USCA4 Appeal: 22-4672 Doc: 28 Filed: 11/02/2023 Pg: 1 of 4
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4672
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT KEVIN BODDIE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:19-cr-00462-BO-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2023 Decided: November 2, 2023
Before HARRIS and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Jennifer C. Leisten, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A.
Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, John L. Gibbons, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Robert Kevin Boddie pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1),
brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Hobbs Act robbery),
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924. ∗ The district court sentenced Boddie in June 2020 to an aggregate term
of 264 months’ imprisonment. On appeal from this judgment, we granted the parties’ joint
motion to remand for resentencing based on the fact that the written judgment contained
conditions of supervised release that the district court had not orally announced. See United
States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020).
On remand, the district court conducted a resentencing hearing and, in light of the
Supreme Court’s intervening decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022),
determined that Boddie no longer qualified for the career offender and armed career
criminal enhancements because Boddie’s prior conviction for North Carolina attempted
common law robbery no longer qualified as a crime of violence. Boddie’s new advisory
Sentencing Guidelines range was 77 to 96 months’ imprisonment. The court imposed a
downward variance sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment on the Hobbs Act robbery
conviction, a 60-month concurrent sentence on the felon-in-possession conviction, and a
∗
Section 924(a)(2) was amended and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g)
convictions. The new penalty provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) sets forth a statutory
maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for a § 922(g) offense. See Bipartisan Safer
Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022). The 15-
year statutory maximum does not apply here, however, because Boddie committed his
offense before the June 25, 2022, amendment of the statute.
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mandatory consecutive sentence of 84 months on the § 924(c) conviction, for an aggregate
sentence of 144 months. Boddie appeals.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015
(2022), which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of
violence under § 924(c), Boddie contends that Hobbs Act robbery is no longer a crime of
violence. He therefore argues that his conviction for brandishing a firearm in furtherance
of a crime of violence, which is predicated upon Hobbs Act robbery, is invalid.
Boddie first asserts that the Hobbs Act robbery statute is indivisible and because the
Supreme Court held in Taylor that one of the means of committing the offense—attempted
Hobbs Act robbery—is not a crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the
statute as a whole is not a crime of violence. He further argues that, even if the statute is
divisible, Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence because it can be
committed by means other than a threat of physical force, i.e., by threatening injury to
intangible property or threatening economic harm, and in order to qualify as a crime of
violence under § 924(c)’s force clause, the offense must have as an element “the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). Lastly, Boddie contends that Hobbs Act robbery does
not qualify as a crime of violence because it can be committed by threatening de minimis
force against the property of another.
We have previously held that “Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of violence
under the force clause of [§ 924(c)].” United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266
(4th Cir. 2019). And “one panel [of this court] cannot overrule another.” United States v.
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Runyon, 994 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 2021). An exception to this rule applies if “the prior
opinion has been overruled by an intervening opinion from this court sitting en banc or the
Supreme Court.” McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2004). Boddie
contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor and our decision in United States v.
Melaku, 41 F.4th 386, 391 (4th Cir. 2022), are intervening opinions that overrule Mathis.
However, we have recently addressed this question and held that “[n]othing about this
Court’s decision in Mathis conflicts with Taylor.” United States v. Green, 67 F.4th 657,
669 (4th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-5194, 2023 WL 6378848 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2023); see
Melaku, 41 F.4th at 394 n.9 (reaffirming the holding in Mathis). Boddie’s arguments to
the contrary are foreclosed by circuit precedent. See Green, 67 F.4th at 668-71.
We therefore deny as moot Boddie’s motion to hold this appeal in abeyance for
Green, and we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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