People v. Johnson

2023 IL App (1st) 220833-U
No. 1-22-0833

FIRST DIVISION
November 6, 2023

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
____________________________________________________________________________

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 98 CR 17950
)
EVERETTE JOHNSON, )
) The Honorable
Defendant-Appellant. ) Joanne Rosado,
) Judge Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE Pucinski delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm denial of leave to file a sixth successive postconviction petition where defendant
did not establish prejudice in the cause-and-prejudice test for his claims that the police detective
coerced his statements and ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate and
present evidence of police coercion committed in other cases to corroborate his claim that his
statements were obtained as a result of police coercion.

¶2 Defendant appeals the postconviction court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition filed under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act). 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et

seq. (West 2018). On appeal, he contends that this cause must be remanded for further proceedings
 1-22-0833

under the Act because he satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test for allowing a successive

postconviction petition to proceed for his claims that his statements were coerced by a police

detective and ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate and present evidence

of coercion by this same detective in other cases. Regarding his claim that Detective Halloran

coerced his statements, we find that defendant cannot establish prejudice in the cause-and-

prejudice test where his abuse allegations in his postconviction petition did not align with his

allegations of abuse in his pre-trial motion to suppress. Regarding his claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate and present claims of police coercion committed

by Detective Halloran in other cases, we find that defendant cannot establish the prejudice prong

of the cause-and-prejudice test where trial counsel’s conduct did not fall below an objective

standard of reasonableness. At the time of defendant’s trial in 2002, no attorney could have

predicted that Detective Halloran had been involved in coercive conduct in other cases, which

resulted in intense criticism after the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission (TIRC)

started gathering evidence and holding hearings on these claims. Evidence that Detective Halloran

had engaged in coercive conduct in other cases might have swayed the jury, if it were available to

defendant at the time of his trial, but defendant is claiming entirely different forms of abuse. This

makes his prior and current prejudice claims sufficiently different that we cannot find that he has

established prejudice. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s decision to deny him leave to file

his sixth successive postconviction petition.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty, based upon an accountability theory, of

first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9(a)(1) (West 1992) and concealment of a homicidal death (720

ILCS 5/9-3.4(a) (West 1987) relating to the death of defendant’s 16-month-old daughter,

-2-
 1-22-0833

Oncwanique Tribblet (the victim).1 At trial, the State presented the account of the victim’s death

and the disposal of her body through the testimony of Tribblet, through oral and handwritten

statements made by defendant after his arrest, and through the testimony of neighbors who reported

a vile smell emanating from defendant’s apartment during this time period. Although the State

sought imposition of the death penalty, the trial court found that defendant was ineligible for the

death penalty and sentenced him to consecutive terms of 95 years’ and 5 years’ imprisonment

respectively. The violence that was done to the victim and in disposing of her body is extremely

disturbing and will not be repeated here as it was fully explored in our order disposing of

defendant’s direct appeal. People v. Everette Johnson, 1-03-0478 (August 20, 2004). We therefore

relate only the facts relevant to the issues in the instant appeal.

¶5 A. Hearing on Motion to Suppress Statement

¶6 Defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress statements in which he argued that he was not

informed of his Miranda rights prior to the police interview, and his statements were obtained as

a result of “physical coercion illegally directed against the defendant” including that he was

deprived of food and sleep for two days, he was verbally threatened repeatedly by various

detectives, he was thrown to the ground at his place of employment in the course of his two day

interrogation, a “short white detective” threw him against the wall, injuring his thumb, and

punched him in the chest and stomach several times. The trial court swore defendant to the contents

of his motion, and the parties stipulated that defendant was arrested between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m.

on June 10, 1998. The State presented the testimony of Chicago Youth Investigator James Funches,

1
The codefendant, Joan Tribblet (Tribblet) was charged in this indictment but subsequently pled
guilty and testified for the State in defendant’s bench trial.
-3-
 1-22-0833

Chicago Police Detectives Michael Rose, Edward Adams, and John Halloran, and Assistant State’s

Attorney Domenica Stephenson (ASA Stephenson).

¶7 i. Youth Investigator James Funches

¶8 Investigator Funches testified that on June 10, 1998, he began to investigate a missing person’s

report for the victim and interviewed defendant at 3:00 p.m. inside an interview room at Area One

Violent Crimes Office. After speaking with him for approximately 30 minutes, Investigator

Funches told defendant that the story he related could not be substantiated and suggested that he

think about any future statements regarding the victim’s disappearance. At 4:00 p.m., defendant

was interviewed again, this time inside the youth investigations office, by Investigator Funches

along with Chicago Youth Investigator Tim Nolan. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights,

defendant indicated that he understood and stated, “I’m going to tell you the truth now.” During

this interview, defendant stated that the victim was dead, that the victim had died accidentally after

ingesting rat poison, and he related what had happened to the victim’s body. He also stated that he

had been drinking on the day that he buried the victim. Defendant described an area along a

roadway, in the median area, where he had dug a grave and buried the victim’s body. He further

described the area as including a rusty bridge.

¶9 After this interview, Investigator Funches arranged to try to locate the victim’s body with

defendant. Defendant left the police station with Investigators Funches and Nolan and Sergeant

Robert Johnson. Defendant directed them to Central Avenue on the west side of Chicago, near

Douglas Park. They continued to drive around until they ended up searching an area near Interstate

90/94 in Deerfield, Illinois. At that time, they stopped to purchase food for defendant at a Dunkin

Donuts. The search was discontinued after they spoke with an Illinois Department of

Transportation tow truck driver at the restaurant to see if he could assist them in determining the

-4-
 1-22-0833

location of the victim’s body. They returned to the police station at approximately 10:30 to 11:00

p.m.

¶ 10 Then, Investigator Funches received a telephone call from Tribblet, and he arranged for her to

come to the police station. Upon her arrival, Investigators Funches and Nolan interviewed her and

then interviewed defendant again at midnight. During this interview, defendant stated that “the

reason that we did not find the body was because he had disposed of it in a different location.” He

stated that the area was close to his grandmother’s home, in the back of an athletic field and near

a railroad, and the victim’s body had been disposed of in a pail and placed under a tarp. Investigator

Funches and a different investigator went to see if they could locate the described area while

defendant remained in the roll call room at Area One Youth Investigations division.

¶ 11 At 4:00 a.m., he turned the investigation over to Detectives Michael Rose and James Jones of

the Area One Violent Crimes Division. Investigator Funches testified that defendant never stated

that he wished to remain silent or that he wished to speak to an attorney. He denied that he, or

anyone else in his presence, threatened defendant, threw him against a wall, or punched in the

chest or stomach.

¶ 12 ii. Chicago Police Detective Michael Rose

¶ 13 Chicago Police Detective Michael Rose testified that on June 11, 1998, at 4:00 a.m.,

Investigator Funches brought defendant and Tribblet to Area One Violent Crimes and informed

him of the status of the investigation. At 5:00 a.m., Detective Rose interviewed defendant while

Detective Jones interviewed Tribblet. Detective Rose advised defendant of his Miranda rights,

which he indicated that he understood and agreed to waive. Defendant told him that he had buried

the victim but could not remember where he had buried her. Defendant also told him that she died

in February of 1998. Detective Rose told him that he did not believe that a man could bury his 16-

-5-
 1-22-0833

month-old daughter and not remember where he had buried her, and that relatives had said that the

victim had not been seen since Christmas of 1997. Defendant stated that he “wanted to change his

version of events.” For the first time, defendant acknowledged that the victim had been killed.

¶ 14 After Detectives Rose and Jones met to exchange information regarding their interviews of

defendant and Tribblet, Detective Rose spoke with defendant again at 5:30 a.m. and asked him

about additional facts that he learned from Tribblet. Tribblet had provided additional information

to Detective Jones about how this crime was committed, and defendant acknowledged that this

had occurred. Defendant also provided further details about the disposal of the victim’s body.

Defendant also stated that he had held her by the neck with her feet “dangling” off the bed when

he spanked the victim three times with a ruler, pulled down her diaper and spanked her with a

ruler, put her to bed, and that when he woke up six hours later, she was dead. After the interview

concluded, Detective Rose spoke with Doctor Nancy Jones of the Cook County Medical

Examiner’s Office.

¶ 15 At 7:00 a.m., Chicago Police Detective Edward Adams brought defendant’s grandmother,

Juanita Johnson, into the station. Defendant and his grandmother met inside one of the offices, at

which point, defendant told her that “everything was going to be all right, that he told us what

happened, and that [she] should cooperate with us.” Detective Rose then interviewed Juanita

Johnson. Detective Rose denied that he told defendant to tell her to cooperate, or “he would be in

trouble[,]” or “he would suffer physical consequences[.]”

¶ 16 At 7:30 a.m., Detective Rose arranged to go to defendant’s place of employment in

Willowbrook, Illinois, because defendant said that he had disposed of the victim’s body parts

behind that business and in a wooded area along a riverbank. Defendant directed them to that

location and the detectives obtained permission from defendant’s supervisors to search the area.

-6-
 1-22-0833

Detective Rose was present for the search, along with two assistant state’s attorney, Detectives

Jones and Adams, and defendant’s supervisors. Detective Rose saw that there was a lot of

vegetation, the area was muddy and steeply sloped towards the riverbank, making it difficult to

navigate the area. Detective Rose testified that he and the other people searching got mud on their

clothing. He stated that he did not go down the slope of the riverbank, but the bottom of his pants

and his shoes were muddy. He denied that the mud on his clothing upset him. He denied that

defendant was thrown to the ground when they were at Borse Industries.

¶ 17 Afterwards, defendant was going to show the detectives where he bought the container of

battery acid and directed them to the area of Central Park and Ogden. Defendant directed them to

a small auto parts store, but the owner stated that he did not carry that product and suggested that

they try another store down the street. The detective went to the second auto parts store, described

the product to the store manager, who handed him a product that fit that description. He took that

container to defendant, and he identified it as the product that he had purchased for the battery

acid, however, he was not certain if that was the store where he had purchased the battery acid.

They returned to Area One.

¶ 18 At 10:45 a.m., Detective Rose interviewed defendant again for a couple of minutes. During

that interview, defendant agreed to sign a consent to search his residence at 1619 West 56th Street,

second floor rear apartment. Tribblet also signed a consent to search for that residence. Detective

Rose denied that defendant refused to sign the consent search form, and that he “slammed him into

the wall with [his] muddy pants[.]”

¶ 19 At noon, Detective Rose purchased hamburgers, fries, and a Coke from McDonald’s for

defendant, and left him alone in the interview room while he ate. Detectives Jones and Adams

searched the residence. They returned from the search with a pair of blue jeans belonging to

-7-
 1-22-0833

defendant and an agenda organizer or a personal diary belonging to Tribblet. Defendant identified

the blue jeans as his own and said that the holes in the jeans came from mixing battery acid relative

to the victim’s body.

¶ 20 Then, at 12:50 p.m., Detectives Rose and Jones went to 5818 West Division, which was the

apartment where defendant and Tribblet were living at the time of the victim’s death. The

detectives were looking for Jerome Johnson, a relative of defendant, but was unable to find him.

The detectives returned to the police station, interviewed other witnesses, but did not have any

further contact with defendant.

¶ 21 At 4:30 p.m., the detectives obtained a search warrant for 5818 West Division, and the search

warrant was executed at 6:30 p.m. Detective Rose went to that location, along with Detective

Boudreau, Lieutenant Cornfield, Sergeant Zaborek, and some mobile crime lab technicians. The

detectives recovered proof of residency for defendant and Tribblet. The mobile crime lab

technicians also recovered some additional items, but Detective Rose was unaware of what items

were recovered except for a screwdriver and a metal pot or lid. Detective Rose denied that he, or

anyone else in his presence, verbally threatened defendant, or threw defendant against the wall, or

punched defendant in the chest or stomach. He also denied that defendant told him that he wanted

to remain silent and to consult an attorney.

¶ 22 iii. Chicago Police Detective Edward Adams

¶ 23 Detective Adams testified that on June 11, 1998, he and Detective James Jones went to a

second-floor apartment at 1619 West 56th Street, after defendant and Tribblet signed a consent to

search that apartment. He recovered a diary or date book from the top of a bedroom dresser, as

well as a pair of men’s blue jeans on the floor of a closet.

¶ 24 iv. Chicago Police Detective Brian Halloran

-8-
 1-22-0833

¶ 25 Detective Halloran testified that on June 11, 1998, he arrived at work at approximately 4:00

p.m. received an update as to the status of the investigation from Detective Jones. Before this date,

he had not had any prior contact with defendant. At 5:00 p.m. he and Detective Jones interviewed

defendant after advising him of his Miranda rights. Prior to the interview, defendant had agreed to

participate in a polygraph examination, and Detective Halloran was instructed by his supervisor to

transport defendant to the police station at 11th and State after the interview concluded at 6:00

p.m. The polygraph examiner had a twenty-minute conversation with defendant and then advised

Detective Halloran that defendant had made a statement implicating himself in the victim’s murder

so there was no need for the examiner to administer a polygraph examination.

¶ 26 They returned to Area One where he spoke to ASA Stephenson and Halloran’s partner,

Detective Frank Validez. Detective Halloran learned that while he was gone, Tribblet had provided

additional information as to how the victim was injured and the disposal of her body. At 8:30 p.m.,

Detectives Halloran and Jones interviewed defendant again for approximately 30 minutes.

Detective Halloran asked defendant if he had used a knife to cut up any other body parts other than

what he had previously disclosed, and defendant stated that he had.

¶ 27 At 10:00 p.m., Detective Halloran and Jones were present for an interview conducted by

Assistant State’s Attorney Markakos. Defendant was informed of his Miranda rights, which he

agreed to waive. This interview lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes. At 1:00 a.m., Detective

Halloran and Detective FNU Vudrow went to 5818 West Division, observed various items inside

the apartment, and spoke with a witness, Pattie Crawford. She gave the detectives an item from

her apartment believed to be of evidentiary value to this case. The detectives stayed at the residence

for two hours.

-9-
 1-22-0833

¶ 28 At 5:00 a.m., defendant was interviewed by Assistant State’s Attorney Domenica Stephenson

and Detective Halloran. ASA Stephenson advised defendant of his Miranda rights at the beginning

of the interview, which lasted 20 to 30 minutes. ASA Stephenson and Detective Halloran

interviewed defendant again at 9:30 a.m., which lasted approximately 60 to 90 minutes. Defendant

was advised of his Miranda rights at the beginning of the interview and agreed to provide a

handwritten statement. At 11:20 a.m., ASA Stephenson and Detective Halloran reviewed a

handwritten statement prepared by ASA Stephenson. Defendant, ASA Stephenson, and Detective

Halloran signed each page of the 24-page statement. Detective Halloran testified that defendant,

in the handwritten statement, attested that he had been treated “very well” by the police and ASA

Stephenson; and had been given a cheeseburger, French fries, Egg McMuffin, pop and water;

allowed to use the restroom whenever he needed; allowed cigarettes to smoke; and to sleep

whenever he wanted. Defendant also attested that “no threats or promises were made to him in

exchange for this statement [,] and he was giving the statement “truly and voluntarily[.]” Detective

Halloran denied that he, or anyone else in his presence, “verbally threatened” defendant, threw

him against a wall, punched him in the chest or stomach, or choked him. He also denied that

defendant stated that he wanted to remain silent or that he wanted to consult with an attorney. He

testified that he was never alone with defendant inside an interview room but may have been alone

with him while accompanying him to the bathroom or when bringing him food.

¶ 29 v. Assistant State’s Attorney Domenica Stephenson

¶ 30 ASA Stephenson testified that she arrived at Area One Police Headquarters between 4:30 and

5:00 a.m. She further testified that she and Detective Halloran interviewed defendant at 5:00 a.m.

inside an interview room where she introduced herself and advised defendant of his Miranda

rights. Defendant agreed to waive those rights, and they conversed for 20 to 30 minutes.

-10-
 1-22-0833

Afterwards, she was present for the court-reported statement of Tribblet at 6:15 a.m. taken by

another attorney.

¶ 31 At 9:30 a.m., she and Detective Halloran interviewed defendant again, and defendant agreed

to waive his Miranda rights. After speaking with him for more than an hour, she explained to

defendant the different ways to have his statement documented. Defendant chose to have a

handwritten statement. After Detective Halloran left the room, she asked defendant how he had

been treated by the police. Defendant said that he had been treated “very well.” He stated that he

had been allowed to sleep, given food and drink, allowed to smoke and use the bathroom whenever

he wanted. He denied that he had received any threats or promises in exchange for his statement

and that he had been coerced in any way to give his statement.

¶ 32 As ASA Stephenson was writing out defendant’s handwritten statement, she also had to review

the court-reported statement of Tribblet. She and Detective Halloran reviewed defendant’s

handwritten statement with defendant at approximately 2:00 p.m. while in an office area. She had

defendant read aloud the first two paragraphs of the statement, and he signed the statement

indicating that he had read his Miranda rights. Then, she read the entire statement aloud to him,

provided him the opportunity to make any corrections to it, initialed the bottom of each page, and

signed the last page of the statement. She attached a photograph of defendant to the handwritten

statement taken at that time. She testified that defendant never complained to her that he had any

physical pain, including pain in his thumbs, or that the detectives had abused him. She also testified

that defendant never told her that he asked for a lawyer or that he had asked to remain silent.

¶ 33 After the presentation of this evidence, both parties agreed that the State had overcome their

burden of proving that the statement was voluntary. When the trial court asked if defendant would

be presenting any witnesses, defense counsel stated that, after conferring with defendant, “[i]t’s

-11-
 1-22-0833

our decision at this point in time to rest, for the record.” The trial court denied defendant’s motion

to suppress statements, finding, in part, that there was no evidence “whatsoever that he was

physically coerced by being deprived of food or threatened, thrown to the ground, injured, punched

and so forth as alleged in the motion.” The trial court also found that “there was absolutely no

evidence that the police in any way mistreated the defendant or had cause to give any of the

statements but that he chose to give.” The trial court further found that the length of the time that

defendant was present at the police station “was the result of [defendant] giving piecemeal

information, and given the unusual…factual aspects in this case, as they unfolded before the police,

with the issues of rat poison, whether the child was alive or not, not knowing exactly where the

child was buried...the defendant leading the police to various locations to produce the body…”

The trial court found that defendant’s decision to provide piecemeal statements was not due to

defendant’s will being overborne but “rather I suppose as part of the soul searching” due to the

fact that this case involved defendant’s own daughter. Subsequently, in defendant’s posttrial

motion for a new trial, defendant did not challenge the trial court’s decision to deny his motion to

suppress statements on the grounds that his statements were physically coerced by the detectives

in this case.

¶ 34 B. Direct Appeal

¶ 35 On direct appeal, defendant challenged the trial court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress

his statements on the basis of a lack of probable cause, the trial court’s decision to deny him leave

to depose Tribblet, and defendant requested that his mittimus be corrected. On August 20, 2004,

this court affirmed defendant’s conviction and ordered the mittimus corrected. People v. Everette

Johnson, 1-03-0478 (August 20, 2004).

¶ 36 C. Initial Postconviction Petition

-12-
 1-22-0833

¶ 37 On June 15, 2005, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition in which he alleged: (1) the

indictment did not notify him that he was charged under an accountability theory; (2) his sentence

for first degree murder exceeded statutory limits; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

argue that defendant was in custody for five days “without food, sleep, or counsel…”; (4) he was

unlawfully arrested without probable cause; (5) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call

witnesses and object to his sentence; and (6) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

these claims. On June 29, 2005, the trial court summarily dismissed defendant’s petition.

¶ 38 Defendant appealed the summary dismissal of his postconviction petition solely on the basis

that he stated the gist of a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel where

counsel failed to raise the issue of the impropriety of his extended-term sentence. On February 9,

2007, this court affirmed the trial court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s petition. People v.

Johnson, (1-06-0189). Defendant sought leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, and on May

31, 2007, his petition was denied. People v. Johnson, 224 Ill.2d 584 (2007).

¶ 39 D. Federal Habeas Corpus Petition

¶ 40 On September 12, 2007, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United

States District Court in which he sought relief on five grounds: (1) the trial court erred in denying

his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence; (2) the trial court erred in denying his request to

depose Tribblet; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for refusing to permit him to testify at trial;

(4) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Detective Wolters gave perjured

testimony; (5) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his sentence was

excessive; and (6) the State failed to disclose their plea agreement with Tribblet. The district court

appointed counsel for defendant, however, counsel subsequently filed a motion to withdraw, and

-13-
 1-22-0833

the court granted the motion. Johnson v. Pierce, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103982, * * 9, 10, 14. On

September 24, 2010, the district court denied defendant’s habeas petition. Id. at * * 10-27.

¶ 41 E. First Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 42 On July 29, 2009, defendant filed a motion for leave to file his first successive postconviction

petition in which he argued that: (1) the police coerced statements from Tribblet by keeping her

children from her; (2) the police illegally interrogated defendant’s children; (3) the State failed to

prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) he was wrongly convicted of the lesser-

included offense of aggravated battery; (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to raise

these claims before the trial court; and (6) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to

raise these claims on appeal. People v. Johnson, 2012 IL App (1st) 100622-U, ¶ 2. The Honorable

Thomas V. Gainer denied defendant leave to file, and defendant’s subsequent motion to

reconsider. Defendant appealed, but his appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw, under

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). Id. ¶ 3. This court found that defendant filed his

motion to reconsider over 30 days after the postconviction court denied leave to file, so that the

postconviction court lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion and this Court lacked jurisdiction

for “his appeal from the circuit court’s order denying that motion.” Id. ¶ 7.

¶ 43 F. Second Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 44 On April 26, 2013, defendant filed his pro se motion for leave to file his second successive

postconviction petition in which he challenged his extended term sentence. After the circuit court

judge denied defendant leave to file his successive postconviction petition, this Court affirmed and

granted appellate counsel’s Finley motion. People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (1st) 133728-U.

¶ 45 G. Third Successive Postconviction Petition

-14-
 1-22-0833

¶ 46 On January 30, 2015, defendant filed his pro se motion for leave to file his third successive

postconviction petition in which he alleged he was actually innocent based on forensic lab results

not shared by his trial counsel, he was arrested without probable cause, and the seizure of his

children “affected [his] legal interest as a father, and arrestee.” Defendant’s motion for leave to

file his third successive postconviction petition was denied, and, after defendant sought leave to

appeal, this Court affirmed and granted appellate counsel’s Finley motion. People v. Johnson,

2015 IL App (1st) 133728-U.

¶ 47 H. Fourth Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 48 On June 17, 2016, defendant filed his pro se motion for leave to file his fourth successive

postconviction petition in which he alleged that a media interview of Tribblet was evidence of his

actual innocence, and that his sentence was disparate to that of Tribblet. Defendant’s motion for

leave to file his fourth successive postconviction petition was denied, and, after defendant sought

leave to appeal, this Court affirmed and granted appellate counsel’s Finley motion. People v.

Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st) 163144-U.

¶ 49 I. Fifth Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 50 On November 30, 2017, defendant filed his pro se motion for leave to file his fifth successive

postconviction petition in which he alleged that he was subjected to double jeopardy, he was

improperly sentenced to an extended sentence pursuant to a statute not in effect at the time in

which the offense was committed, whether his sentence violated Apprendi, and ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel. Defendant’s motion for leave to file his fifth successive

postconviction petition was denied, and, after defendant sought leave to appeal, this Court affirmed

and granted appellate counsel’s Finley motion on November 4, 2020. People v. Johnson, No. 2020

IL App (1st) 181460-U.

-15-
 1-22-0833

¶ 51 J. Section 2-1401 Petition

¶ 52 Defendant also filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c). In

his petition, dated February 7, 2019, defendant alleged that he had newly discovered evidence of

his actual innocence consisting of letter from a reporter showing that Tribblet made statements

inconsistent with her trial testimony during a subsequent interview. Defendant’s motion was

denied on June 28, 2019.

¶ 53 K. Current Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 54 On April 11, 2022, defendant filed his sixth successive postconviction petition in which he

alleged that his confession was coerced and “the product of being tortured by detective [sic] Rose

and John Halloran. They both engaged in a practice of misconduct to make defendant sign a

consent to form [sic] search and a false confession.” As to Detective Halloran, defendant alleged

that when defendant refused to sign the prepared handwritten statement, this detective “viciously

and repeatedly choked and threatened to continue doing physical harm to him…” and defendant

only agreed to sign the statement because he was fearful of “further physical abuse…” Defendant

also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for inadequately investigating whether Detectives

Rose and Halloran had physically abused him.

¶ 55 Regarding the element of cause in the cause-and-prejudice test for filing a successive petition,

defendant alleged that, until the decision in People v. Peoples, 2020 IL App (1st) 161088-U, “no

court had ruled that Halloran participated in torturing suspects. It had only been alleged.” He

further alleged that he subsequently made a request for documents through FOIA and received

information from TIRC relating to the cases involving Detective Halloran. As to the element of

prejudice, defendant stated that he previously “attempt[ed] to raise a [sic] issue related to detective

[sic] Halloran’s abuse in a 2-1401 petition but defendant never received any response.” He further

-16-
 1-22-0833

alleged that the evidence in this case “rested solely on believing the detectives and ASA’s prepared

handwritten version of events.”

¶ 56 As to his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, defendant alleged that he “told his

attorney all about the physical abuse. However, trial counsel never investigated the detectives

involved in abusing defendant prior to filing his motion.” He also alleged that it was common

knowledge by the Public Defender’s Office of the physical abuse committed by detectives working

under John Burge.” Defendant attached, in part, the documents he received from TIRC, which

consisted of a letter from TIRC acknowledging the receipt of his FOIA request on January 28,

2022, and a summary of complaints against Detective Halloran.

¶ 57 On April 20, 2022, the Honorable Joan Rosado denied defendant leave to file his sixth

successive postconviction petition, without providing any further comment.

¶ 58 ANALYSIS

¶ 59 On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for leave to file

a successive postconviction petition under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725

ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)). He contends that he made a prima facie showing of cause and

prejudice for his claim that his statements were obtained as a result of coercive conduct by

Detective Halloran and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not supporting defendant’s claim

at trial that his statements was coerced with evidence that Detective Halloran had been involved

in the systemic abuse of suspects.

¶ 60 The Act provides a statutory mechanism for a criminal defendant to assert that there was a

substantial denial of his or her rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution,

or both. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2018). The Act contemplates the filing of only one petition.

People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27; 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2018) (“Any claim of substantial

-17-
 1-22-0833

denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.”) As a

result, a defendant faces “immense procedural default hurdles when bringing a successive

postconviction petition.” People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 14. These hurdles are lowered only

in very limited circumstances so as not to impede the finality of criminal litigation. Id.

¶ 61 There are two bases upon which the bar against successive proceedings will be relaxed. People

v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22. “The first basis for relaxing the bar is when a petitioner can

establish ‘cause and prejudice’ for the failure to raise the claim earlier.” Id. The second exception

is known as the “fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception, which requires a petitioner to show

“actual innocence.” Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 62 The General Assembly codified the “cause-and-prejudice” exception in section 122-1(f) of the

Act, which provides that leave of court to file a successive petition may be granted “only if the

petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-

conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that failure.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018).

The Act instructs that a defendant “show cause by identifying an objective factor that impeded his

or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings.” Id. A

defendant “shows prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised during his or her post-

conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due

process.” Id.

¶ 63 To meet the cause-and-prejudice test, a defendant is required to “‘submit enough in the way of

documentation to allow a circuit court to make that determination.’ [Citation.]” People v. Smith,

2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. “[L]eave of court to file a successive postconviction petition should be

denied when it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation submitted

by the petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petition fail as a matter of law or where the

-18-
 1-22-0833

successive petition with supporting documentation is insufficient to justify further proceedings.

[Citations]” Id. “The legislature intended for the courts to make cause-and-prejudice

determinations on the pleadings and not by evidentiary hearings.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL

127273, ¶ 47 (citing Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 33).

¶ 64 When a defendant moves for leave to file a successive petition, the circuit court “must decide

the legal question of whether a defendant has satisfied the section 122-1(f) requirement of showing

cause and prejudice” which is “a preliminary screening to determine whether defendant’s pro se

motion * * * adequately alleges facts demonstrating cause and prejudice. [Citation.]” People v.

Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24. If a defendant has “made a prima facie showing of cause and

prejudice,” leave to file the petition should be granted. Id. Thus, at this early leave-to-file stage,

the petition does not have to make the “substantial showing” that will later be required at the

second-stage hearing after counsel is appointed. People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 58.

Satisfying the cause and prejudice test does not entitle a defendant to relief, but rather “only gives

a petitioner an avenue for filing a successive postconviction petition.” Id. (quoting People v. Smith,

2014 IL 115946, ¶ 29). Denial of leave to file is reviewed de novo. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13.

¶ 65 A. Waiver and Res Judicata

¶ 66 As a threshold matter, we first address the issue of the applicability of the preclusion doctrines

of res judicata and waiver. Defendant, in his recitation of the facts in this case, alleged that his

initial postconviction petition included an allegation: “his statement should have been suppressed

because it was false and involuntarily made…” In defendant’s argument section, in which he

asserts that he could establish the “cause” element, he does not specifically address whether this

claim was contained in his initial petition. Instead, he asserts that the evidence that he attached to

-19-
 1-22-0833

his sixth successive postconviction petition was unavailable at the time of trial and when he filed

his initial petition.

¶ 67 However, a review of the record shows that defendant did not raise this issue in his initial

postconviction petition. Therefore, we find that defendant waived review of this issue by failing

to include it in his postconviction petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2018) (“Any claim of

substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is

waived.”)

¶ 68 B. Police Coercion

¶ 69 We now consider whether defendant can satisfy the cause and prejudice test for his claim that

Detective Halloran coerced him into providing his statements, which he raised for the first time in

his sixth successive postconviction petition. Because we find that defendant did not establish the

prejudice prong, we need not address defendant’s contention that he was able to establish cause

for his failure to raise this issue on direct appeal or in his earlier postconviction proceedings.

People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 32 (“[B]oth prongs must be met before leave to

file a successive petition will be granted.”). Thus, we may uphold the denial of leave to file the

claim if defendant has failed to establish either prong. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 56.

¶ 70 Defendant argues that evidence that Detective Halloran had engaged in coercive conduct

similar to that alleged in the documentation contained in the TIRC report would have changed the

outcome of the trial. See People v. Harris, 2021 IL App (1st) 182172, ¶ 50 (“…the sole issue

before the circuit court was whether the outcome of defendant’s suppression hearing would have

been different if the officers who denied using physical coercion had been subject to impeachment

based on defendant’s evidence showing a pattern and practice of police abuse.”). In turn, the State

relies upon our supreme court’s decision in People v. Blalock, 2022 IL 126682, and argues that

-20-
 1-22-0833

defendant did not show prejudice because his abuse allegations did not align with his allegations

of abuse raised in his pre-trial motion to suppress. We agree with the State’s argument and find

that Blalock controls.

¶ 71 “Prejudice” for purposes of a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition is

defined similarly to the “prejudice” required to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.2d 444, 464 (2002). For instance, in Pitsonbarger, our supreme

court adopted the Strickland standard of prejudice for successive postconviction petitions, which

was first articulated in People v. Flores, 153 Ill.2d 264, 280 1992) (“Whether the seemingly

narrower test of prejudice required in a Strickland analysis satisfies the requisite showing of

prejudice under McCleskey is uncertain”), and reaffirmed that adoption in People v. Smith, 2014

IL 115946, ¶ 34 (“We analogized the cause-and-prejudice test in the context of a successive

postconviction petition to the cause-and-prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel

articulated in Strickland.” (citing Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.2d at 464.)). Applying that standard in this

context, “the question is not whether a court can be certain [the error] had no effect on the outcome

or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been established [absent the error.]” People

v. Lewis, 2022 IL 126705, ¶ 46 (quoting People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 54).

Instead, [the court] asks whether it is ‘reasonably likely’ the result would have been
different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. A defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for [the error] the result of the proceeding would have been different.
[Citation.] A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome. [Citation.]

Lewis, 2022 IL 126705, ¶ 46.

¶ 72 In Blalock, our supreme court considered whether the defendant established prejudice in the

context of a claim of police coercion. In that case, the defendant filed a second successive

postconviction petition in which he alleged that he had newly discovered evidence that the police

-21-
 1-22-0833

detectives who interrogated him, Detectives Halloran and O’Brien and Murray, had engaged in a

pattern and practice of police brutality and that his resulting confession was the product of police

coercion. In determining whether the defendant established prejudice in his successive

postconviction petition, our supreme court recognized that, while “all-well pleaded allegations in

the petition and supporting affidavits are taken to be true,” (People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849,

¶ 45), the dismissal of a petition is upheld where “the allegations are contradicted by the record

from the original trial proceedings.” (People v. Torres, 228 Ill.2d 382, 394 (2008). Blalock, 2022

IL 126682, ¶ 48. In doing so, our supreme court also recognized its previous holding in People v.

Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35, that “‘leave of court to file a successive postconviction petition

should be denied when it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation

submitted by the petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petitioner fail as a matter of law or where

the successive petition with supporting documentation is insufficient to justify further

proceedings.’” Id. ¶ 48.

¶ 73 The supreme court compared the defendant’s testimony at trial to the allegations contained in

his postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 49. The court looked at the defendant’s testimony at trial that he

fabricated his statement because he wanted to appease the detectives and assistant state’s attorney

because they would not accept his version of events, and not because anyone threatened him to

make his statement. However, the defendant alleged in his postconviction petition that he was

choked until he passed out, urinated on himself, and had his pinky nail split open and a gun put to

his head during the interrogation. After detailing the distinction between the two claims, our

supreme court held, “[b]ecause defendant’s allegations of police coercion are directly contradicted

by his sworn trial testimony, defendant failed to make a showing of prejudice, and the appellate

-22-
 1-22-0833

court correctly affirmed the circuit court’s judgment denying leave to file the second successive

petition.” Id.

¶ 74 Here, defendant did not testify at the hearing on his motion to suppress or at trial. During the

hearing on the motion to suppress, upon questioning from the trial court, defendant stated that he

did not wish to testify on his own behalf. Before the hearing commenced, he was sworn to accuracy

of the facts contained in his motion by the trial court. In his motion, he alleged that his statements

were obtained by “physical coercion illegally directed against the defendant” including: (1) he was

deprived of food and sleep for two days; (2) he was verbally threatened repeatedly by various

detectives; (3) he was thrown to the ground at his place of employment; and (4) a “short white”

detective threw him against the wall, injuring his thumb, and punched him in the chest and stomach

several times. He did not specifically identify in his motion what conduct was allegedly committed

by Detective Halloran. In sharp contrast, defendant alleged in his postconviction petition that

Detective Halloran “viciously and repeatedly choked and threatened to continue to doing physical

harm to him…” Defendant’s allegations in his postconviction petition contradict the allegations

he swore to during the hearing on his motion. Consequently, following Blalock, we find that

defendant failed to make a showing of prejudice, and the circuit court’s decision to deny defendant

leave to file his sixth successive petition should be affirmed.

¶ 75 Defendant argues that his petition is not contradicted by the trial record because the defendant

in Blalock relied upon trial testimony, and, here, the evidence was the contents of defendant’s

motion, which he was sworn to prior to the start of the hearing. In other words, defendant suggests

that when the evidence is in the form of the contents of the defendant’s motion, which defendant

is sworn to, as opposed to sworn testimony, it does not provide grounds for us to find that his

petition was directly contradicted by the trial record. Obviously, the trial record consists of several

-23-
 1-22-0833

different forms of proof, including trial testimony as well as written documentation. He does not

provide us with any caselaw suggesting that a court cannot consider evidence from the contents of

a motion filed by the defendant and sworn to by defendant, as opposed to trial testimony.

¶ 76 Defendant further relies upon our supreme court’s discussion in People v. Robinson, 2020 IL

123849, regarding what constitutes evidence that is “positively rebutted” by the record. Defendant

argues that, in Robinson, our supreme court “distinguished post-conviction claims that contradict

the trial record from those that are ‘positively rebutted’ by the record.” He cites to the language in

Robinson court that a postconviction claim is positively rebutted by the record only if it is “clear

from the trial record that no fact finder could ever accept the truth of that evidence, such as where

it is affirmatively and uncontestably demonstrated to be false or impossible…” Id. ¶ 60. In doing

so, he suggests that in this case,“[a]t most, there are contradictions between the trial record and the

claims in the petition, which should be resolved at an evidentiary hearing.”

¶ 77 However, the difference between Robinson and the facts of this case revolves around what

kind of trial evidence is being considered. In Robinson, our supreme court considered whether the

contents of the supporting affidavits of newly discovered witnesses contradicted with the evidence

presented by the prosecution witnesses at defendant’s trial. Id. ¶ 57. Here, in sharp contrast, we

are comparing the defendant’s own allegations in his pre-trial motion seeking to suppress his

handwritten statements to defendant’s own allegations in his postconviction petition. Notably, our

supreme court made a similar comparison in Blalock when it compared defendant’s prior trial

testimony with the allegations in his postconviction petition. Blalock, 2022 IL 126682 ¶ 49.

¶ 78 We are aware of the TIRC findings against Detective Halloran and are troubled by his

involvement in this case, but defendant has significantly changed his version of abuse. As a result,

we cannot conclude on this record that he has established prejudice. Thus, because defendant’s

-24-
 1-22-0833

allegations of police coercion are directly contradicted by the trial record, defendant failed to make

a showing of prejudice, and we affirm the circuit court’s judgment denying him leave to file his

sixth successive postconviction petition.

¶ 79 C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

¶ 80 Defendant contends that the circuit court erred in denying him leave to file his sixth successive

postconviction petition where he established cause and prejudice for his claim that his trial counsel

was ineffective for not investigating and supporting the claim that defendant’s statements were

coerced with evidence that Detective Halloran had been involved in the systemic abuse of suspects.

In turn, the State argues that the circuit court properly denied him leave to file his claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel because defendant could not establish cause and prejudice.

Again, because we find that defendant cannot establish prejudice, we do not need to address

whether he established cause. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 32 (“[B]oth prongs

must be met before leave to file a successive petition will be granted.”).

¶ 81 In particular, the arguments by both parties, in part, relate to whether this type of evidence

was available to defense counsel at the time that this case was pending at the trial level. The hearing

on defendant’s motion to suppress was held in March of 2000, and his trial commenced in August

of 2002. Relying upon an article discussed in People v. Peoples, 2020 IL App (1st) 161068-U,

defendant contends that his defense counsel should have supported his motion to suppress with

allegations against Detective Halloran because “by the late 1970’s to early 1980’s, torture by

Chicago police officers was common knowledge in Cook County Criminal Courts.” The State

argues that the courts have already determined that it is not unreasonable for trial counsel to fail to

investigate claims of police coercion in other cases and to present this testimony at trial.

-25-
 1-22-0833

¶ 82 The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective assistance

counsel. Thus, where a criminal defendant is convicted of an offense but did not receive

constitutionally adequate representation, he can seek relief to vindicate his constitutional right to

counsel. People v. Burnett, 385 Ill.App.3d 610, 614 (1st Dist. 2008). Under the Strickland standard,

“[t]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that

counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.”

People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 11746, ¶ 23 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

Specifically, the defendant must demonstrate “that counsel’s performance was objectively

unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36. When reviewing

a ruling on a motion to suppress, overcoming Strickland’s prejudice prong requires the defendant

to show a reasonable probability that: (1) the suppression motion would have been granted; and

(2) the trial outcome would have been different if the evidence had been suppressed.” People v.

Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 81 (citing People v. Bew, 228 Ill.2d 122, 128-29 (2008)). Both

elements of the Strickland test must be met, and we may analyze them in any order. People v.

Kirklin, 2015 IL App (1st) 131420, ¶ 109.

¶ 83 Generally, the decision about what evidence to present is a strategic one. People v. Wilborn,

2011 IL App (1st) 092802, ¶ 79. But “[a]ttorneys have an obligation to explore all readily available

sources of evidence that might benefit their clients.” People v. Morris, 335 Ill.App.3d 70, 79 (1st

Dist. 2002). To this end, counsel has “a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.

And “strategic decisions may be made only after there has been a ‘thorough investigation of law

-26-
 1-22-0833

and facts relevant to plausible options.’” People v. Gibson, 244 Ill.App.3d 700, 703-04 (4th Dist.

1993) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Allegations of prior misconduct by a police officer

may be admissible at trial “to prove intent, plan, motive or a course of conduct of the officer

[citations] or to impeach an officer as a witness based on bias, interest, or motive to testify falsely.”

People v. Porter-Boens, 2013 IL App (1st) 111074, ¶ 11. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate is generally determined by comparing the strength of the trial evidence with

the value of the evidence allegedly not presented at trial. People v. Clark, 2011 IL App (2d)

100188, ¶ 24.

¶ 84 Initially, we note that there is no evidence that trial counsel failed to investigate the

backgrounds of the officers as to whether they had previous complaints against them for coercive

tactics. Assuming arguendo that counsel did unreasonably fail to do so, this failure did not

prejudice defendant. In resolving this issue, we look to cases in which the courts have previously

addressed the availability of evidence, relating to coercive tactics by police detectives.

Consistently, Illinois courts have found that a trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present

evidence of police misconduct in other cases did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

For instance, in People v. Orange, 168 Ill.2d 138, 149 (1995), our supreme court held that the

defendant could not establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate

a claim of police misconduct where “[c]ounsel has only a duty to make reasonable investigations

or to make a reasonable decision which makes particular investigations unnecessary…”

¶ 85 Subsequently, in People v. Deloney, 341 Ill.App.3d 621, 636 (1st Dist. 2003), the court found

that the defendant could not establish prejudice when his trial counsel failed to present evidence

of police abuse. In doing so, the court held:

Even if the evidence [of police abuse] was available at the time of trial, and counsel had
failed to discover it, we do not believe that counsel’s failure to investigate defendant’s

-27-
 1-22-0833

claim of police misconduct failed to meet reasonable professional standards. We accord a
heavy measure of deference to counsel’s decision regarding whether to investigate the
allegations of abuse.

Deloney, 341 Ill.App.3d at 636 (citing Orange, 168 Ill.2d at 149); see also People v. Anderson,

375 Ill.App.3d 121 (1st Dist. 2007) (trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate

claims of police misconduct at Area 2).

¶ 86 The State specifically relies on People v. Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, in which the

defendant alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to corroborate his claim of police

misconduct with evidence that the same detective had engaged in a pattern of abusing defendants

into giving confessions. In responding to the prosecution’s argument that the defendant’s claim

was barred by res judicata because the defendant had not established that this evidence was “newly

discovered,” the court held, “[g]iven the sensitive nature of police investigations and the sheer

scale of the criminal justice system, it is unreasonable to expect defense counsel to discover whom

these individual detectives were abusing unless counsel interviewed every suspect who was

detained by them.” Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶ 162 (citing People v. Patterson, 192 Ill.2d

93, 109 (2000) (“beyond interviewing anyone who had ever been a prisoner at Area 2, we can

conceive of no manner in which [defense counsel] reasonably could have obtained this

information.”); People v. Reyes, 369 Ill.App.3d 1, 20 (1st Dist. 2006) (“the various allegations

against [the detective] could have been discovered prior to trial only if defense counsel had

interviewed every person ever detained by [the detective].”) More recently, in People v. Plummer,

2021 IL App (1st) 200299, ¶ 96, the court followed this line of cases when determining that the

TIRC reports for the detective were not discoverable by defense counsel at the time of the

defendant’s trial. Thus, in all of these cases, the courts acknowledged the difficulty faced by

-28-
 1-22-0833

defense counsel in securing evidence of police misconduct in other cases and found this type of

evidence to be newly discovered for purposes of relaxing the doctrine of res judicata.

¶ 87 While, in these cases, the issue of whether the defense counsel could have discovered this

information at the time of trial was considered in the context of determining the applicability of

res judicata, we find that this determination provides guidance for us in determining whether trial

counsel is ineffective. Moreover, defendant distinguishes Tyler on the grounds that it was decided

at the second stage of postconviction proceedings in which the defendant has a higher burden of

making a substantial showing. We acknowledge this distinction but recognize that we should deny

leave to file a successive postconviction where “it is clear, from a review of the successive petition

and the documentation submitted by the petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petition fail as a

matter of law or where the successive petition with supporting documentation is insufficient to

justify further proceedings. [Citations]” People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. Here, from the

documentation submitted by defendant, and the pertinent caselaw, it is clear that defendant’s claim

falls as a matter of law. Trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present evidence of police

misconduct in other cases did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel did not fall below an

objective standard of reasonableness. As a result, we find that defendant cannot establish that his

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and corroborate his claim of police coercion

and abuse where courts have previously determined that it is unreasonable to expect defense

counsel to discover whom these individual detectives were abusing in other cases in order to

present that evidence at trial.

¶ 88 CONCLUSION

¶ 89 For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s decision to deny defendant leave

to file his sixth successive postconviction petition.

-29-
 1-22-0833

¶ 90 Affirmed.

-30-