Court’s judgment is affirmed.
(2) On June 2, 2021, when the Child was less than four months old, the
Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families/Division of Family
Services (“DFS”) sought and received custody of the Child via an emergency ex
parte order. The Family Court granted the emergency order because the Child was
exposed to fentanyl as a result of Mother’s substance abuse. Following a preliminary
protective hearing on June 9, 2022, DFS retained custody with a permanency plan
of reunification and placed the Child with a foster family. The Child remained in
the care of her foster family throughout Mother’s Family Court proceedings.
(3) Prior to the dispositional hearing on October 1, 2021, DFS provided
Mother with a case plan. The case plan outlined the goals Mother needed to achieve
before reunification with the Child could occur. These goals included: (1)
completing a mental health evaluation and following any recommended treatment;
(2) completing a substance abuse evaluation and following any recommended
treatment; (3) completing a parenting class and providing DFS with a certificate of
2
completion; (4) exhibiting appropriate parenting behaviors; (5) obtaining and
maintaining consistent legal employment; and (6) securing and maintaining stable
housing.
(4) Mother made progress on her case plan. But, at the time of the second
review hearing on February 18, 2022, she had tested positive for fentanyl and had
yet to obtain stable housing. Accordingly, on March 11, 2022, DFS filed a motion
to change the permanency plan from reunification to termination of parental rights.
And on June 14, 2022, DFS filed a petition for the termination and transfer of
parental rights against Mother. The grounds for termination of Mother’s parental
rights were failure to plan for the Child’s physical needs or mental and emotional
health and development under 13 Del C. § 1103(a)(5).
(5) The Family Court held a two-day termination and transfer of parental
rights hearing on September 19, 2022, and October 7, 2022. Testimony was taken
from Mother as well as DFS employees who had worked with Mother while the
Child was in DFS custody. At the hearing, DFS conceded that Mother had
completed the mental health and employment elements of her case plan but
explained that she had failed to maintain stable housing, failed to consistently test
negative for illegal substances, and failed to complete a parenting class. DFS argued
that termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in the Child’s best interests
because it would allow the Child to be adopted by her long-term foster family. In
3
her testimony, Mother maintained that she had been substance free for nearly six
months at the time of the hearing and was making steady progress on all facets of
her case plan.
(6) On November 4, 2022, the Family Court issued an order terminating
Mother’s parental rights to the Child. The court found that statutory grounds for
termination existed under 13 Del C. § 1103(a)(5) because the Child had been in DFS
custody for at least one year and Mother had failed to obtain stable housing, failed
to remain substance free, and had failed to exhibit appropriate parenting behaviors
as required by her case plan. The Family Court further found that termination of
Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interests after weighing each of the
13 Del. C. § 722(a) best interests factors and finding that factors three, four, five,
six, and eight all weighed heavily in favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights.
(7) When reviewing a decision of the Family Court to terminate parental
rights, this Court conducts a “review of the facts and law, as well as the inferences
and deductions made by the trial court.”2 “Conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo.”3 When the trial judge has correctly applied the appropriate law, our review
is limited to an abuse of discretion.4 “To the extent that the issues on appeal
2
Powell v. Dep’t. of Servs. for Child., Youth & Their Fams., 963 A.2d 724, 730 (Del. 2008).
3
George v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth & Their Fams., 150 A.3d 768, 2016 WL 6302525, at
*4 (Del. Oct. 27, 2016) (ORDER).
4
Powell, 963 A.2d at 731.
4
implicate rulings of fact, we conduct a limited review of the factual findings of the
trial court to assure that they are sufficiently supported by the record and are not
clearly wrong.”5 “[T]his Court will not substitute its own opinion for the inferences
and deductions made by the [t]rial [j]udge where those inferences are supported by
the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.”6
(8) Under Delaware law, the Family Court must conduct a two-step
analysis when deciding whether to grant a DFS petition for termination of parental
rights.7 First, the court must determine whether there is clear and convincing
evidence that one of the grounds for termination enumerated in 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)
has been met.8 If one of the grounds has been met, the trial judge must next
determine if there is clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights
is in the best interests of the child.9 Mother challenges both steps of the Family
Court’s analysis.
(9) First, because Mother does not dispute the Family Court’s finding that
she failed to exhibit appropriate parenting behaviors as required by her case plan,
Mother waives the issue and concedes that the Family Court did not abuse its
discretion when it found she failed to plan under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5). Under
5
Id.
6
Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983).
7
Powell, 963 A.2d at 731.
8
Id.
9
Id.
5
Supreme Court Rule 14(b)(vi)(2), “[t]he merits of any argument that is not raised in
the body of the opening brief [is] deemed waived and will not be considered by the
Court on appeal.”10 Accordingly, this Court has held that an appellant’s opening
brief must fully state the grounds for appeal, as well as the “arguments and
supporting authorities on each issue or claim of reversible error.” 11 An appellant’s
failure to “present and argue a legal issue in the text of an opening brief constitutes
a waiver of that claim on appeal.”12
(10) Further, under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5), a parent has failed to plan for a
child in DFS custody when there is clear and convincing evidence that the parent “is
not able or has failed to plan adequately for the child’s physical needs or mental and
emotional health and development . . . .”13 Where the statutory basis for termination
is a failure to plan, the Family Court must also find the existence of at least one
additional condition enumerated in Section 1103(a)(5).14 In a “proper decision on
the termination of parental rights[,]” “the crucial factor should be the child’s welfare,
10
Sup. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(2).
11
Roca v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 842 A.2d 1238, 1242-43 (Del. 2004) (citing Turnbull
v. Fink, 644 A.2d 1322, 1324 (Del. 1994)).
12
Id. (quoting Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993)).
13
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5); Powell, 963 A.2d at 731.
14
Boyer-Coulson v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 45 A.3d 148, 2012 WL 1944868, at *2 (Del. May 30,
2012) (ORDER). Here, the Family Court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Child
had been in DFS custody for at least one year. App. to Opening Br. at A505. Mother has not
appealed this aspect of the court’s ruling.
6
both material and psychological.”15 Therefore, if a parent has failed to fulfill any
requirement of their DFS case plan necessary to provide adequate care for their child,
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5) will be satisfied even where a parent has otherwise
completed their case plan.16
(11) Here, Mother’s failure to dispute the Family Court’s determinations as
to each failed element of her case plan constitutes a waiver of the issue. In its order,
the Family Court found Mother’s parenting behaviors did not comport with her case
plan due to Mother’s belief that she did not need to take a parenting class despite the
Child’s exposure to an “illicit substance” during a previous supervised visit. 17 The
court found that Mother’s attitude and behaviors constituted a failure to
“demonstrate[] parenting practices that create safety for Child . . . .” 18 At no point
does Mother’s opening brief attempt to challenge the court’s finding or make
specific mention of her parenting practices and behaviors. Because making “no
15
In re Three Minor Child., 406 A.2d 14, 17 (Del. 1979) (quoting Homer H. Clark, Jr., Law of
Domestic Relations § 18.5 (1968)).
16
See, e.g., Griffin v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth & Their Fams., 296 A.3d 882, 2023 WL
3046056, at *2 (Del. Apr. 21, 2023) (ORDER) (holding termination of parental rights supported
by the record where parent failed only to obtain stable housing as required by case plan); Arthur-
Lawrence v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 884 A.2d 511, 2005 WL 2397523, at *3-6 (Del. Sept. 27, 2005)
(ORDER) (holding termination of parental rights supported by the record where parent failed to
complete two parts of a seven-part case plan); George, 2016 WL 6302525, at *4-5 (holding
termination of parental rights supported by the record where parent completed twenty-five percent
of their case plan); Whitmore v. Robinson, 223 A.3d 417, 425-26 (Del. 2019) (Seitz, C.J.,
concurring) (noting Family Court often terminates parental rights solely on a failure to satisfy their
DFS provided case plan).
17
App. to Opening Br. at A497-98.
18
Id.
7
specific mention of a legal issue is insufficient” to preserve an issue for appeal,
Mother has conceded she failed to complete the parenting behaviors portion of her
case plan and, as a result, that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in finding
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5) satisfied.19
(12) Second, the Family Court did not abuse its discretion when it held that
termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interests because its
determinations under 13 Del. C. § 722(a) were the product of an orderly and logical
deductive process and are supported by the record. “Under the best interests
standard, there must be ‘clear and convincing’ evidence that termination of parental
rights is essential to the child’s welfare.”20 Section 722(a) “governs the Family
Court’s best interests determination in a termination of parental rights proceeding
and provides factors that the court must consider in making its decision.”21
However, 13 Del. C. § 722(a)’s factors should not be applied in a “narrow, inflexible
manner,” and the Family Court must “consider all relevant factors” as well as the
eight enumerated factors in making the best interests determination.22 In applying
19
Roca, 842 A.2d at 1242-43; see also Rogers v. Christina Sch. Dist., 73 A.3d 1, 8 (Del. 2013).
20
Powell, 936 A.2d at 733.
21
Id. (citing In re Hanks, 533 A.2d 1171, 1179 (Del. 1989)). The 13 Del. C. § 722(a) best interests
factors are: (1) “[t]he wishes of the child’s parents[;]” (2) “[t]he wishes of the child[;]” (3) the
strength of child’s familial and personal relationships, (4) “[t]he child’s adjustment to [their] home,
school and community;” (5) “[t]he mental and physical health of all individuals involved;” (6)
each parent’s compliance with their rights and responsibilities as to child; (7) “[e]vidence of
domestic violence[;]” and (8) “[t]he criminal history of any party of any other resident” of their
household. 13 Del. C. § 722(a).
22
Brock v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth & Their Fams., 272 A.2d 781, 790 (Del. 2022).
8
these factors, the Family Court “may give weight to different factors when balancing
the best interests factors.”23
(13) Here, the Family Court’s decision-making process was orderly and
logical. It made detailed factual findings as to each of the eight enumerated best
interests factors contained in 13 Del. C. § 722(a) and stated whether each factor
weighed for or against termination of Mother’s parental rights.24 Additionally, it
indicated the factors to which it gave greater weight in making its decision.25 The
court concluded its analysis by finding that DFS had established by clear and
convincing evidence that termination was in the Child’s best interests.26 We have
regularly found similar processes sufficient in the past, and do so again here.27
(14) Further, the Family Court’s determination as to each of the best
interests factors Mother challenges is supported by the record. As to factor three—
the strength of the Child’s familial and personal relationships—multiple DFS
employees testified that the Child had an extremely close bond with her foster
family. Regarding factors five and six—the health of all individuals involved and
Mother’s compliance with her rights and responsibilities to the Child, respectively—
23
Bower v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth & Their Fams., 142 A.3d 505, 2016 WL 3382353, at
*4 (Del. June 9, 2016) (ORDER).
24
App. to Opening Br. at A511-16.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See, e.g., Powell, 963 A.2d at 733; Barr v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 974 A.2d 88, 100 (Del. 2009);
Frost v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 61 A.3d 1223, 2013 WL 989363, at *8 (Del. Mar. 12, 2013)
(ORDER).
9
testimony established that Mother struggled with substance abuse while the Child
was in DFS care and never obtained stable housing as required by her case plan.
Finally, as to factor eight, the Family Court reviewed Mother’s Delaware criminal
history and found that she had several criminal convictions, including convictions
for assault in 2020; promoting prison contraband (a felony) in 2012; forgery in 2012;
and resisting arrest in 2011. Additionally, the court’s review of Mother’s record
revealed she had pending criminal charges at the time of the hearing.28
(15) Therefore, because its findings were the product of an orderly and
logical deductive process and are supported by the record, the Family Court did not
abuse its discretion when it found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was
in the Child’s best interests.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths
Justice
28
Mother’s pending criminal charges included one count of Possession with Intent to Distribute a
Controlled Substance, one count of Conspiracy Second Degree – Agreement to Engage in Felony
Criminal Conduct, and three counts of Possession of Controlled Substance without Prescription.
App. to Opening Br. at A515.
10