State v. Stacy

[Cite as State v. Stacy, 2023-Ohio-3942.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PORTAGE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2022-P-0068

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas

ROBERT D. STACY,
Trial Court No. 2022 CR 00871
Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION

Decided: October 30, 2023
Judgment: Affirmed

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Pamela J. Holder, Assistant
Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Wesley A. Johnston, 203 North Broadway Street, P.O. Box 277, Medina, OH 44258 (For
Defendant-Appellant).

MATT LYNCH, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Robert D. Stacy, appeals his conviction and

sentences for Violating a Protection Order and two contempt citations. For the following

reasons, Stacy’s conviction and sentences are affirmed.

{¶2} On October 4, 2022, Stacy was tried on a single charge of Violating a

Protection Order, a felony of the fifth degree in violation of R.C. 2919.27, before a jury in

the Portage County Court of Common Pleas. The following relevant testimony was given

at trial:
 {¶3} Crystal Church testified that she was in a relationship with Stacy for about

ten years. Because of the abusive nature of that relationship, Church obtained a five-

year protection order against Stacy in 2020, prohibiting him from being present at her

residence on Hill Street in Ravenna.

{¶4} On June 8, 2022, at about 11:00 p.m., Church was on her front porch when

Stacy rode up the driveway on a bicycle with a bookbag and asked to be let inside to

change his clothes because he was soaking wet from rain. Church told him “no” and “to

leave,” and that she was calling the police because he was not supposed to be there.

Stacy begged to be let inside. Church told him that, if he did not leave, she would call the

police. She then went inside and called the Sheriff’s Department.

{¶5} Church admitted on cross-examination that Stacy had been at her

residence about two weeks prior to the June 8 incident. On that occasion he asked for

water. Church threw a water bottle out a window to him and asked him to leave, which

he did. She did not report the incident to law enforcement. Church was asked about

another occasion on which she allowed Stacy to get high on her porch but she denied

this happened.

{¶6} Church testified to further incidents in 2018 and 2021 where Stacy was on

her property in violation of the protection order and on which occasions his conduct was

reported to law enforcement.

{¶7} Taylor Youngblood, the supervisor for the domestic relations clerk’s office

in Portage County, identified the Order of Protection issued on August 20, 2020, in Case

No. 2020 DR 00258. Inter alia, the Order provided that Stacy “shall not enter or interfere

with [Church’s] residence”; “shall stay away from [Church] * * * and not be present within

2

Case No. 2022-P-0068
500 feet [of her]”; and “shall not initiate or have any contact with [her].” The terms of the

Order were effective through June 26, 2025.

{¶8} Deputy Sheriff Eric Noall testified that, on June 8, 2022, he responded to a

911 call from Church’s residence. He searched the property for Stacy but did not locate

him. Noall found a bicycle in the driveway and a bookbag containing men’s clothing on

the rear porch.

{¶9} Stacy testified on his own behalf that the State could not prove anything that

Church alleged and that she is full of lies and deceit. Based on proceedings in another

judge’s courtroom, Stacy “thought that the protection order was removed that day in

court.” On cross-examination, Stacy admitted leaving a rose on the front porch of

Church’s residence in late May 2022. Stacy also admitted that, in 2021, he was convicted

of violating the protection order as well as breaking and entering. It was on this occasion

that Stacy “could have swore that [they] had removed the protection order because [he]

was making a stink about it back then.”

{¶10} The jury returned a verdict of guilty.

{¶11} On October 7, 2022, the sentencing hearing was held. Stacy asserted that

he felt neither guilty nor remorseful. The following occurred during the hearing:

The Court: When did you go to prison? I’m trying to -- I know I saw
this. On which offense did you go to prison for? Do you remember?
I’ll find it.

Stacy: Ma’am, it’s one F-5, will you sentence me? Give me
another number or something. I got nine months left on one F-5.
Come on, let’s go. Next person. I’m here on bullshit.

Deputy: All right, Stacy, that’s enough.

The Court: All right, you know what --

3

Case No. 2022-P-0068
 Stacy: What are you gonna do, kick me out of court?

The Court: No, I’m holding you in contempt of court.

Stacy: I don’t care about that either.

The Court: I know you don’t. You don’t care about anything.

Stacy: I don’t care about nothing right now. Take me back
down, take me back to jail. Are you going to sentence me or not?

The Court: In reference to this case * * * the court hereby
sentences you to eleven months in ODRC and up to two years of
discretionary post release control. Additionally, the court will give
you credit for time spent in the Portage County Jail. And for your
most recent outburst, the court’s going to order you in direct
contempt of court. Do you want to say anything before I sentence
you?

Stacy: Thank you for sentencing me on the other stuff, Your
Honor.

The Court: Okay. And the court now is going to sentence you to
thirty days in the Portage County Jail to be served consecutively with
your prison term. So when you’re done serving your prison term,
we’re going to bring you back to Portage and you’re going to do
another thirty days for your disrespectful conduct in court.

Stacy: Thank you, Your Honor.

The Court: You’re very welcome. Now, you have the right to
appeal your verdict in this case. If you cannot afford documents, the
court will provide those documents to you without any cost. If you
cannot afford to hire an attorney to file a notice of appeal, the court
will provide you with court-appointed counsel to file a notice of
appeal. Do you have the funds in which to appeal your conviction?

Stacy: Am I done being sentenced yet?

The Court: You trying for another contempt? Do you have the
funds to hire an attorney?

Stacy: I’m not talking to you.

The Court: Okay. The court for that outburst I’m going to give you
another thirty days consecutive to the thirty days I already gave you.
4

Case No. 2022-P-0068
 Why don’t you just take him out of here. We’re tired of looking at
him.

Stacy: Have a good day and God bless you.

{¶12} On October 12, 2022, the trial court issued an Order and Journal Entry

memorializing Stacy’s sentence.

{¶13} On November 14, 2022, a Notice of Appeal was filed on Stacy’s behalf. On

appeal, the following assignments of error are raised:

[1.] Did the trial court commit a reversible error when it found Mr.
Stacy guilty of Violation of Protective Order.

[2.] Stacy’s convictions [sic] were against the manifest weight of the
evidence in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution
(Clause XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution).

[3.] The trial court’s imposition of 11-month prison sentence was
excessive and finding of two separate and subsequent imposition of
30 days [sic], each to be served consecutively to each other and
consecutively to the prison term, was improper.

{¶14} A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence raises the issue of “whether

the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” State v.

Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422, 2017-Ohio-9423, 108 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 165. In reviewing the

sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence

in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61

Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶15} In contrast to sufficiency, “weight of the evidence addresses the evidence’s

effect of inducing belief.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-

Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25. An appellate court must consider all the evidence in

the record, the reasonable inferences, the credibility of the witnesses, and whether, “in
5

Case No. 2022-P-0068
resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”

(Citation omitted.) State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

{¶16} In order to convict Stacy of Violating a Protection Order, the State was

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “recklessly violate[d] the terms of *

* * [a] protection order issued * * * pursuant to * * * 3113.31 of the Revised Code.” R.C.

2919.27(A)(1). “A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless

indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable

risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.” R.C. 2901.22(C).

{¶17} That sufficient evidence existed to convict Stacy of Violating a Protection

Order is beyond contention. Church testified to Stacy’s presence on her property asking

to enter her home on June 8, 2022, in violation of the terms of a protection order issued

pursuant to R.C. 3113.31 and valid until June 2025.

{¶18} With respect to the weight of the evidence, Stacy has two arguments. First,

he denies that he was at Church’s residence on June 8. Here, it is simply a matter of

whether to credit Church’s testimony or Stacy’s testimony (since, as Stacy notes, there

was no other evidence connecting him to the bicycle or bookbag). The jury chose to

credit Church’s testimony and we find no compelling reason to hold otherwise. Although

Stacy denied being on her property on June 8, he freely admitted to being there on other

occasions so that his presence there on June 8 would be neither implausible nor unlikely.

{¶19} Stacy also claimed that he believed the protection order had been removed,

a belief bolstered by Church’s failure to contact law enforcement on prior occasions, thus

negating the element that he acted recklessly with respect to the existence of a protection

6

Case No. 2022-P-0068
order. Stacy’s argument is unconvincing. Stacy’s reason for believing the protection

order had been removed was that he made “a stink” about it at the time he was being

prosecuted for violating it. Complaining about or protesting the terms of a protection order

is not a reasonable basis for believing the order has been removed, nor is being

prosecuted for violating it. Applied to the present case, reckless means Stacy

disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the protection order was likely in

effect, i.e., there was “merely good reason” to believe that it was in effect. 1973 Note,

R.C. 2901.22. The protection order was issued by the domestic relations court and Stacy

received nothing from that court indicating that it had been removed. Given these

circumstances, the verdict that Stacy acted recklessly with respect to the existence of the

protection order is sound. State v. Salazar, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-06-020, 2007-Ohio-

196, ¶ 20 (“appellant’s violation of the same order one year earlier which resulted in

appellant serving a term of incarceration should have served as an effective reminder of

the validity of the protection order between the parties”).

{¶20} The first two assignments of error are without merit.

{¶21} Stacy raises several arguments under the third assignment of error. The

first is that his eleven-month sentence for Violating a Protection Order is excessive.

{¶22} “The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence

that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence * * * if it clearly and

convincingly finds * * * [t]hat the sentence is * * * contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).

Presently in Ohio, “[t]rial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the

statutory range and are [not] required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing

7

Case No. 2022-P-0068
maximum * * * or more than the minimum sentences.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Vieira,

11th Dist. Lake No. 2021-L-110, 2022-Ohio-1636, ¶ 12.

{¶23} Stacy’s eleven-month sentence is within the statutory range of permissible

sentences for a felony of the fifth degree. R.C. 2929.14(A)(5) (“[f]or a felony of the fifth

degree, the prison term shall be a definite term of six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or

twelve months”). The sentence is neither excessive nor otherwise contrary to law.

{¶24} Stacy also maintains that “the finding of both contempt’s [sic] were

unjustified and the sentences were improper.” Brief of Appellant at 11.

{¶25} “Contempt of court is defined,” inter alia, as “conduct which brings the

administration of justice into disrespect, or which tends to embarrass, impede or obstruct

a court in the performance of its functions.” Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk, 27 Ohio St.2d

55, 271 N.E.2d 815 (1971), paragraph one of the syllabus. “The purpose of contempt

proceedings is to secure the dignity of the courts and the uninterrupted and unimpeded

administration of justice.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶26} “A direct contempt is one committed in the presence of or so near the court

as to obstruct the due and orderly administration of justice, and punishment therefore may

be imposed summarily without the filing of charges or the issuance of process.” (Citation

omitted.) State ex rel. Johnson v. Cty. Court of Perry Cty., 25 Ohio St.3d 53, 57, 495

N.E.2d 16 (1986); R.C. 2705.01 (“[a] court, or judge at chambers, may summarily punish

a person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of the court or judge as to obstruct the

administration of justice”); Disciplinary Counsel v. Repp, 165 Ohio St.3d 582, 2021-Ohio-

3923, 180 N.E.3d 1128, ¶ 28 (“judicial officers have the inherent authority to summarily

8

Case No. 2022-P-0068
punish a person for direct contempt to secure the effective administration of justice and

the dignity of the court”).

{¶27} “Because of the summary nature of punishment for a direct-contempt

conviction, the obstruction must pose an imminent threat to the administration of justice;

it is not even enough that the obstruction poses a likely or probable threat.” Disciplinary

Counsel v. Bachman, 163 Ohio St.3d 195, 2020-Ohio-6732, 168 N.E.3d 1178, ¶ 24. “The

record must demonstrate that the contemnor had an intent to obstruct the administration

of justice or disobey an order of the court.” (Citation omitted.) Id. Moreover, “[t]rial courts

* * * must be on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to

the administration of justice.” Id., quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153, 78

S.Ct. 622, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958).

{¶28} Contempt proceedings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

State v. Puleo, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2021-L-131, 2022-Ohio-4040, ¶ 8; State v. Kilbane,

61 Ohio St.2d 201, 400 N.E.2d 386 (1980), paragraph one of the syllabus (“[c]ourts, in

their sound discretion, have the power to determine the kind and character of conduct

which constitutes direct contempt of court”); Denovchek v. Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs.,

36 Ohio St.3d 14, 16, 520 N.E.2d 1362 (1988) (“since the primary interest involved in a

contempt proceeding is the authority and proper functioning of the court, great reliance

should be placed upon the discretion of the trial judge”).

{¶29} Stacy contends that neither of the instances for which he was found in

contempt “rise to the level of misbehavior that obstructs the administration of justice.”

Brief of Appellant at 11. We disagree.

9

Case No. 2022-P-0068
 {¶30} Stacy’s conduct during sentencing was not merely disrespectful but was

uncooperative so as to frustrate the trial court’s ability to conduct a proper sentencing

hearing. In the first instance the court was attempting to assess Stacy’s criminal history.

The court inquired of Stacy about a prior charge for which he had served time and he

responded that she should just give him a sentence because the proceedings were

“bullshit” and because he did not care. Similarly in the second instance, the court inquired

of Stacy whether he could afford an attorney for appeal. Stacy was nonresponsive, again

expressing his impatience with the proceedings. The court duly warned Stacy that he

could be found in contempt a second time and repeated the inquiry. Stacy’s response

was that he would not speak with the court. State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-

Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 1 (“[i]f a defendant’s outburst or other courtroom misbehavior

causes a significant disruption that obstructs the administration of justice, that behavior

may be punishable as contempt of court”); State v. Hudson, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10

MA 157, 2011-Ohio-6424, ¶ 69 (“the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

Tareshawty in direct contempt for interrupting the court twice, even after being warned to

stop; this necessitated a summary sanction to prevent continued disruptions and vindicate

the trial court’s authority”); State v. Dumas, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10-MA-50, 2011-Ohio-

1003, ¶ 46 (“[a]ppellant’s contemptuous comments [‘[a]ppellant basically told the court

that what it said did not matter’] established an imminent threat to the administration of

justice so that immediate punishment was required to prevent demoralization of the

court’s authority”).

{¶31} With respect to the sentences imposed for contempt, Stacy argues that

“Ohio’s criminal sentencing statutes do not authorize a trial court to impose or increase a

10

Case No. 2022-P-0068
defendant’s sentence merely because Defendant has an outburst or expressed himself

in a profane of offensive manner.” Brief of Appellant at 10, citing Bryant. As noted in the

preceding paragraph, Bryant supports the position that an outburst is punishable as

contempt when it “causes a significant disruption that obstructs the administration of

justice.” Here, Stacy’s outbursts disrupted the trial court’s efforts to conduct the

sentencing hearing. The effect of these disruptions was aggravated by the fact that Stacy

was acting pro se and so his behavior was not mitigated by having responsible counsel

present on his behalf.

{¶32} As to the length of his sentences, we note that the statutory penalties for a

first offense for civil contempt include “a definite term of imprisonment of not more than

thirty days.” R.C. 2705.05(A)(1); compare (A)(2) (“[f]or a second offense * * * a definite

term of imprisonment of not more than sixty days in jail”). While it is “acknowledged that

the sentencing limits within R.C. 2705.05(A) do not apply to direct contempt violations[,]

* * * it is also clear that R.C. 2705.05(A) is to be considered as a guideline for the court

when punishing a contemptor.” State ex rel. Yost v. Crossridge, Inc., 2022-Ohio-1455,

188 N.E.3d 629, ¶ 38 (7th Dist.); State v. Hudson 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10 MA 157,

2011-Ohio-6424, ¶ 65 (“this court has found that these limits [in R.C. 2705.05(A)(1)] can

be used as a ‘guide’ for reasonable sanctions for direct contempt”); State v. King, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 80958, 2002-Ohio-7228, ¶ 12 (“[a]lthough the court is not bound by the

sentencing scheme in R.C. 2705.05(A), that code section sets limits on punishments that

the General Assembly has deemed to be reasonable”). We find no abuse of discretion

with respect to Stacy’s contempt citations.

{¶33} The third assignment of error is without merit.

11

Case No. 2022-P-0068
 {¶34} For the foregoing reasons, Stacy’s conviction and sentence for Violating a

Protection Order and two contempt citations are affirmed. Costs to be taxed against

appellant.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

concur.

12

Case No. 2022-P-0068