UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
KIMBERLY S. CLARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 95-2607
E. I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND
COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg.
James H. Michael, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CA-94-67-H)
Submitted: May 16, 1996
Decided: May 30, 1996
Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Kerry Dane Armentrout, GREEN & O'DONNELL, Harrisonburg,
Virginia, for Appellant. Eva S. Tashjian-Brown, MCGUIRE,
WOODS, BATTLE & BOOTHE, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia;
Bruce M. Steen, MCGUIRE, WOODS, BATTLE & BOOTHE,
L.L.P., Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Kimberly Clark appeals from the district court's order dismissing
her employment discrimination suit, 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e (West
1994), for failure to serve the Defendant within 120 days as required
by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Clark filed her complaint on September 20,
1994. However, the Defendant was not served until February 15,
1995, approximately 150 days later. Clark did not file a motion to
extend the time for effecting service until after the Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to timely serve under Rule
4(m). The district court denied Clark's motion for an extension and
granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss. We affirm.
Rule 4(m) requires that if the complaint is not served within 120
days after it is filed, the complaint must be dismissed absent a show-
ing of good cause. Mendez v. Elliot, 45 F.3d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1995).
"Both Rule 4(m) and Rule 6(b) allow the district court discretion to
extend the time for service." Id. at 79. If the request is made after the
expiration of the 120-day period, the moving party must show that the
failure to act "was the result of excusable neglect." Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(b).
Clark's only excuse for her failure to timely serve the Defendant
was that she relied on a commercial process server"but for reasons
unknown to [her], service was not made." (Brief of Appellant, p. 6).
Moreover, Clark's motion for enlargement of time was not filed until
five months after the expiration of the 120-day limit. We agree with
the district court's conclusion that Clark failed to establish either good
cause for her failure to comply with Rule 4(m) or excusable neglect
entitling her to an extension under Rule 6(b). Accordingly, we affirm.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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